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  i 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The study seeks to clarify why donors such as the World Bank still insist on the use 
of their financial management system rather than the recipient country‟s financial 
management system, despite the intention under the Paris Declaration 2005 to use 
the respective government‟s systems.  The study then explores the reasons why the 
financial management system used by the World Bank is more effective in managing 
risks related to public financial management and aid as compared to the Government 
of Malaysia approach. The study compares financial management by the World 
Bank and Ministry of Education, Government of Malaysia, in their parallel 
implementation of Educational Sector Support Projects (ESSP) under the Eighth 
Malaysian Plan, 2001-2005.  The quality of financial management of projects in two 
systems is compared using established criteria of good financial management 
practice. Findings are based on evidence from interviews, documentation and direct 
observations. The study demonstrates the significant roles in reducing risks played in 
the World Bank approach by the Project Management Reports (PMR), the high 
quality of Project Implementation Unit (PIU) staff and the better procurement 
procedures. The implication is that more effective risk management and financial 
management reporting were needed by the Ministry of Education in implementing 
the ESSP under the Eighth Malaysian Plan 2001 - 2005.  
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PART 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Part 1 of this study contains five chapters. It addresses the Introduction of this study 
in Chapter 1. In Chapter 2, it explores the existing state of knowledge on the nature 
of problems in public financial management and aid. Later in Chapter 3, we(I) 
discuss the definition, nature and concept of risk management related to public 
sector. In Chapter 4 it will discussed on the analytical framework, and finally the 
research methodology in Chapter 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
An effective financial management system in the public sector is crucial in reducing 
the risks of mismanagement of fund such as fraud and corruption that have impact on 
the service delivery. Reforms to improve performance, control and accountability of 
financial management systems have been widely recommended e.g. by OECD 
(Kickert, 1997: 733; cited in Ocampo, 2000).  In the case of Malaysia, reforms 
related to public expenditure management firstly took place in 1969 with the change 
to the programme, performance budgeting system (PPBS) from the traditional line-
budgeting system, and later to the Modified Budgeting System (MBS) in 1989. The 
reforms also included the introduction of the Micro Accounting System (MAS) in 
1992, which is similar to Activity Based Costing.  The objectives of the reforms 
were set out in the Seventh Malaysian Plan and Eighth Malaysian Plan which stated: 
“effective financial management will be given further emphasis to ensure greater 
accountability in the management of public funds and improve financial discipline at 
every level of Governments” (Economic Planning Unit, 1991; cited in Salleh 2007).  
 
However, Siddiquee (2006) notes that the MBS has yet to significantly improve due 
to the various weaknesses and deficiencies as highlighted by the Auditor General of 
Malaysia in the Auditor General Annual Report. The annual Audit Reports have 
revealed much failure of government bodies to comply with the rules and 
  2 
regulations, as well as loss and embezzlement of public funds, and improper 
monitoring and supervision.    
 
 Therefore, this thesis seeks to address the issues related to the implementation of an 
effective financial management system in managing risks in Malaysia. This thesis is 
based on the researcher‟s experience on secondment as the Project Accountant and a 
team member of the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) in the World Bank 
Education Sector Support Projects (ESSP) under the Eighth Malaysian Plan.  The 
appointment as the Project Accountant was based on the researcher‟s academic and 
professional qualification as a Chartered Accountant registered with the Malaysian 
Institute of Accountants. This research was strongly supported by the Ministry of 
Education, Malaysia, and the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) of the Prime Minister 
Department of Malaysia when it was proposed by the researcher. The motivation to 
proceed with this research lies behind the identification of the factors which 
contributed to the success of the World Bank approach in implementing projects in 
the ESSP as compared to the Government of Malaysia (GoM) approach.  
 
This thesis focuses on the problems raised in Malaysia‟s parliament (2005) and by 
the Auditor General of Malaysia (2006) regarding bad cash management, as 
exemplified in the implementation of the educational sector support projects (ESSP) 
in the Eighth Malaysian Plan. The reference is particularly to the projects financed 
and implemented by Government of Malaysia, as compared to similar ESSP projects 
using the World Bank approach. The Auditor General‟s Annual Report (2006) 
highlighted the weakness of public financial management (PFM) in Malaysia, as 
common in lower and middle income countries. The problem is widely recognized in 
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the literature on PFM and aid management (e.g. Schick, Brooke, Pretarious and 
Youker). Various tools to measure and improve PFM have been developed, notably 
the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) and fiduciary 
assessments e.g. by Department for International Development of UK (DFID) for 
managing fiduciary risk on financial aid. 
 
This study sets out to establish whether reform of domestic public financial 
management (PFM) can learn from project implementation unit (PIU) management 
of risk in the case of education infrastructure investment projects in Malaysia. It 
develops and applies a framework of criteria for good financial risk management to 
invest in educational infrastructure separately managed by government systems and 
by World Bank in Malaysia in the Eighth Malaysian Plan period. 
 
This research is needed because the means for improving PFM is not well 
understood. Furthermore, international aid is ambiguous regarding Project 
Implementation Units (PIUs). On the one hand, the aid management reform agenda 
(see Paris Declaration, 2005) wants to get rid of PIUs since they are alleged to 
reduce country ownership by by-passing government systems. Simeltanously, donors 
still want to use PIUs because country financial management systems are not trusted. 
For instance, most opinions at a meeting of task managers in World Bank (2008) 
agreed that using PIUs reduces the risks that their funds are mismanaged.
1
  Can the 
efforts for reforming the government systems regarding finance management of 
projects learn from the management methods of PIUs? in particular, the way they 
manage risks. These are the questions which this research seeks to answer. 
                                                 
1
  Brown Bag Lunch Meeting held in Washington D.C. on 15
th
 February, 2006 hosted by WBI‟s 
Capacity Development Unit and OPCS. 
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Firstly, this chapter identifies and discusses the problem and its context.  At the 
second stage, it explains the motivation as well as focus of the study. The third issue 
is to it elaborates the research objectives, research questions and hypotheses, 
research methodology and approaches, and the relevance of the study. Finally, it 
outlines the structure of the study.   
 
1.2 Problem and its Context 
 
Managing public financial management system in an effective manner is the key in 
public finance. This is because it involves major sums of money collected from 
various sources through taxation incomes, grants and loans either from the public or 
even external sources such as donors like the World Bank and DFID. The funds 
collected will then need to be spent wisely and accordingly based on what being 
planned in the budgetary processes. Campos, and Phadhan (1996), stated that a good 
public expenditure management should consists of three key objectives namely, 
fiscal discipline (expenditure control); allocation of resources consistent with policy 
priorities (“strategic” allocation); and good operational management. 
Unfortunately, there are many issues and problems related to public funds such as 
over-spending, under-utilized and unauthorized expenditures which have been raised 
while contributing to the risks of public funds. The risks that had lead to the 
mismanagement of fund influenced the service delivery while it failed to achieve its 
main objectives by the government entities or bodies accountable for it. The issues 
  5 
were seriously discussed at both national and international level that had shown how 
weak the implementations of the financial management systems for government 
bodies or countries were. The condition will even get worse when it leads to the 
practicing of fraud and corruption without realizing it.  
 
The weaknesses that had been identified by the World Bank (1998) in resource 
allocation and had been used that undermine public sector performance included 
poor expenditure controls; inadequate funding for operations and maintenance; little 
relationship between the budget as formulated and the budget as executed; poor cash 
management; inadequate reporting for financial performance; and poor cash 
management. All the weaknesses were in relation to the financial management 
systems of the country.  Furthermore, according to Schick (World Bank, 1998), the 
central budget agencies have to take the lead in putting the basics in places to support 
all three functions of the budget which are control of public resources, plan for future 
resource allocation and management of resources. 
 
For instance, in the case for Aid Effectiveness, as in a study by Brooke (2003) 
confirmed that most countries that requested for funding from international 
organizations were countries that had poor financial management systems. Brooke 
(2003) added that in order to overcome the weaknesses in the country‟s financial 
management systems, the development agencies typically require governments to 
take measures to reduce the likelihood of fund being wasted or misappropriated in 
both the short and long terms. This also included the additional measures or parallel 
systems that may only apply to donor funds.   
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This is supported by Caiden (1980) that stated „not surprisingly, countries heavily 
dependent on aid are more likely to have weak PEM‟.  Caiden added that major 
problems emerge from priorities (not only between a donor and a country, but 
between donors and the poor coverage of aid funding in the budget.  The weaknesses 
are not newly discovered. In 1980, Caiden wrote: “If ever there was a subject who 
has been overwritten, overanalyzed and overtheorized with so little practical result to 
show for the effort, it is budgeting in poor countries.”  
 
On the other hand, poor aid management also signals a weak PEM system. For 
instance, in the report by the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts 
(2008) on its Twenty-seventh Report of Session 2007-08 (HC395) on DFID: 
Providing budget support to developing countries. The report stated although DFID 
assesses weaknesses in financial systems of a country it rarely estimates the 
associated risks of corruption or waste of UK funds. Furthermore, DFID‟s 
monitoring has basic weaknesses in specifying suitable indicators and tracking 
progress against objectives (HC 395, pg. 3).  
 
The weaknesses identified and stated above were due to the risks that can be 
associated with the country financial management systems. Among the risks 
associated to public financial management or public expenditure management are 
listed in the “PESTLE” (Political Economic Social Technical Legal Environmental) 
Model in the Government Strategy Survival Guides by the HM Treasury UK (2004) 
as well as by the Canadian Treasury. In addition, risks such as fiduciary risk, 
development risk and reputation risk are been identified as risks that contributed to 
how effective were the fund provided for aid effectiveness (Allen, Campo and 
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Garrity, 2004) and Ford (2005).  This is because risks such as fiduciary risk can lead 
to corruption and fraud which consequently become a major drain on the effective 
use of resources in the public sector.  
 
As an example, relevant to this case study in the educational sector, research 
suggests that in some countries as much as 80 percent of the total funds allocated to 
schools by education ministries were lost to “leakage”. These dramatic losses add 
weight to the question of “How can corruption be uncovered and what strategies 
exist to fight it?” .This is supported in the studies on corruption and fraud in the 
educational sector by Hallak and Poisson (2002) and Ochse (2004). In Hallak and 
Poisson study at the International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP), they had 
identifies 10 main areas in which malpractice occurs. Whereas, in the study by 
Ochse, the German Cooperation (GTZ) has suggested various measures to prevent 
corruption in the educational sector that include in the areas of personnel, financial 
management and procurement systems. In the case of an infrastructure projects, 
Baldry (1997) and Beest (2003) also suggested that the government had to face a lot 
of challenges in facing risks through out the project cycle such as officials‟ attitudes.   
 
Many literatures both academic and non-academic, suggested the importance of 
effective financial management systems as a management control tools in mitigating 
risks related to public financial management or public expenditure management. This 
is also supported by CIPFA (2001) and the Strategy Unit‟s of the HM Treasury 
(2002) that had recommended that effective Risk Management (RM) systems, 
including Internal Control (IC) be included so as to ensure public funds are 
safeguarded and used in accordance with statute.  
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The significance of financial management is supported by CIMA (2003) too which 
noted recent cases of corporate failure, which underlines the importance of 
performance reporting – „an area that many firms assume is simple but find hard to 
get right‟.  A good financial monitoring and forecasting system enables the 
management of an organisation to consider its financial performance and forecasting 
for a given period, identifying variances and trends. This enables corrective actions 
to be taken to manage unfavourable variances or for favourable variances to be 
applied to corporate priorities.  The need for good financial management reporting 
that can reduces the risk in managing public fund was also described by a study  
carried out by Drebin, Chan & Ferguson (1981) on “Objectives of Accounting and 
Financial Reporting for Government Units” that had identified five basic objectives 
which are as follows: 
 
1.  To provide financial information useful for determining and predicting the flows, 
balances and requirements of short-term financial resources of the governmental 
unit. 
 
2. To provide financial information useful for determining and predicting the 
economic condition of the governmental unit and changes therein. 
 
3.  To provide financial information useful for monitoring performance under terms 
of legal, contractual and fiduciary requirements. 
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4.  To provide information useful for planning and budgeting, and for predicting the 
impact of the acquisition and allocation of resources on the achievement of 
operational objectives. 
 
5.  To provide information useful for evaluating managerial and organisational 
performance. 
 
Other related reporting worth noted are the joint study on the “World Class of 
Financial Management for Public Sector” by the Audit commission of the HM 
Treasury UK and PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2004) and also the “Financial 
Management Capacity Model” by the Auditor General of Canada (1999) which 
described the importance of financial management as a new approach in managing 
risks related to public expenditure management.   
 
Furthermore, in the case of Aid Effectiveness, the World Bank (1998) stated that 
their financial management system that consists of the project or financial 
management report and other bank conditions are part of the Bank internal control 
systems in managing risk in their respective projects. Among the conditions related 
to how the project should be managed or implemented includes the setting of the 
project implementation unit. The project implementation unit (PIU) responsibilities 
are to oversee or to monitor as well as to evaluate the project both financially and 
physically. Other than that, it also emphasized on the procurements procedures and 
financial reports that generate both financial and non-financial data and information. 
According to the World Bank, the need for good financial management is essential 
for Bank-financed projects. It is more than an administrative and control process. 
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Sound financial management is a critical ingredient of project success. Timely and 
relevant financial information provides a basis for better decisions, thus speeding the 
physical progress of the project and the availability of funds, as well as reducing 
delays and bottlenecks.  This is why Bank policy and procedures require good 
financial management in Bank-funded projects. Sound project financial management 
provides: 
 
1. Essential information needed by those who manage, implement and supervise 
the projects, including government oversight agencies and financing 
institutions; 
 
2. The comfort needed by the borrower country, lenders and donor community 
that funds have been used efficiently and for the purposes intended; and 
 
3. A deterrent to fraud and corruption, since it provides internal controls and the 
ability to quickly identify unusual occurrences and deviations. 
 
Furthermore, the World Bank also claimed that the PMRs/FMRs implemented to all 
it project-financed initiatives effective 1998, which is a departure from its previous 
method of reporting known as Statement of Expenditure (SOE) as one of the ways 
that the Bank managed its risks such as the risks of corruption and fraud. This is 
another step taken by the Bank in strengthening its financial management systems.  
 
Therefore, strengthening financial management systems among participating 
countries of the Paris Declaration is one of the key issues that were highly debated. 
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This move is proposed as a mitigating factor to reduce the lack of confident of 
donors that had put various pre-conditions in their respective budget supports. With 
the improvement of the country financial management systems, the Donors had no 
reasons to include any pre-conditions in the future for its budget supports. The 
intention of pre-conditions is to avoid risks that the allocation of funds will be 
mismanagement. This includes the alignment of how the projects should be 
implemented. A strong financial management systems emphasis on the 
implementation of the projects as well as financial reporting and monitoring are part 
of the rationale of the Paris Declaration objectives. Furthermore, a financial 
management reports that can produce both financial and non-financial information 
are really useful for performance evaluation and better decision-making. The 
transparency of financial management systems will lead to the confident of Donors, 
for instance, in providing more funds to those countries that required it.  
 
The above issues on how public expenditure is being managed have also been 
highlighted by various international bodies other than the World Bank. In the Paris 
Declaration 2005 (OECD, 2006), there were various measures carried out in order to 
achieve their objectives by 2020.  
 
For instance, the aspect of public financial management is stated in one of the Paris 
Declaration Indicator 2 in Building Reliable Country Systems. In each case, the 
focus will be on the degree to which existing systems adhere to broadly accepted 
good practices or there is a reform programme in place to promote improved 
practices. The survey returns, CDF Progress Report and AER country profiles 
contain some information of the improvement of country procurement systems, and 
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this is reflected in the country chapters.  However, no systematic and quantified 
assessments of procurement-system quality are available at this point. Therefore, this 
overview focuses on public financial management (PFM). 
 
Furthermore, the assessment of PFM systems as in the Indicator 13 which is based 
on a component of the World Bank‟s CPIA is a measure of the quality of a country‟s 
budget and financial management system. It assesses the degree to which the 
country‟s arrangements include a comprehensive and credible budget linked to 
policy priorities; effective financial management systems for budget expenditure and 
budget revenues; timely and accurate fiscal reporting; and clear and balanced 
assignment of expenditures and revenues to each level of government. 
 
Based on the World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), 
2005, out of 29 countries about 69% of the countries are within moderately weak and 
moderately strong categories that is between a score range of 2.0 to 3.5.  The Paris 
Declaration target is that half of partner countries should be able to move up at least 
half a point by 2010. In this study too, the main requirement is not technical but a 
significant political will that lie behind most successful efforts to improve the PFM 
systems.  
 
According to Youker (1999), among the factors that were reported as problems in the 
evaluation for all projects financed by the World Bank  are lack of detailed, realistic, 
and current project plans (schedule, budget, procurement), unclear lines of authority 
and responsibility (organization not structured for project management), lack of 
adequate resources, poor or no analysis of major risk factors; and delays caused by 
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bureaucratic administrative systems (approvals, procurement, personnel, land 
acquisition, and release of funds). 
 
1.3 Motivation and Focus of the study 
 
The issues have been discussed earlier by the international bodies on poor 
management of public fund has also been brought up to the attention of the general 
public in Malaysia. For instance, the fiscal year of 2004 was a great challenge to the 
education sector especially to the Ministry of Education, Malaysia with a lot of 
infrastructural projects failed to complete as per schedule, abandoned and even had 
to postpone. This included building safety issues and spiralling project costs in the 
Educational Sector Support Projects (ESSP). Subsequently, this development had 
caused a lack of public confidence towards the management of public funds. Most of 
the setback were due to shortage of funds, delay in payments to the contractors and 
suppliers, cost overruns of certain projects, and also the delays and failures in 
supplying quality equipment to the respective schools and institutions even though 
the personnel involved in managing the projects were selected staffs appointed 
through the Department of Public Services of the Prime Minister Department.  These 
events had dealt a great blow to the Government of Malaysia (GOM); especially to 
the Ministry of Education (MOE) that eventually lead to the Parliament of Malaysia 
insistence that cabinet ministers investigate the many delays in the development of 
civil works project and procurement of equipment.  
Furthermore, the issues highlighted by the press involving the collapse of school 
buildings after its handing over also demanded investigation which was subsequently 
carried out later.  These issues have emerged due to an overall poor project 
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management which can be seen at its initial stage of implementation. This shows that 
the implementers, especially the MOE is less aware of the inherent risks involved in 
project implementation that eventually posed itself as a great challenge not only to 
the MOE but also to the GOM as well as the Malaysian public. These issues were 
more critical since most project failures involved those project financed by domestic 
financing as compared to the same project being funded under the World Bank 
(World Bank, 2005) or Asian Development Bank under the 8
th
 Malaysian Plan.  
 
Issues of bad cash management are still being raised every year by the Auditor-
General of Malaysia. In the last Auditor-General‟s Report for the fiscal year 2007, 
the same issues were raised again which stated that the budget monitoring systems 
were not up to expectations and thus resulting in some ministries and departments 
overspending. Some even spent without proper allocations; some spent less than 50 
per cent of their budgets and some did not spend for the purpose the budgets were 
approved for. According to the report, the factors that had caused were in part due to 
poor „Vote Book‟ keeping and failure of the warrant holder to submit complete 
monthly expenditure returns to the relevant officer. Most of the monthly expenditure 
reports produced by the accountant-general did not tally with the records in the Vote 
Book.  
 
Furthermore, the Auditor-General of Malaysia, Tan Sri Ambrin Buang said “four 
ministries spent about RM 34 million on eight projects which were not allocated for. 
Among the ministries was the Education Ministry which spent RM32 million on 
three projects. There are 13 ministries/departments which overspent by RM450 
million on 29 projects.  According to the report, there were 15 
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ministries/departments which received re-allocations amounting to more than RM60 
million for 18 projects but did not spend a single cent. The actual expenditure was 
also less than the original allocation that was approved. The 2007 Treasury Circular 
and General Circular stated that expenditure for projects could not exceed the 
estimated or ceiling price of the project except with the approval of the Treasury and 
the Economic Planning Unit. But despite these warnings, 63 projects were carried 
out by 17 ministries/departments that have exceeded the estimates under the 9
th
 
Malaysian Plan by more than RM970 million. In addition, 13 projects carried out by 
nine ministries/departments have exceeded the ceiling price estimate by more than 
RM440 billion, led by the Treasury Department itself. Finally, the Auditor-General 
Tan Sri Ambrin Buang added that, “development expenditure which does not 
comply with the rules can be avoided if the central agency constantly monitors the 
money spent on projects so it doesn‟t exceed the estimates” (NST, 2008). 
 
The above statements from the Auditor-General have shown how critical and how 
risky funds are being managed by most government ministries and departments 
every year with similar implications for Domestic financing. This developments had 
put public funds at a higher risks level and thus there is a dire need to mitigate them 
in the most effective and efficient manner in order to reduce the level of risk and to 
bring back public confidence.  But questions still persists to develop projects such as, 
“Can the risks of public expenditure management be reduced if there was an 
awareness of the risks which had caused the government millions of dollars be 
saved?; Are there a variable current standard procedures with regard to procurement 
on development projects; and is the existing financial management reporting 
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currently implemented as a management control tools sufficient in managing the 
risks in public expenditure management?” 
 
Furthermore, the issues highlighted by the Auditor-General of Malaysia and the 
Prime Minister of Malaysia on financial management reporting that can generate 
useful financial and non-financial information that led to a higher level of 
transparency in reporting, as well as the submission of financial reports by all 
government bodies be considered seriously. 
 
Therefore, this situation warrants a study on the effectiveness of the current financial 
management reporting especially in the management of fund related to the 
procurement of development projects.  This included the issues brought up yearly by 
the Auditor General of Malaysia on failures of most government agencies due to 
among others; bad cash management, and delays in submission of financial reports. 
The emphasis on timely reporting is important and is in line with the calls made by 
the Prime Minister of Malaysia and the Auditor General.  
 
Furthermore, the discussions of related issues on public expenditure management 
debated in the Paris Declaration 2005 and subsequently in 2008 such as the 
objectives in strengthening the country financial management systems accordingly 
by year 2010 by participating countries; and also the claim of the World Bank of the 
effectiveness of their Project Management Reports/Financial Management Reports 
(PMRs/FMRs) in managing risks such as in the case of fraud and corruption, has 
motivated the researcher to proceed with this study. 
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This also included the comments and recommendation of the House of Common UK 
on DFID roles in managing their budget supports projects that lack of monitoring 
device that DFID should learns from other donor experiences (2009).  
 
1.4 Study Objectives, Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
1.4.1. Objectives of the study: 
 
The objective of this thesis is to explore and analyze the effectiveness of financial 
management systems in managing risks on public expenditure management, 
particularly in relation to the project-based ventures between the World Bank 
approach and Domestic approach applicable and implemented in the Educational 
Sector Support Projects (ESSP) in the Eighth Malaysian Plan in Malaysia. The areas 
that will be explored and analyzed based on the problems and issues discussed earlier 
in this study which are financial reporting, procurement and project implementation.  
 
This study also seeks to present a systematic analysis of both financial and non-
financial risks that occur in financing the development of the educational sector or 
the Educational Sector Support Projects (ESSP) in Malaysia under the 8
th
 Malaysian 
Plan. It thus proposes a new approach in financial management reporting model that 
can help improve and reduce the risks related to public expenditure management in 
financing educational projects or programs. The model of financial management 
reporting known as PMRs or FMRs as emphasis and claimed by the World Bank in 
the LACI (World Bank, 1998) are seen as an enabling tool in managing risks related 
to public expenditure management such as corruption and fraud. The PMR or FMR 
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was used in the ESSP during the 8
th
 Malaysian Plan.  Therefore, the study seeks to 
address the following main, sub-objectives and hypotheses, followed by relevant 
research questions. 
 
Main Objective: 
 
Is to identify and investigate why the World Bank project financial management 
systems approach implemented in the ESSP of the 8
th
 Malaysian Plan is more 
effective in managing risks related to public expenditure management as compared 
to the project financial management system approach by domestic financing 
approach.   
 
Sub-Objectives: 
 
1. To identify and to analyze the reasons why the implementation of the World 
Bank project financial management reports or project management reports 
(FMRs/PMRs) is more effective in managing risk such as fraud and corruption 
as claimed by World Bank as compared to the Domestic financing approach.  
 
2. To identify and to analyze what and why are the additional conditions and 
procedures are as part of the project financial management systems emphasized 
by the World Bank rather than using the country financial management system 
under the 8
th
 Malaysian Plan for the ESSP.  
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3.    To identify and to analyze factors that had contributed to the performance of the 
World Bank financing in the ESSP. 
 
4. To identify and to analyze the risk factors that had caused failures or poor 
performance of most domestic financing projects for the ESSP under the 8
th
 
Malaysian Plan as compared to the World Bank approach. 
 
1.4.2. Research Questions: 
 
Therefore, in order to achieve the above main and sub-objectives, the following 
research questions are relevant to this study as guidelines to the researcher. The 
research questions are: 
 
1. What and why are the financial management systems implemented in the 
World Bank approach more effective in managing risks as compared to the 
country financial managements in the Government of Malaysia approach for 
the ESSP in the 8
th
 Malaysian Plan? 
 
2. What and why the World Bank PMR or FMR implemented in the ESSP 
effective in managing risks as compared to the domestic financing? 
 
3. Are the additional conditions which are part of the project financial 
management system imposed by the World Bank effective in risk reduction 
as compared to domestic financing? 
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4. What are the other factors that had contributed to the performance of World 
Bank approach as compared to Domestic approach for the ESSP under the 8
th
 
Malaysian Plan? 
 
5. What are the perceptions of the risk factors that had contributed to the poor 
performance of the domestic financing ESSP in the 8
th
 Malaysian Plan? 
 
Furthermore, in supporting the above objectives, the study also tries to address the 
following hypotheses. 
 
1.4.3. Hypotheses: 
 
1. The World Bank Project Financial Management Report (PMRs/FMRs) 
approach is more effective in managing risks related to public expenditure 
management as compared to the domestic financing of the ESSP in Malaysia 
under the 8
th
 Malaysian Plan. 
 
2. The World Bank project financial management systems implemented for the 
ESSP in the 8
th
 Malaysian Plan such as the project implementation unit and 
procurement procedures were more effective in reducing risks as compared to 
the government or country financial management systems. 
 
3. The lack of competency in risk management among those involved in the 
ESSP had resulted in a poor performance in managing public fund 
effectively, efficiently and economically in the domestic financing. 
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1.5   Research Methodology 
 
The study uses qualitative research methods, though quantitative data are drawn 
upon in the analyses (especially of level and perception of associated risks as the 
factors contributed to the poor performance of Domestic financing). As this study is 
a case study approach, the main techniques used for data collection and analyses 
were semi-structured and in-depth interviews, direct observations and documentary 
analysis, supplemented by newspapers and analysis of secondary sources. The 
purpose of using case study approach is because it allows the researcher to deal with 
a wide variety of evidences from different sources (Yin, 1989) and was deemed to be 
the most suitable in dealing with the issues related to this study. Fieldwork was 
carried out in Malaysia in Mid-May until Mid-August 2007. 
 
1.6  Relevance of the Study 
 
The intention of this study is that the research findings will serve as a guide to future 
project managers in terms of the best practices involved in managing public funds 
and managing risks in implementing projects in the future. 
 
The research findings could assist in developing an awareness of officials involved 
in managing their respective development projects and procurement of goods and 
services in the future.  This would generate a higher level of public confidence 
towards public organization due to their transparency in managing risk. 
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The researcher believes that the findings could be useful to the administrators within 
the MOE divisions or other government agencies in Malaysia as well as for other 
countries for further study in designing and implementing appropriate strategies 
recommended for future transactions in the most economically, efficiently and 
effectively.  
 
The scope of the study is limited to the Ministry of Education, Malaysia.  Since the 
matter at hand attracts international interests, the researcher expects a challenging 
task ahead in further developing this study in the near future. 
 
1.7 Structure of the Study 
 
This thesis consists of three parts. Part I consists of Chapter 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. Chapter 
1 provides the introduction to the thesis. In chapter 2, focuses on discussions relating 
to the problems of public financial management and aid effectiveness. Chapter 3 will 
discuss on the associated risks and the management of risks in the public sector that 
is relevant to this study. The discussions will shift its focuses in Chapter 4 on 
discussing the financial management approaches in mitigating risks related to public 
financial management and aid effectiveness and the analytical framework for this 
research study. This will include discussions on the different models and strategies in 
managing risks on both financial and non-financial aspects. It will also highlight the 
underlying theories and studies on the issues of implementation of the World Bank 
conditions and procedures in managing risks in public expenditure management and 
service delivery. 
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The final chapter of Part I, which is Chapter 5 will discuss the research methodology 
of the study. In this chapter, discussions on data collections as well as the analysis 
and various sources of evidences were presented in support of this study. 
 
Part II of the study consists of the three chapters. The chapters discuss the empirical 
evidences and analyses as in Chapter 6, 7 and 8. Chapter 6, focuses on the findings 
on the claimed made by the World Bank of the PMRs/FMRs effectiveness which 
underlies all its funded-projects after 1998 as a way of effectively managing risks 
related to public expenditure management. In this chapter, it will identify and 
investigate the PMRs or FMRs approach prepared by both „Domestic‟ and „World 
Bank‟ financing and later discuss and provide evidences of the effectiveness of the 
World Bank PMRs or FMRs approach in managing the risks implemented in the 
ESSP.  The findings are backed up with the study by Drebin, Chan & Ferguson 
(1981) on „Objectives of Accounting and Financial Reporting for Government Units‟ 
and “Best Practice of Financial Management” by HM Treasury UK (2004). The 
results also include the impacts based on the evidences from various other related 
sources.  
 
The Chapter 7 discussed the findings related to the World Bank financial 
management systems imposed in the ESSP such as the stipulated additional 
conditions and procedures. The discussions also involved the formation of the 
project implementation unit (PIUs) that managed the ESSP and the procurements 
requirements as well as the used of PMR or FMR for project implementation and 
monitoring. Other factors were also discussed that had contributed to the success of 
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the ESSP under the „World Bank‟ financing as compared to „Domestic‟ financing as 
a mean of reducing risk in managing public fund. 
 
The third chapter, Chapter 8 discusses on the evidence related to risk factors and its 
impact that had caused failures to most Domestic financing of the ESSP. In this 
chapter, it addresses the perception of staff who were involved in this Domestic 
financing infrastructure of the ESSP on matters related or associated to risks based 
on the „PESTLE MODEL‟ as referred to in the Orange Book on Management of 
Risks – Principles and Concepts by the HM Treasury UK (2004) as well as its impact 
of the „Domestic‟ financing. 
 
The final part of this thesis, Part III, which is Chapter 9, will discuss the overall 
arguments, findings and conclusions on the effectiveness of the World Bank 
additional conditions and procedures in managing risks related to public expenditure 
management and service delivery. It also includes the discussion on the implications 
both theoretical and practical, as well as policy and practice that will support the 
study into an acceptable PhD thesis. It also includes the limitations that the 
researcher faced especially during the data collection period.   
 
1.8   Conclusion 
 
The next chapter looks in detail on the nature of the problems in PFM. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Nature of Problems in Public Financial Management (PFM) and Aid 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter we explore the existing state of knowledge relating to problems in 
PFM, it particularly in project management. The concepts and objectives of public 
financial management (PFM) are firstly defined and the nature of the problems 
relating to public financial management and aid effectiveness are discussed, focusing 
on the issues presented and debated in the Paris Declaration 2005 and 2008. The 
conclusion of this chapter will then depict the findings regarding the nature of the 
problems in PFM. 
  
2.2  Concepts and Objectives 
 
2.2.1  Concepts 
 
According to Campo and Tommasi (1999), Public Financial Management (PFM) 
consists of: 
 
(i) Collected resources from the economy, in sufficient and appropriate manner; 
and 
  
(ii) Allocation and use of those resources responsively, efficiently and 
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effectively.‟   
 
Whereas, Public Expenditure Management (PEM) pertains only to (ii) of the above, 
that is, „allocate and use of those resources responsively, efficiently and effectively 
through the instrument of governments policy.  
 
This stand is supported by Allen, Campo and Garrity (2004); Maggi & Hegarty 
(2008) that Public Financial Management (PFM) includes all component of a 
country‟s budget process consisting of both upstream (including strategic planning, 
medium-term expenditure framework, annual budgeting) and downstream 
fundamentals (including revenue management, procurement, control, accounting, 
reporting, monitoring and evaluation, audit and oversight).  Furthermore, Maggi and 
Hegarty (2008) added that „a sound PFM supports aggregate control, prioritization, 
accountability and efficiency in the management of public resources and delivery of 
services, which are critical to the achievement of public policy objectives such as the 
MDGs.‟  
 
PEFA (2005, cited in Pretorius and Pretorius, 2009) identifies the critical dimensions 
of an effective PFM system as:  
 
i. Budget comprehensiveness and transparency;  
ii. Policy based budgeting;  
iii. Predictability and control in budget execution;  
iv. Accounting and reporting: and  
v. External scrutiny and audit.   
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However, Witt and Muller (2006: 30, cited in Pretorius and Pretorius, 2009) 
emphasise on the importance of public finance that “comprises a complex set of 
closely interrelated subsystems (e.g. tax and customs, budgets, expenditure, inter-
governmental finance, parliamentary oversight, internal and external financial 
control).  
 
Therefore, the government is responsible in ensuring that the resources should be 
collected sufficiently and later use effectively, efficiently and responsively in 
practice (ADB, 2004).  As PEM relates to the usage of cash, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) stated that cash planning and management should be kept 
within the budgeted expenditure in cash terms as to avoid borrowing that might 
disrupt monetary polices and to help identify the need for in-year remedial fiscal 
action by the government. 
 
2.2.2  Objectives of PFM  
 
In order to achieve a good PFM rating, the government should strive and ensure that 
the main objectives of efficient, effective and economic utilization of the funds are 
realised. According to Campos and Phadhan (1996), the objectives of PEM that need 
to be achieved are: 
 
i) Fiscal discipline (expenditure control); 
  
ii) Allocation of resources consistent with policy priorities (strategic 
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allocation); and  
 
iii) Good operational management.   
 
As cash planning is important in ensuring that the budget allocation are fully utilized 
and delivered, IMF suggested that both planning and management the budget 
information systems must be comprehensive, timely, accurate, and reliable.  It 
further suggested that in the cash planning stage, the following three main objectives 
must be adhered to: 
 
a) Ensure that expenditure are smoothly financed during the year, so as to 
minimize borrowing costs; 
 
b) Enable the initial budget policy targets, especially the surplus or deficit, 
to be met; and 
 
c) Contribute to the smooth implementation of both fiscal and monetary 
policy. 
 
In addition, the IMF added that problems still arises in the execution of budget 
between payments coming due and the availability of cash necessary to discharge 
due to timing problems even though if the budget is realistic in terms of it being 
well-prepared. 
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Furthermore, Campo and Tommasi (1999) stated that it is necessary to differentiate 
between the expenditure policy question of “what” is to be done, and the expenditure 
management question of “how” it is to be done. This is because the setting of hard 
boundaries between policy and implementation eventually lead to unrealistic 
policies, ad hoc implementation and, over time, both policy and implementation. The 
mechanisms, techniques, skills and data required for good PEM are different from 
those needed to formulate good policy and it is independent of the economic 
orientation, strategic priorities, or policy choices. 
 
In the case of aid effectiveness, OECD (2003) stated that an effective financial 
management of public resources will promote accountability within developing 
countries and provides donors assurance on the use of their funds in achieving the 
objectives of development programmes. OECD added that good financial 
management systems in the partner countries are required for all forms of aid, but are 
particularly important for budget support, where donors did not allocate funds to 
finance specific expenditures.  
 
This stand is supported by DFID (2009) on its budget support which was designed to 
improve aid effectiveness by reinforcing developing countries own policies and 
systems, and at the same time reducing transaction costs.  It also aims to reduce 
poverty by helping the developing countries to fund their own poverty reduction 
strategy. 
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Furthermore, in the Paris Declarations 2005, the donors and partner countries were 
also committed to emphasis in measuring the performance of a country‟s PFM 
systems by: 
 
(a)  Working together to establish mutually agreed frameworks that provide 
reliable assessments of the performance, transparency, and accountability of 
country systems;  
 
(b)  Implementing harmonized diagnostic reviews and performance assessment 
frameworks in public financial management; and  
 
(c)  Integrating the diagnostic reviews and performance assessment frameworks 
into country-led strategies for capacity development.  
 
2.3  Problems related to Public Financial Management and Aid Effectiveness 
 
Studies carried out by researchers such as Thamhain and Wilemon (1986); World 
Bank (1998); and Youker (1999) had acknowledged and agreed that the problems or 
issues of the PEM or PFM were due to weaknesses in allocating the resources. Other  
weaknesses identified include were poor planning; no links between policy-making, 
planning and budgeting; lack or poor controls on expenditure; inadequate funding or 
operations and maintenance; poor cash management; lack or insufficient on reporting 
of financial performance; and poorly motivated staff. These weaknesses were 
considered serious as they involved huge amount of money which come from 
various sources. 
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Another characteristic of weak PEM is the incentive to spend budget allocations as 
soon as possible even though there is no guarantee that the funds appropriated will 
be available in the following year. Perhaps the best indicator of the state of the PEM 
system is the relationship between what is budgeted and what is actually spent at the 
program level. Rather than looking for the problem in budget execution, reformers 
need to look at the relationship between policy-making, planning and budgeting. 
 
Youker (1999) added that additional recurring problems annually identified by the 
World Bank and the host country pertaining to project-financed by the World Bank, 
included the followings: 
 
1) A lack of shared perception and agreement on the objectives of the projects 
by staff and stakeholders; 
 
2) A lack of commitment to the project by the team, management and 
stakeholders; 
 
3) A lack of detailed, realistic, and current project plans (schedule, budget, 
procurement); 
 
4) Unclear lines of authority and responsibility (organisation not structured for 
project management); 
 
5) A lack of adequate resources; 
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6) A poor feedback and control mechanisms for early detection of problems; 
 
7) A poor or no analysis of major risk factors; and  
 
8) Delays caused by bureaucratic administrative systems (approvals, 
procurement, personnel, land acquisition, and release of funds). 
 
Raker et al (2004, cited in Pretorius and Pretorius, 2009) describe the budget process 
as a „theatre‟ that masks the actual distribution of resources and spending patterns. 
This lead to large deviations between budget estimates and actual spending, strong 
systematic biases and large leakages between the centre and frontline (Killick 
(2005), cited in Pretorius and Pretorius, 2009). The reasons given were that: 
 
 i) Accountability institutions were not effective (lack of capacity, time constraints, 
lack of political will, and ineffective parliamentary scrutiny);  
 
ii) Inadequate flow of information (culture of secrecy among officials, lack of timely 
reporting);  
 
iii) Low public awareness (under-developed civil society including independent 
media); and  
 
iv) Donor conditions (budget „ritual‟ maintained to keep the donors happy). 
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The study proposed that PFM reform will only succeed it there is political will to 
drive the reforms, sufficient capacity for long-term sustainability, strengthened 
parliamentary systems, and a civil society to hold the government accountable. In the 
absence of strong political leadership, Hedger and Kizilbash Agha (2007, cited in 
Pretorius and Pretorius, 2009) suggested that politically astute technocrats could take 
centre stage in the reform process. 
 
Furthermore, Brooke (2003) stated that effective systems of public financial 
management and accountability make a critical contribution to the achievement of 
development outcomes. The approach of direct financial transfers into the recipient 
government‟s account, either as grants or as loan had places the emphasis on 
achieving better use of all public resources, not just those funded by development 
agencies. The strongest case for aid instruments such as budgetary support in terms 
of policy objectives such as poverty reduction often occur in countries which have 
weak public financial management systems.  
 
Brooke (2003) proposed a study should be carried out to prepare an inventory of 
short-term remedial measures required by various agencies to address perceived 
weaknesses in public financial management, procurement and financial 
accountability systems, and to evaluate them in terms of their impact in the short-
term and on longer term improvements in government-wide systems.  The study was 
concerned with weaknesses that arise in all parts of the resource management cycle 
and those that are put in place with or without technical assistance.  Therefore, in 
order to reduce the likelihood of funds being wasted or misappropriated, measures 
should be taken by the development agencies that required the government to 
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response to the weaknesses in their public financial management system, both in the 
short and long terms. 
 
Brooke (2003) stated that a number of authors both political scientists and 
development economists have questioned the applicability and usefulness of results-
focused expenditure management in developing countries.  Brooke (2003) argued 
that low standards of financial accountability and programme management within 
the in line government ministries and agencies, poor performance data, the 
weaknesses of parliaments and civil society organisations in holding governments 
accountable for service delivery and patrimonial politics conspire to negate its 
potential advantages.   
 
In 1997, Schick stated that lessons learnt from developing countries that lead to 
budget reform in OECD countries is to “get the basics right” (World Bank, 1998; 
cited in Pretorius and Pretorius, 2009). According to Schick (World Bank, 1998) the 
central budget agencies have to take the lead in putting the basics in place to support 
all three functions of the budget which are controlling public resources, planning for 
future resource allocation and managing the resources. The countries should build 
institutional mechanisms that support as well as demand a performance orientation 
for all dimensions that also included introducing mechanisms to promote 
transparency and accountability. 
 
In addition, Allen Schick (1998) cited in a New Zealand case had the discussion of, 
„informality‟ and unpredictability in the behaviour of public administration militates 
against the adoption of New Zealand style „government by contract‟ in which even 
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the operations of central policy ministries and the headquarters functions of line 
ministries are subject to formal contractual specifications of performance levels 
(outputs). Schick further pointed that low rates of pay in the civil service in 
developing countries, absenteeism and moonlighting, corruption and the evasion of 
rules of conduct, leading to low commitment to official responsibilities. He also 
stated that, „The operation of civil service must first become formal and respective of 
rules of conduct and financial management as a precondition for adopting elements 
of the New Zealand model‟. 
 
The other preconditions proposed by Schick are as followings: 
 
1) Willingness and ability in persuading ministries and agencies to execute 
budgets as voted to control expenditure; 
 
2) Sound financial accountability, the respect of financial management 
procedures and internal financial controls; and 
 
3) The operation of „integrated and centralised [government] departments‟‟. 
 
Furthermore, in a case-study based programme of research in ODI on the 
introduction of effective poverty with the focus of public expenditure plans in a 
sample of five African countries had identified a number of shortcomings in current 
budgetary and public expenditure management practice that requiring „fundamental 
reforms‟ to make results-orientation effective. Among the main problems identified 
in some countries are listed below: 
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1) Budgeting practice at the centre is too haphazard and often behind 
timetable, and, with cash budgeting still practised for macroeconomic 
reasons, resource flows are late and uncertain; 
 
2) These uncertainties are aggravated by (i) the non-consolidation of aid 
receipts into budgets, (ii) unrealistic revenue estimates, (iii) poor cash 
forecasting, and (iv) deficient commitment controls and the accumulation 
of arrears; 
 
3) Financial discipline remains too lax, with too many unsanctioned 
opportunities for the misuse of funds and too much corruption, leading to 
persistent divergence between funds voted and funds actually spent by 
ministries and within programmes; 
 
4) Longer term poverty reduction strategies and medium term resource 
planning are not yet integrated into the preparation of the annual budget, 
leading to inconsistency and incoherence; 
  
5) Performance management – monitoring, evaluation and programme 
review – capacity is low, with limited consultation of and input from civil 
society; 
 
6) Staff commitment at the working level – in administrations and service 
delivery units – is low as a result of imperfectly implemented 
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administrative reforms, inadequate budgets, low pay and unclear 
objectives; 
 
7) The culture of performance assessment is still nascent, and the desire at 
working level to internalise and make use of available qualitative and 
qualitative evidence of performance remains fragile. 
 
Furthermore, poor aid management stated by Caiden (1980) in the earlier chapter, as 
well as the comments made in the reports on DFID weaknesses by the House of 
Commons Committee that DFID should teach (provide a lesson) on how they 
monitor their funds for aid effectiveness by other donors should be seriously 
considered as its related to the public fund of UK being at risks.  
 
Therefore, strengthening the country financial management system plays a 
significant role in reducing the risks in which the funds will be mismanaged. 
Therefore, donors should be rightfully more cautions in ensuring their funds are safe 
and use accordingly.  Measurement mechanism by PEFA and donors such as World 
Bank should be considered. For instance, the weaknesses encountered in the report 
on PFM Performance Measurement by PEFA. The findings from PEFA report on 
Early Experience from Application of the PFM Performance Measurement 
Framework (PEFA, 2006) revealed that „compliance with PEFA methodology for 
indicator scoring and documentation‟ had shown that only 6% scores sufficiently 
supported when the indicator P1-7 on Extent of unreported government operations is 
analysed. The common problems related to this issue were due to lack of the main 
extra-budgetary operations and donor-funded project expenditure data. Furthermore, 
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in D-1 on the „predictability of direct budget support‟ the score was only 20% 
compliancy. This was due to failure to obtain data on donor forecasts, or lack of 
forecasts, with which to calculate deviation of actual disbursements. (PEFA 
Secretariat, 2006: 15). This showed the important reporting played on effective 
financial management in which reliable and timely data can be easily capture and 
analysed. 
 
Therefore, in the debate in the Paris Declaration 2005, there are three main areas on 
financial management systems that attracted the interests of the researcher who are 
working on relevant issues, that is, the study on how and why donors respond to the 
risks on aid effectiveness. The focus of financial management systems on projects in 
this study are financial reporting, project implementation and procurement 
management. 
 
2.3.1.   Issues in Financial Reporting 
 
Financial reporting is important as it reflects what and how the fund had been 
allocated, spent and decision making. Therefore, a good financial reporting should be 
produced in a timely and with reliable flow of information. It is useful for the 
management to look at its financial status and its ability to initiate prompt corrective 
action when the accounting data indicate a significant deviation from the budget. 
Thus an effective financial accounting system plays a vital role on any structure of 
management controls. 
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The need for good financial reporting is supported by a study by Allen and Tommasi 
(2001). They listed that the principles of good reporting should consist of 
completeness, legitimacy, user-friendliness, reliability, relevancy, consistency, 
timelinessness, comparability and usefulness. The need for timely, accurate and 
complete reporting is the basis for two performance indicators in the PEFA 
framework (PEFA 2005). The implicit assumption for non-production of timely 
reports is lack of capacity, but there are no research findings could be found to verify 
this assumption.  
 
The issues related to financial reporting in the public sector such as shifting from 
cash to accrual accounting system as well performance based reporting were also 
discussed. This is because the accrual accounting reporting reflects the real picture of 
the government financial status. For instance, in a study in Australia, the Auditor-
General for Australia, Pat Barrett addressing the CPA Forum 2004 stated that „the 
Australian Public Sector (APS) move from cash to accrual accounting was a 
significant development, not just for accounting systems and financial reporting, but 
also for the way in which resources were being managed and accounted for.‟ Barrett 
also mentioned that the accrual based financial management reform has also been a 
„driver‟ for other key initiatives among them are a shift from input to output based 
budgets and outcomes reporting; the evolution of performance measurement and 
management using the balance score card approach; recognition of the importance of 
ownership and management; and the preparation of the whole of government 
financial statements. 
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The requirements of an effective financial reporting are supported in a study by 
Drebin, Chan and Ferguson (1999) of „Objectives of Accounting and Financial 
Reporting for Government Units‟. According to Drebin, Chan & Ferguson an 
effective financial reporting should achieve the objectives that the information is 
useful for decision making in determining and predicting short-terms financial 
resources; economic conditions; legal contractual and fiduciary requirements; 
budgetary and planning; and finally for organizational and managerial performance. 
 
In order to achieve its main objectives for Aid Effectiveness, the World Bank had 
introduced a financial reporting to all its project-financed effective 1998 known as 
Project Financial Management (PMR) or Financial Management Reports (FMR). 
According to the World Bank (1999), Project financial management is a process 
which brings together planning, budgeting, accounting, financial reporting, internal 
control, auditing, procurement, disbursement and the physical performance of the 
project with the aim of managing project resources properly and achieving the 
project‟s development objectives. A good financial management is a critical 
ingredient for project success. Timely and relevant financial information provides a 
basis for making better decisions, thus speeding the physical progress of the project 
and the availability of funds, and reducing delays and bottlenecks.  This is why the 
Bank policy and procedures require good financial management in Bank-funded 
projects.  A sound project financial management provides: 
 
- Essential information needed by those who manage, implement and supervise 
projects, including government oversight agencies and financing institutions; 
 
  41 
- The comfort needed by the borrower country, lenders and donor community 
that funds have been used efficiently and for the purposes intended; and 
 
- A deterrent to fraud and corruption, since it provides internal controls and the 
ability to quickly identify unusual occurrences and deviations. 
 
The new approach for financial management reporting (PMR) is designed to assist 
borrowers in managing their projects and also to facilitate project monitoring. This is 
because the report is comprehensive that comprises project financial reports, project 
progress reports and project procurement management reports. Three models of the 
PMR have been developed and included in this manual: the cash accounting model; 
the accrual accounting model; and the simplified model for small projects.  
 
The usage of PMR based is also useful in boosting confidence of all donors other 
than the World Bank in case of direct budget support. This is because through the 
PMR, supervision and project management are easier and more effective whenever a 
project is able to produce regular progress reports. It is a common practice that large 
entities reported their progress every week or month. Using annual reports for this 
purpose is quite unrealistic because by the time the information is available; its 
usefulness has long since expired. The typical period for reporting discussed in this 
manual is quarterly. For project managers to be able to consider project progress 
from quarter to quarter, it would be, in most cases, a considerable improvement on 
the current status quo. This is also another financial management tool in managing 
risks related to public funds. 
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Furthermore, in its effort in preventing fraud and corruption under the World Bank 
projects (World Bank 2000), the Board of World Bank had approved the Loan 
Administration Change Initiative (LACI) that introduced the new approach of project 
management reporting (PMR) which was reported to be effective in preventing fraud 
and corruption in World Bank projects because it is “an integrated project 
monitoring system bringing together accounting and financial management, 
disbursement, procurement and contract management, and physical progress. It 
introduces a simplified system of disbursing funds, linking disbursements to project 
progress as reported in quarterly project management reports.”  
 
In addition, the World Bank added that the “Project Management Reports (PMRs) 
prepared under LACI arrangements require for their timely submission an 
appropriate and duly staffed project organization structure and an effective internal 
control environment, including a physical and financial monitoring system. Through 
the latter, project management will compare actual and planned project progress and 
explain any major variations. In addition, the PMR includes a procurement 
management report for monitoring of selected contracts above and below the prior 
review thresholds. It had been observed that in projects already using this 
mechanism, overall control over project activities is significantly enhanced. This also 
helps reduce corruption and fraud.” 
 
2.3.2 Issues in Project Implementation Unit 
 
In order to ensure that the fund provided for aid effectiveness achieve it objectives. A 
project implementation unit (PIUs) also known as Project Management Unit (PMU) 
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is formed. The unit is an internal control system that is responsible in the 
management of the projects both financial and non-financial which included the 
procurement controls (World Bank, Feb.1999, see. Project Financial Management 
Manual – Exposure Draft, Chapter 3). 
 
Project implementation units (PIUs) are separate entities created by the World Bank 
to implement development projects or programmes in developing countries. The 
organisation structure of the PIU is that it is responsible and accountable for 
implementation of the project and reporting of its expenditure and progress at a 
timely manner that adheres to the Bank policies and guidelines (World Bank, 2005). 
It consists of a “small team which functions physically and operationally within the 
line agency responsible for the project, of such a team is given some autonomy and 
separate physical facilities while still being accountable to a ministry” (Boyce and 
Haddad, 2001,7; cited in Ghio, 2008). 
 
There are several types of PIUs. The Guidance Note for Project Management (World 
Bank, 2005) has classified PIUs into five categories: “stand-alone or Parallel”, 
“semi-integrated”, “super-integrated”, “semi-autonomous” and “fully-integrated”.  
The role of PIU is crucial as a mechanism that help ensure the success of project 
implemented. PIUs establish procedures to identify analyze and manage the risks 
that may arise from internal and external sources that may affect the projects. These 
procedures would cover defining, identifying, analyzing and managing risk. It has 
been stated in the World Bank (1999), Project Financial Management Manual on 
„Design and Assessment of Project Financial Management Systems‟. In addition, 
PIU management should develop policies and procedures to ensure that its directives 
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are followed. Among them are appropriate documentation of the policies and 
procedures, covering management of finances, accounting, procurement and 
financial reporting; and also suitable authorization procedures, e.g. for the award of 
contracts by authorized personnel. 
 
The issues discussed in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness adopted at the 
High-Level Forum in March 2005 invited donors to: “avoid to the maximum extent 
possible, creating dedicated structures for day-to-day management and 
implementation of aid-financed projects and programmes”. The issue was to phase 
out ‟Parallel or Stand-alone‟ PIU by 2010 under the Paris Declaration. The reason 
was because Parallel PIUs were mainly costly and unfavourable to the borrowers‟ 
countries. This is further substantiated that ‟Parallel or Stand-alone‟ PIU  as 
according  the World Bank, 2005; cited in Ghio, 2006: 8 is „one of the factors that 
enable PIUs to provide efficiency in project implementation is the difference in 
salaries between the public and private sector in the developing world. A common 
feature in low-income countries is that low salaries in the public sector contribute to 
poor performance in public sector agencies  With the reduction of this parallel PIU, it 
has taken one of the key actions the aid community would take to promote greater 
capacity development within the borrowers, and thus increase aid effectiveness. 
Other than that, “Parallel entities actually tend to undermine established structures, 
and chains of command, and typically divert scarce skilled human resources from 
mainstream administration” (Lopes and Theisohn, 2002, 81; cited in Ghio, 2008, 12). 
  
A Survey on “Strengthening Capacity by avoiding parallel implementation structures 
in the Use of Country PFM Systems” (OECD, 2008) has seen a progression toward 
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strengthening local capacity for planning, implementation, and ongoing 
accountability to a country‟s citizens and parliament. The Indicator 6 is used to 
measure the progress through the reduction in parallel PIUs – those which are 
created outside the existing structures of national implementation agencies.  There is 
strong evidence that parallel PIUs tend to undermine national capacity building 
efforts, distort salaries and generally confuse accountability for development.  This 
indicator measures the total number of parallel PIUs in a single country. It is 
expressed in absolute terms rather than a ratio.  As a result, the number of parallel 
PIUs in a single country needs to be considered against nature and volume of 
development assistance in that country. It is recognized that parallel and integrated 
Project Implementation Units evolve on a continuum and the purpose of this 
indicator is, therefore, to better identify where parallel begins and integrated ends. 
 
In 2005, the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) of ADB had conducted a 
Special Evaluation Study on the Role of Project Implementation Unit to investigate 
the nature of ADB‟s arrangements for PIUs and investigate how much they cost, 
how they function in various agencies and projects that the ADB had deals with, and 
how they are distributed across sectors and countries.  The findings indicated that 
152 out of 263 projects (or about 58%) contacted replied and 90% stated that the 
projects examined were managed by some form of PIU. Almost one sixth of the 
projects used PIUs staffed by the executing/parent agencies themselves, while a third 
used externally recruited staff. The remaining half of the projects, were managed by 
PIUs consisting of a mix of internally deputed and externally hired staff.  
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According to the study, PIUs were found to be primarily used as a mechanism to 
implement projects and to create capital assets, rather than as a tool to build human 
or institutional capacity. The effects of PIUs on capacity development in the parent 
agencies were variable. A risk of separate, externally staffed PIUs undermining the 
agency‟s project management capacity was confirmed. It was also confirmed that 
governments tend to perceive PIUs as a burden. 
 
ADB was committed towards the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of March 
2005 to harmonize project implementation arrangements, minimize the use of 
parallel structures for project implementation, and use joint PIUs with other donor 
agencies where possible. The Chair‟s Summary of the Development Effectiveness 
Committee Discussions recalled that ADB had in 2005 committed to “avoid, to the 
maximum extent possible, creating dedicated structures for day-to-day management 
and implementation of aid-financed projects and programmes” to support the 
strengthening of partner country systems.  But the main conclusion in the studies 
carried out by ADB stated that in the foreseeable future, PIUs shall continue to be a 
generally legitimate and justifiable implementation mechanism for capital 
investment projects. In this study, it was also recommended that if the financing 
modality and government preferences require the establishment of a PIU, ADB 
should encourage the use of PIUs that are staffed internally. The issue highlighted of 
this form of PIU was lack of expertise in management and organisation within the 
government ministries (ADB, 2005). This was among many obstacles of moving 
towards the transition from PIUs to integrated project management within 
government ministries. According to ADB (2005) “Usually missing from the team is 
someone with an MBA or an organizational and change management specialist who 
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can assists the Operations Adviser in the ECA Region. Several staff said they need 
more specific advice on how to handle the complex process of eliminating PIUs. 
They asked for tool kits, increased supervision budgets and stronger support from the 
management. 
 
Furthermore, there were mixed-opinions among staff of the World Bank on the 
issues of PIU. For instance, in the argument of the importance of PIUs role was 
discussed in the Brown Bag Lunch (BBL) held by the World Bank (2006) attended 
by 100 Bank staff.  The staffs argued that PIU are driven largely by the need to 
mitigate risks in weak capacity environments but it can also reflect internal 
incentives such as speed of project processing and disbursement. Many regard PIUs 
as „special cells‟ that are created to implement projects by sometimes by passing 
local bureaucracies to get the job done. This also includes worries about the ability of 
the Bank to ensure that projects were implemented without increasing corruption, 
especially in those countries where civil service salaries are not adequate and to 
ensure that data on projects, progress report can be prepared as scheduled. 
  
In addition, The PIU Guidance Note cites a study by the MNA region that found that 
while PIUs have facilitated implementation and monitoring, they failed in terms of 
positive long-term impact on capacity building. Another study by the Latin America 
region found that the mainstreaming project within the government structures 
actually enhanced administrative and operational coordination with government 
support. 
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2.3.3. Issues in Procurement 
 
Procurement is the central of public expenditure management. According to 
Pretarious and Pretarious (2009) a well-organised, efficient and transparent public 
procurement system is a vital component of any sound PFM system and it transcends 
the budget process from procurement planning to audit.   “Public procurement 
systems are at the centre of determining how public money is spent since budgets get 
translated into services largely through the government‟s purchase of goods, works, 
and services” (OECD 2005b: 8).  It is widely acknowledged that the procurement 
system is also most susceptible to bribery and corruption, with the TI estimating that 
annually US$400 billion is lost worldwide (Ware et al 2007). 
 
Furthermore, Pretorius and Pretorius (2009) stated that the principles of procurement 
included: rules-based systems; competition; transparency; accountability; and 
economy and efficiency which contributed to the integrity of the financial system.  
They added that a well functioning procurement system should consist of a strong 
legal framework, institutional arrangements that ensure consistency in policy 
formulation and implementation, and a professional cadre of procurement personnel.  
However, according to Soreide (2002) and Syquia (2007) (cited in Pretorius and 
Pretorius, 2009) the key challenge is to adapt these principles to the overall 
governance conditions in the specific country. 
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A study carried out by Hunja (2001) (cited in Pretorius and Pretorius, 2009) stated 
that a comparative lack of success in developing countries is attributed to deeply 
vested interests, a lack of political will, a paucity of technical knowledge and the 
complexity of the institutional issues involved. Therefore, Walre et al 2007 (cited in 
Pretorius and Pretorius, 2009) suggested that there is a critical need for associated 
improvements in budget management, personnel management and staff capacity. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
Public Financial Management (PFM) involves both collection of funds from various 
sources and its distribution through spending in the most effective, efficient and 
economic manner, which is also known as Public Expenditure Management (PEM). 
The management of public fund must include the cycle of the overall budget process 
that consists of both “up-stream” (preparation and programming) and “down-stream” 
(execution, accounting control, reporting, monitoring and evaluation).  Failures in 
managing the funds may be viewed as an indicator of a country‟s financial 
management systems weakness as it was discussed earlier in this chapter. 
 
The problems identified in financial management systems of most developing 
countries were also discussed in the Paris Declaration 2005 by donors and 
participating countries with the purpose of overcoming the weaknesses of the 
systems as in case of reducing the risks in managing the fund provided.  Among the 
risks associated were fiduciary risk, development risk and reputation risk as well as 
corruption according to donors in their budget supports. Other than that, the risks 
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factors stated in the models by HM Treasury of UK and the Canadian Treasury are 
part of the risks associated with public expenditure management in the public sector.  
 
PEFA was developed as a means to quantify and measure PFM quality. Aid 
management reform agenda (as in the Paris Declaration) emphasises the need to 
improve aid recipient country‟s PFM.  The limitation of existing state of knowledge 
of the problem included how well the risks involved were analysed, especially by 
project managers. Furthermore, PEFA assesses standards but it doesn‟t specify 
actions. Even though The Aid management Reform Agenda is to get rid of the PIU‟s 
but in reality, they preferred project management mechanism of donors since 
financial management systems in the most developing country is still unsatisfactory. 
Can the efforts to reform government systems for finance management, like projects 
learn from the management methods of PIUs? Particularly in the way of they manage 
risks. 
 
This study sets out to establish whether the reform of domestic PFM can be based 
from experience gathered from established PIU financial risk management as in the 
case of education infrastructure investment projects in Malaysia.  The study also 
develops and applies a framework for good financial risk management practices to 
the investment in education infrastructure which were managed separately by the 
government‟s financial management systems as compared to the World Bank under 
the 8
th
 Malaysian plan period that is between the years 2001 to 2005. Subsequently, 
the next chapter will look more closely at how risk can be analysed, and from which 
an analytical framework for this research can be developed. 
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Chapter 3 
 
The Management of Risk in Public Financial Management and in Aid 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, we have identified the problems related to public financial 
management and aid. The problems contributed to the risks involved in public fund 
that were required to be identified and addressed effectively. Most studies proposed 
insurance as a way of mitigating risks. However, in mitigating risks related to public 
fund, the establishment of an effective financial management system is an alternative 
worthy of serious consideration. 
  
Therefore, this chapter outlines the existing state of knowledge on financial risks and 
public management of risks in particular in relation to aid. First of all, it It will 
elaborate the definition, concept, importance and the evolution of risk management 
in the public sector. Secondly, it outlines the nature of risks, particularly fiduciary 
risks, as the main risks related to public financial management and aid. At the third 
level, it elaborates the state of knowledge regarding financial management as a 
means of mitigating risk. The last but not the least, the financial management 
approaches of the World Bank and the Government of Malaysia in projects 
considered is discussed, as a means of mitigating risks which is related to this 
research study. 
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3.2 Definition, Nature, Concept and Importance of Risks in Public Financial 
Management and Aid Effectiveness 
 
3.2.1.  Definition of Risk 
 
Generally, the definition of risk is commonly related to negative consequences rather 
than positive consequences. Studies by Cabano (2004), Baldry (1997) and CCTA 
(1993) defined risk as “the potential for realization of unwanted, negative 
consequences of an event”. Baldry (1997) added for an event to be considered as a 
source of risk, there must be a reasonable loss associated which arises as a 
consequence of this chance event. The scale of the loss is referred to as the risk 
impact while it attempts to place and acceptable value on this loss, which often 
associated in monetary term. 
 
The definition of negative consequences is also supported by The Canadian 
Standards Association Risk Management on the issues related to safety and health. In 
the Guidelines for Decision-Makers (CAN/CSA-Q850-97) of the Canadian 
Standards, risk was defined as “the chance of injury or loss as defined as a measure 
of the probability and severity of an adverse effect to health, property, the 
environment or other things of value.  Futhermore, on the first of November, 2000, 
working draft of the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) Risk 
Management Terminology defined risk as the “combination of the probability of an 
event and its consequences. Note 1 – In some situations, risk is a deviation from the 
expected.” 
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However, there were studies such as Garrett (2005) which stated that risk can be an 
“opportunity which is a favourable or advantageous combination of 
circumstances/events in a suitable occasion or time; a chance for progress or 
advancement. The “opportunity is the measure of the probability of an opportunity 
event (a positive desired change) occurring and the desired impact of that event. This 
is supported with the definition by the HM Treasury of UK in their Orange Book 
(2004) that risk can be defined as “an uncertainty of outcome, whether positive 
opportunity or negative threat, of actions and events.  It is the combination of 
likelihood and impact, including perceived importance”.  
 
In the case for the public sector, the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (2001) 
purposely for the federal service that defined risks as follows:  
 
“Risk refers to the uncertainty that surrounds future events and outcomes.  It is the 
expression of the likelihood and impact of an event with the potential to influence the 
achievement of an organisation‟s objectives.” 
 
The Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (2001) stated that the phrase "the 
expression of the likelihood and impact of any event" implies that, as a minimum, 
some form of quantitative and qualitative analysis is required for making decisions 
concerning major risks or threats to the achievement of an organization's objectives. 
Although this definition of risk refers to the negative impact of the issue, the report 
acknowledges that there are also positive opportunities arising from responsible risk-
taking, and that innovation and risk co-exist frequently (The Privy Council Report).  
  54 
 
Furthermore, the Australian and New Zealand Public Sector Guidelines for 
Managing Risk (HB 143:1999) supported the positive consequence risk and defined 
risk as the “chance of something happening that will have an impact on objectives, it 
is measured in terms of consequences and likelihood.” This is supported by the 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants defines risk as “the possibility that one 
or more individuals or organisations will experience adverse consequences from an 
event or circumstance.” 
 
This is supported by Atkinson and Webb (2005), who stated that “risk is usually 
formalized as the uncertainty of financial returns in a for-profit organization. 
Whereas, for a non-profit or not-for-profit organization, risk is usually formalized as 
uncertainty in achieving the organization‟s stated quality objectives”.  
 
3.2.2. Nature of Risks  
 
The issues and problems discussed on PFM or PEM in the earlier chapters were due 
to the risks that have been identified as contributors to failures in achieving the main 
objectives of project implemented.  Risks had also impacted on the service delivery 
and wasting public funds.  Some of the risks that can be associated to PFM and PEM 
in the public sectors are those listed in the Orange Book (HM Treasury UK, 
2004:39). The book has listed and identified the internal and external risks factors 
such as in the “PESTLE” Model. The contribution risks factors can also be found in 
the “PEST” Model of the Canadian Treasury (2001) of the Integrated Risk 
Management.  Both models agreed that internal and external risks factors had 
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contributed to the failures in the financial management systems related to public 
expenditure management.  
 
As stated earlier the weakness of a country‟s financial management system carries 
risks in budget support. Risks such as corruption and human rights scandals have 
made many donor governments worried and subsequently, they were more cautious 
about budget support.  Most donors normally do not give budget support to countries 
where there is very poor transparency and accountability.  But when budget support 
is provided, donors often accompany it with some conditions which include 
programmes or initiatives to improve governance in that country.  Consequently, 
they invest considerable efforts into making financial systems more transparent to 
address their concerns that the given supports do not go astray.  
 
 Due to inherent weaknesses identified in the financial management systems, debates 
in the Paris Declaration 2005 circled around whether to allow the recipients countries 
to use their own public financial management (PFM) systems. Donors concerns and 
worries were centred on the risks of their budget supports in countries with weak 
PFM. Therefore, as donor assurance and since funds are fungible, using separate 
procedures may provide some fiduciary assurance but it does not guarantee 
development effectiveness as the use of parallel systems entails higher transaction 
costs and may undermine the country‟s own financial management systems 
development.   
 
The weaknesses of the country financial management systems identified through the 
findings of  the Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration reported in 2008 of most 
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participating countries still showed a lack of progress on the use and strengthening of 
country PFM systems. The Paris Declaration monitors the use of participating 
countries PFM systems around three separate components: budget execution, 
national financial reporting, and national auditing requirements. The results showed 
that the progress were still at the low and medium level. For instance, for the 
indicator 2a that measures the country‟s financial management systems, the results 
showed that for 44 countries, 11 scored below 3.0; 24 scored between 3.0 and 4.0; 
and 9 scored 4.0 or above. The above result indicated that for some countries, real 
progress needs to be made in strengthening the PFM systems. The survey also 
identified that 56% of all countries made no progress at all on the quality of their 
PFM systems, but 32% did improve the quality of their PFM systems by at least one 
measure. Subsequent progress on the quality of country systems is mixed with some 
achieving the target while some have not showed significant progress which give the 
overall impression that the quality of PFM remain almost the same. 
 
Among the risks that donors may face in using the countries‟ PFM systems in 
providing aid are fiduciary risk, development risks and reputation risks. The 
definitions of the risks are stated in the „Report on the use of country systems in 
public financial management, 3
rd
 High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness‟ (2008, pg. 
29) as the followings: 
 
1) Fiduciary risk - Which refers to the possibility that aid money may not be 
used as intended, or may not be used effectively. Donors‟ understanding of 
this concept varies depending on what the scope of the intended use of funds 
is. Some aspects considered include value-for-money aspects and what 
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boundaries are drawn among fiduciary and other risks. 
 
2) Development risk.  -  While fiduciary risk refers to the specific output of an 
aid intervention, development risk refers to the danger of missing the ultimate 
objectives of such an intervention. This category includes the risks posed by 
such disparate factors such as an unstable macroeconomic environment, poor 
design and implementation of policies, lack of results monitoring, weak 
governance, and poor coordination among donors, limited ownership, and 
failure to disburse funds. 
 
3) Reputational risk. -  Reputational risk refers to the possibility that events 
directly or indirectly related to the current aid intervention may impair the 
donor‟s ability to provide future support.  It includes the possibility that 
fiduciary or developmental failure may rebound on the donor as a sort of 
second-round effect. 
 
For the purpose of this research study, this research is concerned only with fiduciary 
risk, i.e. risk related to financial management.   
 
Fiduciary risk 
 
Fiduciary risk is highlighted in this research because it refers to the possibility of the 
fact that fund provided will be misused or stolen by the persons or entity. Ford 
(2005) defined fiduciary risk as the risk that “funds that are not properly accounted 
for; which are used for the intended; and which do not represent value for money.” 
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As it involved various players, it can also lead to the practice of fraud and corruption. 
Schick (1998c, cited in Pretorius and Pretorius, 2009) noted that in poorer countries, 
informal practices often „make the system work‟ but can retard development and 
breed corruption. 
 
The definition of fiduciary risks is further elaborated in a study by Brooke (2003) on 
the attitude to risk by the multi-lateral and bilateral agencies in addressing 
weaknesses in public management systems in the context of policy-based support. 
The findings revealed that 6 of 17 respondents had an explicit policy towards 
fiduciary risks arising from reliance on local systems and procedures. All the 
respondents agreed that they seek to place increasing emphasis on relying on 
Government „ownership‟ of an agreed financial management reform programs which 
they believed is the best way to reduce risks in the long term.  
 
Further literature in relation to defining fiduciary risks offers different views about 
the nature of fiduciary risks which include: 
 
1) That funds provided will not reach the point of deployment into national 
budgets. 
 
2) The failure of financial management systems and process to ensure that 
resources are deployed in accordance with national policies as expressed in 
the budget. 
 
3) That the budget might not adequately express priorities or an effective use of 
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resources. 
 
4) Some donors, such as Norway, emphasize their lack of tolerance of 
corruption although primarily from a development perspective rather than as 
a direct link to fiduciary risk. They require specific corruption evaluations 
and use them extensively in basing their approach to aid. 
 
5) Others place a lot of emphasis on the „reality‟ of system performance at the 
individual transaction level through their emphasis on audit scrutiny. 
 
In addition, the World Bank‟s (2002) concept of fiduciary risk is that “must include 
the possibility that actual expenditure will diverge from authorized expenditures (as 
reflected in the borrowing country‟s budget), whether because of misappropriation or 
misallocation.”  
 
 
Corruption is a fiduciary risk that is associated with financial management. For 
instance, aid provided through a weak PFM system obviously increases fiduciary 
risks, and it may also reduce development impact or, in any case, entail a trade-off 
between immediate benefits and longer-term systemic gains. Campo & Tommasi 
(1999) stated that although corruption in government is often identified with large 
procurements and major public works project, public expenditure is hardly the only 
source of potential corruption.  They added that one major route to improve PEM 
(and, of improving the quality of governance as well) is to reduce the opportunities 
for corruption and punishing offenders when it occurs. The reverse approach is also 
true: a major way of reducing corruption is to strengthen PEM. Quite aside from any 
moral or legal consideration, corruption weakens fiscal discipline, distorts the 
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allocation of resources; harms operational efficiency and effectiveness; and, 
obviously, is unethical to due process. 
 
Corruption can be defined as the misuse of public or private office for personal gain. 
“Misuse” (unlike “abuse”) covers both “sins of commission” (i.e., giving illegal 
favours), and “sins of omission” (i.e., deliberately turning the other way). And the 
inclusion of the term “private” in the definition of corruption underlines the fact that 
there cannot be a bride received without a bride given. In the context of developing 
countries, this points out that much corruption is externally generated.  Clearly, 
attention needs to be paid to the “imported corruption” as well as to the home grown 
variety. 
 
In the case of corruption in the education sector, the researcher suggests that in some 
countries as much as 80 percent of the total funds allocated to schools by education 
ministries are lost to “leakage”. How can corruption be uncovered and what 
strategies exist to fight it? A research into ethics and corruption in education by the 
International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) identifies the opportunities for 
corruption in 10 main areas in which malpractice occurs: finance; allocation of 
specific allowances; construction, maintenance and school repairs; distribution of 
equipment, furniture and materials; writing of textbooks; teacher appointment, 
management, payment and training; teacher behaviour; information system; 
examinations and diplomas; and accreditation of higher education institutions. 
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In addition, the environment in which corruption flourishes is produced by internal 
factors, relating to the education system‟s decision-making and management 
structure, external factors, linked to the overall environment in which the education 
system functions. Among internal factors contributed to corruption are: 
  
1) The absence of clear norms and regulations is of particular concern; 
especially in finance, specific allowances, teacher management, 
credentials, accreditation and public procurement. 
 
2) Poor management, characterised by low capacity to use funds 
efficiently, week accounting and monitoring systems, and a lack of 
control mechanisms and supervision, creates the risk of 
embezzlement. 
 
Furthermore, in Ochse (2004) study, has stated that the German Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ) suggested measures to prevent corruption in German 
development cooperation in the education system. The areas are personnel; finance 
and procurement system in educational institutions; access to educational 
institutions; and the quality and quantity of education. Various guidelines are 
introduced, among them was on the preventing corruption. This included various 
measures in strengthening personnel and financial management system in 
overcoming the risk in corruption in managing educational fund. 
 
In the case of failures of most government development or infrastructure projects, 
Baldry (1997) and Beest (2003) agreed that in managing infrastructure educational 
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project, the government will be facing risks through out the project cycle. According 
to Beest (2003), failures or delays were due to activities in a project which are 
subject to approval by various authorities such as authorities approving the projects 
and its progress according to the laws and regulations stipulated in the country which 
is also known as the consents at various development phases. In his study, there are 
some evidences that indicated that the authorities and owners of the projects may 
have misaligned objectives which resulted in the difficulty face in the timely and 
smooth availability of consents. According to Baldry (1997), the risk impact of the 
officials‟ attitudes includes: 
 
1) Project cost overrun causing deferment or even cancellation of other projects 
within the same funding period; 
 
2) Project time overrun causing operational difficulties due to unavailability of 
new or improved facility or service, to evolution of changed operational 
practices now made incompatible with facilities created; 
 
3) Project performance criteria not fully achieved resulting in inadequate 
operational support, consumer dissatisfaction, or perpetuation of hazardous or 
unacceptable conditions; 
 
4) Perceived inadequate project performance causing erosion of stakeholder 
confidence in project delivery service to the disadvantage of other projects. 
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Therefore, the above problems undermined the public sector performance that also 
caused a lack of confident by the public of how poorly the public fund was being 
managed. Another weakness in PEM by most government bodies or agencies that the 
IMF has identified was the typical attitude in spending budget allocation as soon as 
possible with no consideration that the funds appropriated will be available later in 
the financial year. These had created a significant adverse impact on public 
expenditure management and service delivery. 
 
3.2.3. Risk Management  
The need for risk management 
 
Risk management is important because it can contribute to effective financial 
management. SOLACE (2002) states that “If a council doesn‟t have effective risk 
management then it doesn‟t have effective management”. In addition, the Cadbury 
Report (Sec 4.23 &2.24), (1992) containing a code of best practice designed to 
achieve high standards of corporate behaviour also supports the importance of risk 
management and suggests that “……the Board should make a collective decision on 
risk management policies.”  
 
Furthermore, the HM Treasury (2002) and the OPDM (2004) suggested that through 
the application of risk management strategies, it will help the decision makers and 
managers to make strategic decisions especially about the appropriateness of 
adopting policy or service delivery options. This is because the importance of risk 
management is attributed to its function in the integration of policy, planning and 
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operational management as well as financial management in achieving its 
organizational objectives. 
 
In addition, the importance of risk management in the context of the public sector 
was highlighted by the Strategic Partnering Taskforce (SPT), of the Office of the 
United Kingdom Deputy Prime Minister (2004). It stated that risk is a major factor to 
be considered at a number of stages in a partnership project that need to be 
considered throughout the stages of project management and procurement process. It 
should adopt a risk management approach from the outset of defining the strategic 
partnering vision that can be expected to: 
 
- Improve the likelihood of success for turning vision into reality as it 
encourages forward thinking and thus minimises unwelcome surprises; 
 
- Increase visibility – involving all stakeholders raises risk awareness and 
enhances accountability; 
 
- Enhancing communication which in turn improves the basis for strategy 
setting, performance management and decision making; 
 
- Add realism from the outset, which gives a better basis for the allocation of 
resources and timetabling of the project. 
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Concept of risk management 
 
Generally, the concept of risk management as a “life cycle” process that consists of 
identifying, assessing, addressing, reviewing, monitoring and reporting risks 
(Cabano (2004), Wood & Ellis (2003), Perry and Hayes (1985) and Fone & Young 
(2002), Baldry (1997)). The concept is also supported by CCTA (1993), ALARM 
(2001), Turnbull Report (1999), the HM Treasury (2002) and the OPDM (2004) 
which further suggested that by applying the “life cycle” of risk management, it will 
help the decision makers and managers to make strategic decisions especially about 
the appropriateness of adopting policy or service delivery options.  
 
The above concept of risk management can be clearly understood from the “Risk 
Management Model” of the Conceptual Framework of Risk Management developed 
by Strategy Unit‟s (2002) in the Report of HM Treasury as well as in the „Orange 
Book‟ on Risk Management in Public Sector of the HM Treasury UK as below: 
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Risk Management Model – developed from the model in the Strategy Unit‟s 
November 2002 report: “Risk – improving government‟s capability to handle risk 
and uncertainty”. (Source: HM Treasury UK: Orange Book Management of Risk -
Principles and Concepts (2004) 
 
 
The above model implies that there is a need for simultaneous interaction and control 
of risks in the sense that risk management will be more effective. The reason for this 
approach is because a specific risk cannot be addressed individually as one risk may 
have an impact on another risk. Therefore, the whole model has to function in an 
environment in which how much risk is tolerable and justifiable. 
 
According to HM Treasury, the model also by necessity, dissects the core risk 
management process into elements for illustrative purposes but in reality they blend 
together.  For example, at any particular stage in the management process, any 
particular risk will not necessarily be the same for all risks. It also illustrates how the 
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core risk management process is not isolated, but it takes place in a context, and, 
how certain key inputs have to be given to the overall process in order to generate 
the outputs which will be desired from risk management. 
 
But ALARM (2001) commented that according to the “Orange Book”, the central 
government identified a fourth option for managing risks – that of terminating the 
risk. However, it has been recognized that the ability to practice this in the public 
sector may be limited. Accordingly ALARM states that the important matter to note 
from these definitions is that risk management must be integrated. Effective 
corporate governance requires risk management to be integral to policy, planning 
and operational management. It cannot be a “bolt on”, but instead must be embedded 
into the culture of the organization. Applying the risk management cycle – 
identifying, assessing, addressing, reviewing, monitoring and reporting risks (taken 
from 2.3.2 from Concept of Risk Management above) will help strategic decision 
makers and managers make informed decisions about the appropriateness of 
adopting policy or service delivery options. 
 
Secondly, the definition makes it clear that risk management must be holistic. That 
is, must be concerned with the whole range of business risk faced by the 
organization.  Many public sector managers and organizations still regard risk 
management as being concerned with insurance. 
 
Furthermore, ALARM (2001) added that risk management issues should be included 
as a matter of routine in: 
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- An organization‟s best value reviews 
- The business planning process 
- Project management 
- Bidding for funding – both internally and externally 
- Any arrangement for close liaison with similar bodies and organizations, and 
customers/stakeholders to encourage a cross-fertilization of ideas 
 
The evolution of risk management in public sector 
 
In Chapter 2, the researcher stated the limitations of academic studies on risk 
management in the public sector. Most studies on the management of risk are related 
to the private sector rather than the public sector. The studies therein mostly 
suggested insuring the risks rather putting an emphasis on alternative approaches 
such as implementing an efficient and effective financial management systems. For 
instance, studies by ALARM (2001) have shown that only about 20-25% of an 
organization‟s risk profile is insurable risk. It follows then that about 80% - the 
significant majority – of risks faced by an organization cannot be covered by simply 
transferring the risk to an insurance company. 
  
ALARM added that a review of the insurance-based approach showed a weakness 
when the Municipal Insurance Company in 1992 withdrew from the insurance 
market and thus demonstrated to commercial insurers that risk management need to 
be taken seriously consequently many organizations chose to “re-badge” their 
insurance officers as “risk and insurance officers”.  
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The development or evolution of risk management in the public sector can be seen in 
the diagram below (Source: Corporate Governance in the public sector – The role of 
risk management, ALARM (2001) :  
2001 
 Risk management to contribute to the effective setting of objectives 
and integration into business processes to ensure that objectives are 
successfully delivered 
 
 
Realization that most risks are not insurable and risk management 
attention to achieving corporate objectives 
 
More confidence about managing risk to reduce reliance on 
insurance companies and act as self-insurer 
 
Managing risk within the insurance deductible 
 
1993 
 
Thus, from the above diagram, we can see that the concept of risk has been changed 
through time. Risk management in the public sector is more towards mitigating risks 
in achieving the objectives that would promote better service deliveries. 
 
3.3 Risk management in public sector 
 
Havens (1999) stated that effective management control or internal control system is 
a way of how risk should be managed. He considered it to be at the heart of budget 
and policy implementation. Effective management control should also describe all 
the policies and procedures that were put in place by a government to ensure the 
proper and effective functioning of the overall government or the individual entity.  
The purpose of management control is to ensure that budgetary and other policy 
decisions are executed properly; the use of resources are maximized and 
  70 
mismanagement are minimized if not avoided entirely; and that reliable and timely 
information is obtained, maintained, and used for effective decision- making. 
 
This understanding is supported by the European Court of Auditors in its 1998 
publication European Implementing Guidelines for the INTOSAI Auditing Standards 
(draft) that defines management controls as all the policies and procedures conceived 
and put in place by an entity‟s management to ensure: 
 
- The economical, efficient, and effective achievement of the entity‟s 
objectives; 
- Adherence to external rules (laws, regulations, etc) and to management 
policies; 
- The safeguarding of assets and information; 
- The prevention and detection of fraud and error; and 
- The quality of accounting records and the timely production of reliable 
financial and management information. 
 
Currently, no universally applicable list of financial controls, reporting, performance 
monitoring and effective communications are described as categories of controls. 
 
An effective financial reporting is essential as the management should receive a 
timely, reliable flow of information about its financial status. Therefore, it will be 
useful for the management to initiate prompt corrective action when the accounting 
data indicate a significant deviation from the budget. Thus, the financial accounting 
system is a vital part of any structure of management controls. To assure that the 
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accounting systems produces timely and reliable data, management should require 
the system to be audited at regular intervals. 
 
The need of good financial reporting is supported by a study by Allen and Tommasi 
(2001). They listed that the principles of good reporting should consist of 
completeness, legitimacy, user-friendliness, reliability, relevance, consistency, 
timeliness, comparability and usefulness. The need for timely, accurate and complete 
reporting is the basis for two performance indicators in the PEFA framework (PEFA 
2005). The implicit assumption for non-production of timely reports is lack of 
capacity, however no research could be found to verify this assumption.  
 
A study by Drebin, Chan and Ferguson (1999) on the „Objectives of Accounting and 
Financial Reporting for Government Units‟ stated that an effective financial 
reporting should achieve the objectives that information is useful for decision 
making in determining and predicting short-terms financial resources; economic 
conditions; legal contractual and fiduciary requirements; budgetary and planning; 
and finally for organization and managerial performance. 
 
Furthermore, it is noted that through performance monitoring, an organization can 
accomplish certain activities. The management‟s first responsibility is to ensure that 
those activities are achieved and toward this end, it is essential that management 
track the performance of the organization against its stated goals. This will require 
the management to describe the goals in measurable terms (client served, units of 
output delivered, etc.) and to establish a reliable and timely reporting system to keep 
itself informed of the implementation progress against the stated goals. To assure the 
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reliability of the data, it is desirable that the performance reporting system be linked 
to the financial accounting system and that it be audited (including appropriate tests 
of the reporting procedures) at regular intervals. Management should also establish 
its performance expectations with respect to the outputs being measured and should 
initiate corrective action if the report results deviate from expectations. 
 
In addition, effective communication is also crucial in managing risks. For instance, 
in the modern organizations, managers recognize that subordinates and front-line 
workers perform better if they have a clear understanding of the mission and goals of 
the organization and the purpose being served by the activities they are asked to 
perform. In such an organization, the channels of communication are an integral part 
of the management control system. 
 
The importance of the various categories of an effective management control in 
mitigating risks is also supported by a study by The Treasury Board of Canada 
Secretariat (1999) on Best Practices in Risk Management; Private and Public Sector 
Internationally. The study, involves 228 examples throughout the world. The 
conclusion showed that the approaches suggested the application of the risk-cycle 
concept and emphasized the role of two-way communication, and staff training as a 
way of enhancing awareness of risks which occurs in organizations.  Further, it was 
noted that organization members should strengthen the internal control system 
effectively.  
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In another study, risk management researchers suggested ways of mitigating risks 
according to different scenarios as stated in the Annex A and B by the DFID (2002: 
13 and 17) on managing fiduciary risk when providing budget support. 
 
In identifying potential risks, the Risk Management Standard by COSO, ALARM 
and IRM (2002) indicated the external and internal environment as distinct risk 
areas. The standard also introduced a guideline that included a risk estimation 
(assessment) technique using 3 x 3 matrix for risk consequences and their potential 
of occurrences or likelihood. 
 
Table 3.1. - Risk Consequences (Threats or Opportunities) 
 
Estimated 
impact 
Description of impacts Indicators 
High - Financial impact on the organisation 
is likely to exceed certain value. 
- Significant impact on the 
organisation‟s strategy or 
operational activities. 
- Significant stakeholder concern. 
 
(to be filled by the 
management / responsible 
division) 
Medium - Financial impact on the organisation 
likely to be between certain range 
- Moderate impact on the 
organisation‟s strategy or 
operational activities 
- Moderate stakeholder concern 
 
(to be filled by the 
management / responsible 
division) 
Low - Financial impact on the organisation 
likely to be less that certain value 
- Low impact on the organisation‟s 
strategy or operational activities 
- Low stakeholder concern 
(to be filled by the 
management / responsible 
division) 
 
 
Furthermore, strengthening the financial management systems is considered as the 
most important approach in managing risk relating to public expenditure 
management in the public sector. This included the strategies through out the 
budgetary down stream from the financial planning stage of budget to disburse the 
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fund. This also included the four main areas of the budgetary process which were 
budgetary planning, procurement, financial reporting and control, and monitoring 
and evaluation.  
 
For instance, the HM Treasury of UK (2002) and the OPDM (2004) had mentioned 
the importance of risk management to policy, planning and operational management 
as well as financial management in achieving organizational objectives. 
 
The emphasise on financial management as a tool in managing risks is also stated in 
a study by Hallak and Poisson (2006) on financing education which is relevant to 
this case study. Hallak and Poisson make 12 recommendations for policymakers and 
educational managers to create and to maintain transparent regulatory systems, to 
strengthen management skills for greater accountability and to increase ownership of 
the management process. Among them are: 
 
- Norms and regulations must be clear, procedures must be transparent and an 
explicit policy framework is needed to stop corruption. The framework must 
specify the distribution of responsibilities among those allocating, 
distributing and using educational resources. 
 
- Transparency in the system can be promoted by standardising financial 
procedures, making staff management regulations uniform, harmonising 
procurement rules and adopting an agreed format for financial report 
production at school and intermediate authority levels. 
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- If corruption is to be reduced, skills in management accounting, monitoring 
and auditing must be improved. 
 
- The public must have access to information in order to build participation, 
ownership and social control. Members of the public must be sufficiently 
informed about their local schools to be able to detect fraud and to claim 
from the school the things they are entitled to. 
 
The need for a transparent regulatory system is also supported by Ochse (2004) on a 
study for the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) that suggested measures to 
prevent corruption in the education system in German development cooperation in 
the Education System. The measures included the areas of personnel; finance and 
procurement system in educational institutions; access to educational institutions; 
and quality and quantity of education. Ochse also introduced guidelines with the aim 
are to influence those who are responsible for development cooperation projects 
towards promoting reform in the education sector. The guideline on preventing 
corruption also identified approaches and measures to promote the participation of 
parents, teachers, citizens and civil society organisations in reforms to the education 
system. Various measures are being introduced which include strengthening 
personnel and financial management system in overcoming the risk in corruption in 
managing educational fund.  
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Among the measures included to prevent corruption, we can mention: 
 
- Personnel: strengthening the legal foundations and building awareness in 
regard to performance orientation and corruption prevention; establishment 
of codes of conduct. 
 
- Finance system: strengthening an appropriate legal framework and 
institutional mainstreaming of internal and independent external community-
level, financial control bodies with clear responsibilities, adequate resources 
and explicit authority to identify corruption and to make recommendations on 
how to prevent corruption and impose sanctions. 
 
Other than that, the importance of financial management in managing risks is also 
stated by the Auditor General of Canada (1999). Among the objectives of financial 
management are as followings:  
 
- Ensure that managers have support for decision making; 
- Ensure the availability of timely, relevant and reliable information, both 
financial and non-financial; and 
- Contribute to managing the risks to the organisation; 
 
The Auditor General of Canada (1999) also stated that risk management and control 
is part of key elements of financial management which can be clearly seen in the 
diagram Exhibit 1 below.  They also introduced the “The Financial Management 
Capability Model” as a model for good financial management. Among the 
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advantages of the model is that it serves as a tool for government organization in 
determining its financial management requirements according to the nature, 
complexity and associated risks of its operations; and assess its existing financial 
management capabilities against the requirements that has been determined.  
 
Exhibit 1 - ELEMENTS OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, in preventing fraud and corruption in World Bank projects (World 
Bank 2000), the Board of the World Bank had approved the Loan Administration 
Change Initiative (LACI) that introduced a new approach of project management 
reporting (PMR) which was reported to be effective in preventing fraud and 
Support for 
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corruption in World Bank projects because it is “an integrated project monitoring 
system bringing together accounting and financial management, disbursement, 
procurement and contract management, and physical progress. It introduces a 
simplified system of disbursing funds, linking disbursements to project progress as 
reported in quarterly project management reports.”  
 
The World Bank added that a good financial management is a critical ingredient of 
project success. Timely and relevant financial information provides a basis for better 
decisions, thus, it will speed the physical progress of the project as well as the 
availability of funds while, reducing delays and bottlenecks.  This is why the Bank‟s 
policy and procedures require good financial management in Bank-funded projects. 
As a guideline for good financial management, the Bank stated that sound project 
financial management should: 
 
- Provide essential information needed by those who manage, implement and 
supervise projects, including government oversight agencies and financing 
institutions; 
 
- Provide the comfort needed by the borrower country, lenders and donor 
community that the funds have been used efficiently and for the purposes 
intended; and 
 
- Be a deterrent tool against fraud and corruption, since it provides internal 
controls and the ability to quickly identify unusual occurrences and 
deviations. 
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3.4      World Bank and Government of Malaysia Project Financial  
Management Approaches for the ESSP. 
 
3.4.1.  World Bank approach 
 
This section emphasizes on the financial management requirements or criteria in 
reducing risk by the World Bank for the ESSP in the Eighth Malaysian Plan.  The 
criteria or conditions highlighted simultaneously the project financial management 
system implemented by the Government of Malaysia through the Ministry of 
Education for similar project of the ESSP.  
 
For the purpose of this research study, the World Bank set up conditions for 
negotiations. The conditions were firstly, the opening and maintenance of a Special 
Account at a commercial bank; and secondly, the financial reports known as Project 
Management Report (PMR). The disbursement of funds through Special Account is 
a new procedure that is linked with the PMR. Thirdly, it is concerning the 
appointment of key staff for project implementation known as Project 
Implementation Unit (PIU).  The PIU will consist of the project manager, 
procurement specialist, accountant, architect and quantity surveyor.  Fourthly, the 
development of the key performance indicators considered as a measurement tools of 
project progress and achievement of programmers goals and objectives. Finally, 
establishing on procurements procedures such as stated in the procurement side letter 
2
. Among the conditions on procurement are as in Annex 2 (page 2 of 2) in paragraph 
2 and 3 as followings: 
                                                 
2
  Line 6, Agreed Minutes of Negotiations Between Malaysia and Development for the purposed 
Education Sector Support Project, February 11, 1999 
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“ 2. Malaysia specifically assures you that for all goods and works contracts to be 
financed by the Bank for the Project following national competitive bidding 
procedures (“NCB”): 
 
(a) All bidders shall be treated equally, and preferential treatment will 
not be granted to any bidder or group of bidders.  Specifically, 
civil works contracts valued below 50,000 Malaysian Ringgit will 
not be reserved for Bumiputra contractors. 
 
(b) Prior registration, licensing and/or other government authorization 
will not be a requirement for purposes of participating in bidding 
competitions; such registration, licensing and/or other government 
authorization may, however, be required from the selected bidder 
as a prior condition to signing the contract, provided tat ownership 
of said bidder by local nationals will not be a condition of 
registration. 
 
(c) The “two envelope” system for technical and financial proposals 
in bid submissions will not be used. 
 
(d) All bids shall be opened in public. 
 
(e) Prospective bidders shall be allowed at least 30 days from the date 
of the first advertisement to submit bids. 
 
3. Malaysia further assures you that: 
 
(a) Direct contracting will be used only after prior consultation with 
the Bank. 
 
(b) Central contracting, under which goods are procured through 
negotiations with pre-selected suppliers will not be used.” 
 
 3.4.2. Government of Malaysia approach 
 
Other issues related to financial management are also stated in the „Aims of 
Development in Education Financing 2001-2010‟, Records of financial resources 
acquired from individuals, public and private agencies, international bodies and Non-
Government Organisations (NGOs) showed that they are managed at the institutional 
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level. Currently, the Ministry of Education, Malaysia (MOE) does not have a 
comprehensive accounting system as a financial information database of other 
sources of funding.  As such the MOE and other government agencies have 
difficulties in obtaining up-to-date data quickly and accurately. It is a challenge for 
the MOE to develop a comprehensive financial information database. 
 
In the MOE‟s „Education Development Blue Print 2001 - 2010‟, the challenges faced 
in the management of finance and development of educational physical facilities 
were mostly implementation issues related to limited allocations. This development 
worries and requires an urgent need for a more effective financial management. 
Among the main challenges stated are the allocations of development projects fairly 
in terms of location; and identification of effective approaches so as to ensure 
development projects are completed on schedule without incurring any additional 
costs. 
 
This included the strategies in increasing efficiency and effectiveness of financial 
management at all levels of the MOE by the following ways: 
 
1. Ensuring all education managers possess the necessary knowledge and skills 
in financial management; 
 
2. Empowering all financial managers; 
 
3. Increasing educational institutions as responsibility centres; 
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4. Strengthening the mechanisms for supervision, monitoring, and auditing 
financial management; and 
 
5. Ensuring transparency in financial management particularly in educational 
institutions. 
 
Further steps in financial management that includes: 
  
1.  Increasing and expanding the involvement of other agencies in the 
supervision and monitoring activities of financial management; 
 
2. Planning and disseminating a standard guideline for supervision, monitoring, 
and auditing activities relating to financial management of educational 
programs to all; 
 
3. Promoting a standard remuneration and penalty system for educational 
development project developers to ensure that they adhere to the project 
terms and agreements. 
 
Finally, a mechanism for reporting financial management for educational 
programmes must be put in place for strengthening the current monitoring system.  
 
In the „Education Development Blue Print 2001 - 2010‟ under the „Aims of 
Development in Education Financing 2001-2010‟, the Development, Privatisation 
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and Supply Division (DPSD) of MOE policy statement consists of the following 
scope of responsibilities: 
 
1.  To build and maintain the premises of educational institutions in accordance 
with the standard set based on the needs of the end-users and international 
standards. 
 
2. To provide supplies and to procure sufficient educational equipment for all 
educational institutions. 
 
3. To ensure the safety of education premises and infrastructures. 
 
4. To offer business opportunities to capable Bumiputera entrepreneurs in the 
planning and implementation of development and procurement projects. 
 
Among the DPSD implementation strategies that related to the ESSP are as follows: 
 
1.  Channel educational development allocation resources, which include human 
resources, machinery, capital and land, properly and accurately. 
 
2. Enhance the implementation and the monitoring of physical educational 
projects according to the schedule. 
 
3. Provide lands for physical educational projects in accordance with both the 
present and future needs. 
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4. Improve the system of procurement. 
 
5. Enhance process of payment. 
 
6. Expand and enhance the proficiency and expertise of the Ministry‟s staff in 
the field of development and procurement. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
There were various risks that can be associated to public financial management and 
aid effectiveness. Among the crucial was fiduciary risk which left unchecked which 
can lead to fraud and corruption. Thus, risks should be mitigated effectively as they 
involved the use of public fund and public confidence in the capacity of the 
organisations or agencies involved to deliver the products and services expected. 
There are calls towards the establishment of an effective financial management 
system which can serve as a useful mechanism in managing risks. This includes the 
various precautionary measures carried out by donors, for example, the World Bank 
in ensuring the effectiveness of their project-financed in achieving its objectives. The 
effectiveness and efficiency of financial management reporting and project 
implementation unit are among the requirements set by donors such as World Bank. 
The intention was to reduce risk and to put emphasise on to strengthening their 
country financial management systems for participant countries. 
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This study compares the project financial management approaches between the 
World Bank and the Government of Malaysia. The World Bank had setup conditions 
in reducing the risks so as to ensure that the fund provided for projects to the 
Malaysian Government under its 8
th
 Malaysian Plan will achieve the set objectives. 
These approaches by the World Bank are used as the basis in developing an 
analytical framework for project financial management. The analytical framework 
will be used as a guideline in analyzing the effectiveness of the approaches in 
reducing risks related to public financial management and aid.  
 
Chapter 4 will discuss further on the standards and criteria of good financial 
management system which will serve as the analytical framework for this research 
study. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Analytical Framework 
 
4.1 Introduction   
 
In the previous chapter, we have identified the nature of risks, the need for risk 
management in the public sector and the importance of an effective financial 
management system as an approach to mitigate risks in relation to public financial 
management and aid. For instance, conditions set by the World Bank that has to be 
met by the Government of Malaysia (GOM) for the ESSP in the Eighth Malaysian 
Plan through the Ministry of Education. These requirements have highlighted the 
GOM‟s project financial management system and this chapter will study and 
compare the different approaches toward financial and risk management in the public 
sector between the World Bank and GOM. 
  
Therefore, this chapter identifies the standards and criteria that fulfil the 
requirements of an effective financial management system that can reduce risks in 
public financial management and aid. They are used as guidelines for analyzing the 
effectiveness of the World Bank and the Government of Malaysia project financial 
management approaches.  Secondly, it elaborates the elements of these effective 
financial management systems. Thirdly, this chapter outlines how the criteria will be 
applied to ESSP implementation. At last, the conclusion summarizes the main points 
of the chapter. 
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4.2 Standards and criteria of effective financial management systems 
 
For the purpose of this study, the researcher has identified the following approaches 
that are useful as the basis in analyzing the findings for this study. 
 
The criteria are based on the followings: 
 
a) World-class financial management for Public Sector by the Audit 
Commission of HM Treasury UK & PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005); and 
 
b) The study of „Objectives of Accounting and Financial Reporting for 
Government Units‟, by Drebin, Chan & Ferguson (1981). 
 
The intention is also to achieve the main objectives, sub-objectives and hypothesis 
set in paragraph 4.0 in Chapter 1 of this study.  Now, we are going to look at how 
these approaches will be used as the basis criteria for analyzing the World Bank and 
the Government of Malaysia approaches in the implementation of the project 
financial management for the ESSP under the Eighth Malaysian Plan.   
 
4.2.1. The “World-Class Financial Management for Public Sector” by the 
Audit Commission, HM Treasury UK & PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005) 
 
The standards and elements as criteria for the analysis are used because the Audit 
Commission of UK (2005) emphasized financial management as a key management 
discipline. It consists of the following financial management criteria which are:  
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- An essential element of good corporate governance; 
- An essential part of the firm foundations of an organisation, underpinning 
service quality and improvement; and 
- A basis of accountability to stakeholders for the stewardship and use of 
resources. 
 
Furthermore, based on the HM Treasury and PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005) study 
on enhancing good practice in financial management of a public sector body, the 
Commission developed a discussion paper to stimulate debate across public services 
and among finance professionals about what achieving world class standards of 
financial management in government might mean in practice and, more broadly, 
what standards of financial management the public sector should aspire to over the 
longer term. Even though, it does not attempt to set these standards, but it is high 
level in nature and is not intended to be a practical guide to how standards of 
financial management in the public sector might be improved.  
 
There are five key themes or elements of financial management focus which are 
useful for analysis in this study. They are financial governance and leadership; 
financial planning; finance for decision-making; financial monitoring and 
forecasting; and financial reporting. 
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Financial governance and leadership 
  
The measure of quality financial governance and leadership starts from the top, and 
there is a need to understand the working financial environment. There is a need to 
foster an organizational culture where individual collectively responsible for 
stewardship. This would include steps taken in ensuring the effective and efficient 
use of resources, posting of officers with sufficient financial knowledge, skills and 
experience, and the need for financial accountability being extended to external 
stakeholders. The development of the organization‟s strategic and corporate plans 
also need to take into account the need to communicate with all parties involved an 
understanding and appreciation of the financial implications.  
 
 
 
Financial 
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making 
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FINANCIAL 
GOVERNANCE AND 
LEADERSHIP 
Financial 
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Internal 
External 
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Financial Planning 
 
Financial planning needs to be integrated to an organisation‟s strategic and corporate 
planning processes – the financial plan (budget) is simply a quantitative expression 
of a plan of action. As such, financial plans should reflect the organisation‟s key 
strategic priorities. Annual financial plans, integrating current expenditure plans and 
investment programmes, with cash flow and balance sheet projections, should be 
developed in the context of a longer-term financial strategy, which supports the 
organisation‟s strategic plan. 
 
Finance for decision-making 
 
In developing an organisation‟s strategic and corporate plans, the top management 
needs to consider the value of money achieved by allocating resources efficiently to 
different activities. It also requires to have a thorough understanding of the financial 
implications of current and potential alternative policies, programmes and activities 
on projects implemented.  
 
Financial monitoring and forecasting 
 
If an organisation is to meet its strategic and operational objectives, then its top 
management needs to assure itself that financial performance is up-to-date and 
forecast financial outturn for the year are in line with the plan, which will include 
cash flow and balance sheet projections. Variances should be monitored and 
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reviewed for the underlying costs of the organisation‟s key activities and how they 
are profiled over time. Financial information needs to be integrated with non-
financial performance and activity information as such information forms the basis 
for financial forecasts and enables value for money to be monitored. Financial 
information is also required for setting the budget and internal accountability and 
monitoring. This information throughout the year should be derived from the 
organisation‟s statutory financial statements. 
 
Financial reporting 
 
To run an organisation effectively, top management needs up-to-date financial and 
non-financial performance information on a timely basis. It should be presented in a 
form that is tailored to meet user needs that are easy to understand and highlights the 
key financial issues that they need to be aware of. For its part, top management needs 
to provide timely, accurate and balanced information about its stewardship and use 
of resources and its non-financial performance to the organisation‟s stakeholders.  
 
4.2.2. The “Objectives of Accounting and Financial Reporting for Government  
Units‟ by Drebin, Chan & Ferguson (1981)  
 
The “Objectives of Accounting and Financial Reporting for Government Units‟ by 
Drebin, Chan & Ferguson, provides a useful criteria for decision-making at all level 
especially to the management in evaluating the performance of its organization. This 
can be helpful for the management as the decision makers to reduce the risk related 
to financial management. The study by Drebin, Chan & Ferguson (1981), shown that 
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financial information is useful for decision-making in meeting short-term financial 
resources, economic condition, legal, contractual and fiduciary requirements, 
budgeting and planning, and finally for organization and managerial performance. 
  
Based on their study, Drebin, Chan & Ferguson stated that there are five basic 
objectives that must be achieve through accounting and financial reporting as 
follows: 
 
1. To provide useful financial information for determining and predicting the 
flows, balances and requirements of short-term financial resources of the 
government unit. 
 
2. To provide useful financial information for determining and predicting the 
economic condition of the governmental unit and changes therein. 
 
3. To provide useful financial information for monitoring performance under 
terms of legal, contractual and fiduciary requirements. 
 
4. To provide useful financial information for planning and budgeting, and for 
predicting the impact of the acquisition and allocation of resources on the 
achievement of operational objectives. 
 
5. To provide information useful for evaluating managerial and organisational 
performance. 
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SHORT-TERM FINANCIAL RESOURCES 
 
Short-term financial resources provide financial information that is fruiful in 
determining and predicting the flows, balances and requirements of short-term 
financial resources of the governmental unit. The financial information gathered can 
be used: 
 
a. For determining and predicting the balances and availability of short-term 
financial resources, including cash, for specific uses; 
  
b. For predicting the need to obtain additional short-term financial 
resources; 
 
c. For predicting the impact on short-term financial resources of specific 
revenue and other financing sources; 
 
d. For predicting the impact on short-term financial resources of planned 
programs and activities; and 
 
e. For predicting the ability of the governmental unit to meet its short-term 
obligations as they come due. 
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     ECONOMIC CONDITION 
 
Financial information is useful in determining and predicting the economic 
condition of the governmental unit and changes therein. Information on the 
economic condition will prove useful, 
  
a. For determining the value and predicting the service potential of resources 
held by the governmental unit; 
 
b. For determining whether the value and service potential of physical resources 
have been maintained during a period; 
 
c. For predicting the amounts and timing of future outflows resulting from 
existing commitments and the ability of the governmental unit to meet these 
when they come due; and 
 
d. For determining and predicting the cost of programs or services provided by 
the governmental unit. 
 
LEGAL, CONTRATUAL AND FIDUCIARY REQUIREMENTS 
 
Financial information is also useful for monitoring performance under terms of legal, 
contractual and fiduciary requirements. It can serve the management in: 
 
a. Determining whether resources were utilized in accordance with legal and 
contractual requirements; 
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b. Determining whether resource contributions of taxpayers, grantors and 
service recipients intended to support activities of a given time period were 
sufficient to recover the cost of those activities; 
 
c. Determining whether fees or reimbursements are in accordance with legal, 
grant or contractual requirements; and 
 
d. Accounting for the use and disposition of resources entrusted to public 
officials. 
 
PLANNING AND BUDGETING 
 
Financial information will prove useful for planning and budgeting, and for 
predicting the impact of the acquisition and allocation of resources in achieving 
operational objectives. The information is useful, 
 
a. For predicting the impact of program alternatives on short-term financial 
resources of the governmental unit; 
 
b. For predicting the impact of program alternatives on the economic condition 
of the governmental unit; 
 
c. For predicting the amount of resource contributions of taxpayers, grantors, 
and service recipients needed to support activities of a given time period; 
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d. For predicting the effectiveness, including the distribution of benefits among 
groups, of proposed programs and activities in achieving goals and 
objectives; and 
 
e. For predicting the incidence of the burden of providing resources for 
governmental operations.  
 
In addition to the outputs or results of program alternatives, achieving an equitable 
distribution of the cost of providing programs and services is an important 
consideration in budgeting.  Thus, information useful for predicting the incidence of 
this burden would be a significant factor in budgeting decisions. 
 
ORGANISATIONAL AND MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE 
 
 
Finally, financial information is useful for evaluating managerial and organisational 
performance. Evaluation of organisational and managerial performance is necessary 
if voters, legislative and oversight bodies are to play a meaningful role in policy 
development.  Choosing among candidates for public office and assuring that 
planned programs actually achieve their intended results require information on 
actual performance. Financial information will prove useful in measuring 
organizational and managerial performance in, 
 
a. Determining the cost of programs, functions and activities in a manner which 
facilitates analysis and valid comparisons with established criteria, among 
time periods, and with other governmental units; 
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b. Evaluating the efficiency and economy of operations of organisational units, 
programs activities and functions; 
 
c. Evaluating the results of programs, activities, and functions and their 
effectiveness in achieving their goals and objectives; and 
 
d. Evaluating the equity with which the burden of providing resources for 
governmental operations is imposed. 
 
4.3  How will the criteria be applied in the analysis of findings? 
  
In analyzing the findings as in Part II, the researcher will firstly use both standards 
and criteria in the “World-Class Financial Management for Public Sector” by the 
Auditor General of HM Treasury UK & PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005); and the 
study by Drebin, Chan & Ferguson (1981) on “Objectives of Accounting and 
Financial Reporting for Government Units”. These references are used for the 
purpose of achieving the objective set for Chapter 6 in this study. The approaches 
analyzes the effectiveness of the Project Management Reports implemented by the 
World Bank and the Government of Malaysia, through the Development Unit of 
Division for Development and Procurement (DPSD), Ministry of Education, 
Malaysia for the ESSP under the Eighth Malaysian Plan. 
 
Secondly, to achieve the objectives as outlined in Chapter 7 through the use of the 
approaches especially the “World-Class Financial Management for Public Sector” by 
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the Auditor General of HM Treasury UK & PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005). This is 
supported with the elements in Risk Management Model by the HM Treasury UK 
(2002) which is considered very useful as a guideline in achieving the findings for 
Chapter 7 for this study. 
 
Thirdly, as this study concerns the effectiveness of risks management in public 
expenditure management focus on the educational sector support project (ESSP) in 
Malaysia, therefore, it is important at an earlier stage to identify and to analyze the 
risks factors. Toward achieving this aim, the risk management model of the HM 
Treasury (2002), and the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (2001), are used as 
reference models to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of financial risk 
management. Subsequently, questionnaires are administrated to the officers and 
staffs involved in the management of the ESSP. The officers and staffs are those 
from the Division of Development and Procurement (DPSD), Ministry of Education, 
Malaysia. They were involved in the financing of infrastructure educational projects.  
 
The results collected, are analyzed and discussed with reference to the impact of the 
risks to the projects they managed, particularly, on the Domestic financing in the 8
th
 
Malaysian Plan. This also includes the effectiveness of the country financial 
management systems and its impacts on projects implemented. This will be 
elaborated in Chapter 8 of this study. 
 
All the findings are supported with other evidences from various sources both 
primary and secondary from interviews and official documentations. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
 
The financial management approaches stated above have been developed as the 
analytical framework to this study. They are used to analyze the effectiveness of the 
financial management systems implemented for the Educational Sector Support 
Projects (ESSP) in the Eighth Malaysian Plan by the World Bank, and the Malaysian 
Government through the Ministry of Education. 
 
Approaches that are based on recognized and established standards and criteria of 
good financial management also concord well with the practice of good corporate 
governance. Good corporate governance is part of foundations of an organization 
which underpins service quality and improvement.  Good financial management, on 
the other hand, forms the basis of management accountability to stakeholders with 
reference to stewardship and use of resources. This is especially important in the 
context of managing risks in an organization with the effect of enhancing elements of 
accountability and transparency in the management of public funds.   
 
This chapter stressed the importance of the main three elements of financial 
management: financial planning, financial monitoring and forecasting and reporting. 
Risk management and information systems especially in the public sector are 
prominent in the Canadian Financial Management Capacity Model (1999); the study 
by Drebin, Chan & Ferguson (1981) on “Objectives of Accounting and Financial 
Reporting for Government Units”; and the “World Class financial management for 
public sector” by HM Treasury of UK and PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005).  Finally, 
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with the research framework now in place, we turn to the next chapter on the 
research method used in this study. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Research Methods  
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the research methods used in the study, the sources and 
methods of data collection, and the limitations and problems encountered during the 
research.  
 
The central issue of this thesis is that most government bodies were inadequate in 
managing allocated funds in the most effective, efficient and economic manner. 
Problems such as shortage of funds, over-spending and unauthorized expenditure had 
put public fund at risk. This risk in not only about project cost but also it concerns 
delays and abandonment of projects which happened under the ESSP. The projects 
mentioned above were under the domestic financing of the 8
th
 Malaysian Plan. The 
issues or problems raised were in relation to a general lack of awareness of risk 
management in managing public fund and its implications. This situation is similar to 
the case discussed or debated in the Paris Declaration (2005) among the donors and 
participating countries. Among others, the discussion touches on the establishment of 
Project Implementation Units (PIUs) as well as donors‟ pre-conditions and 
procedures requirements in setting up an effective and efficient financial 
management system tool in managing risks. The issues of phasing-out the Parallel 
PIUs as well as using the participating countries own financial management systems 
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draws mix-opinion in a „lunch-box‟ meeting held by the World Bank with 100 of 
their staff who were involved in project implementation (World Bank, 2005). The 
key research questions forming the basis for data collection and analysis are as 
follows: 
 
1) Why is the financial management system implemented in the World Bank 
approach is more effective in managing risks as compared to the borrowing 
country‟s financial management in the Government of Malaysia approach for 
the ESSP in the 8
th
 Malaysian Plan? 
 
2) Why is the World Bank PMR or FMR implemented in the ESSP effective in 
managing risk as compared to the domestic financing? 
 
3) Are the additional conditions as part of the project financial management 
system imposed by the World Bank effective in reducing as compared to 
domestic financing? 
 
4) What other factors have influenced and contributed to the successful 
performance of the World Bank approach as compared to Domestic approach 
for the ESSP in the 8
th
 Malaysian Plan? 
 
5) What are the perceptions of the management, officers and staffs involved on 
risks as factors that contributed to the low performance of the domestic 
financing of the ESSP under the 8
th
 Malaysian Plan? 
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5.2   The Case Study Approach 
 
In identifying and formulating the answers to the above five questions, the researcher 
has used the case study approach. According to Yin (1998) in the case study 
approach, it has a unique quality of enabling the researcher to deal with a full variety 
of evidence from interviews, documents and observations. In this case study, a 
comparison was made between the World Bank‟s financial management practice and 
the domestic financing management practice. It explores the effectiveness of both 
financial management systems during project implementation of the ESSP in 
Malaysia. Areas studied include the development of civil works projects and the 
procurement of goods and services of the Development and Procurement Divisions 
(DPSD), Ministry of Education (MoE) and its related agencies. 
 
5.2.1. Unit of Analysis 
 
The unit analyzed for this study is the Division of Development and Procurement, 
Ministry of Education, Malaysia. This division is responsible for the distribution and 
allocation of fund and projects through out the Ministry of Education. The Division 
main function includes planning, implementation and monitoring infrastructure and 
other development programmes and procurement of goods and services though out 
Malaysia.  
 
The purpose of why the DPSD being selected as the unit for analysis is because the 
researcher can easily access and gather needed information and data. This is possible 
because the researcher was one of the staff in this division. As this study is a 
comparative case study, it will look at the differences in the project implementation 
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of infrastructure and non-infrastructure development of the ESSP from the World 
Bank‟s approach and domestic financing approach under the 8th Malaysian Plan.  
 
The focus will be on the effectiveness of the World Bank financial management 
systems consists of additional conditions and procedures as stipulated rather than 
using the existing government or country financial management systems through out 
the ESSP, that is, before and during project implementation. Further, the unit 
analysis will consists of project management reports prepared by both financing 
operating within two different project implementation units.  This also includes the 
format or model used by various states and districts of the education departments and 
other implementers such as Public Work Department or also known as in Malay as 
Jabatan Kerja Raya (JKR) and Contractors for the purpose of project monitoring and 
evaluation. 
 
5.2.2. Research Techniques 
 
A mixed approach consisting of quantitative and qualitative analysis will be carried 
out in this study. The idea of having a mixed approach in the research methodology 
is to strengthen the evidence, especially in identifying the related risks that have an 
impact on the domestic financing ESSP. As the evidences obtain from various 
sources, quantitative data are still useful, even though the more qualitative data will 
be analyzed in this study. According to Cater (1991): cited in Larbi, 1998), the 
choice of the research approaches depends on the phenomena being investigated, the 
research objectives and the state of existing knowledge. 
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In the quantitative research techniques, questionnaire using the „Lickert Scale‟ was 
used in the data collection on the staff involved in the implementation of domestic 
financing ESSP within the DPSD of MoE. Where as, for the qualitative research 
techniques, semi-structured/in-depth interviews, documentation sources and 
observations were used in the data collection. These similar approaches have been 
used in the study of policy and programme implementation (e.g. Pressman and 
Wildavsky, 1973; Ayee, 1994; and Zifcak, 1994, cited: Larbi, 1998). According to 
Larbi (1998) „One common feature of these studies is that they dealt with processes 
that were complex and which involved several individuals and organizations, 
legislation, rules and norms, as well as the behaviour of actors and stakeholders in 
the process of implementation and its management‟. The sources of information and 
methods of data collection are discussed next.   
 
5.3  Data collection 
 
5.3.1.  Desk Study 
 
The data related to the literature of this study were gathered through sources from the 
internet. The internet was the main source for the study of literature review as it 
provides the researcher with critical and reliable information quickly and accurately. 
This included accessed through the library of University of Birmingham for relevant 
books and articles related to public expenditure management, public financial 
management and also risk management.  Articles were also searched from websites 
of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), World Bank (WB), International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), DFID, PEFA and many others that are too long to be listed here but are 
listed in the bibliography. The literatures were also obtained from the views of the 
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supervisory panel members of my study and also the World Bank Task manager of 
the ESSP involved in the projects. 
 
Documentations such as the Implementation Completion Reports, Bank 
Memorandum and Agreement with the of Malaysia and World Bank Project 
Financial Management System Manual were obtained earlier from the Secretariat of 
the World Bank ESSP at the Educational, Planning and Research Division (EPRD), 
of MoE and the Auditor-General Reports, relevant newspaper articles and selected 
journals.  These references were useful in lending support in informing issues and 
problems raised. Therefore, the literature reviews has helped the researcher in 
building the thesis argument and research questions. They were also useful as they 
helped form the theoretical basis for the conclusion of this research study. 
 
The data collection was carried out in three phases. The first phase was designing the 
research proposal and presenting as well as defending it to scholarship select 
committee at the Ministry level somewhere in May – September 2004 in order to 
secure a scholarship for this study. The second phase involved collection of relevant 
documentations from the EPRD and DPSD of MoE, which was carried out in May – 
September, 2006.  The final stage of this data collection period was in Mid-May – 
Mid-August, 2007. In this stage, the researcher needs to get the approval from the 
Macro Economic Section, Economic Planning Unit of the Prime Minister 
Department, Malaysia (EPU). The EPU will then request the required consent letter 
from the EPRD of MoE, and from one of the Associate Professor in the Business 
Management and Economic Faculty of University Kebangsaan Malaysia (National 
University of Malaysia) for their respective approval and comment about the 
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feasibility and potential of the thesis. The researcher has no obstacle in getting the 
approval from the agencies involved for this study. Once, approval has been given 
the researcher will be able to proceed with data collection which involves conducting 
interviews, distribution of questionnaire, identifying focus-group, selecting sources 
of documentations and carrying out on-site observations. 
 
5.3.2. Interviews 
 
Face-to-face interviews were carried out along with discussions with the relevant 
officials which as the key sources of information. In order to triangulate the 
evidences from supporting documentations, some of contractors involved in the as 
well as the public who consists of parents that were also interviewed during site-
visits. They were among the focus groups of this study. The interviews were either 
in-depth or semi-structured depending on the focus groups. In the case of decision-
makers involved in this case study of the ESSP, in-depth interviews were carried out. 
The idea of collecting the evidences through the interviews at the various levels is to 
ensure that the data gathered will be more reliable. According to Oppenheim (1992), 
the minimization for interviewers will be bias and influence the respondents. 
Furthermore, in-depth interview is one of the central qualitative research tools for 
collecting information on the implementation of the projects. „Asking key 
programme personnel and key stakeholders about the reform process is an important 
method of data collection in implementation research‟ (King et al., 1987, cited in 
Larbi,1998).  Overall, there were about at least 50 interviewees selected to 
participate in this study. They were from various educational backgrounds and levels 
of positions within the Ministry of Education.  This group consists of officers 
working in the MoE head quarters as well as those at the various States Education 
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Departments and Districts Education Offices. The full list of those interviewed and 
their organizational affiliations is provided in Appendix A. The questions for the 
interviews session is enclosed in the Appendix A. 
 
A general interview guide approach was used during interviewing (Quinn Patton, 
1990) and this was based on the research objectives and literature review. Topic 
guides and questions were developed to cover each of the way how fund and project 
being allocated and implemented. This includes the process of payments to the 
contractors and suppliers as well as the process of making their appointment. The 
duration of each interview varies depending on the interviewees‟ position and 
charge, and their perceptions, knowledge, skills and understanding of their 
responsibilities under ESSP and its implications.  
 
5.3.3. Selecting Respondents 
 
The interviewees in this study were not randomly selected but being chosen earlier. 
They were those involved directly with the ESSP in the 8
th
 Malaysian Plan of the 
World Bank and domestic financing. The interviewees were from various positions 
which included the decision-makers in the MoE such as the Deputy-Secretary 
General of Development and Finance, Heads of Departments and Divisions, 
accountants within MoE, Officers from the State Education Department and 
Education District Office. The Head Auditor for the Educational Sector from the 
Office of Auditor-General was also interviewed. Other than that, in order to 
triangulate and improve the reliability of the evidences from the senior officers 
above, supporting staff within the Ministry of Education were also interviewed. 
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In order to conduct the interview sections, appointments with the interviewees were 
set earlier. They were informed of the purpose of the interview and once an 
agreement had been achieved, the interviewer metthe respondents or interviewees at 
the suggested location at the agreed date and time. The location of the interviews 
varied depending on interviewees‟ convenient. The interviews were not only based 
on the questions that been set earlier by the researcher but also they included 
questions that the researcher thought they would greatly help in achieving the 
purpose of the study. But on certain circumstances, the interview was done 
informally when, for example, the researcher happened to coincidently meet the 
interviewees such as the project-contractors and officers from the State and District 
Education Department that were involved in the project management and 
implementation. The interview sessions proved to be very encouraging and useful. 
They managed to highlight many related issues and generate additional information 
concerning this case study. According to (Dev and Silverman (1993), cited in Larbi, 
2005) rightly stated that an interview is a form of discussion or conversation 
prompted by open-ended questions to allow for maximum expression of opinion and 
explanation on certain issues. Even though, some of the interviewees were 
interviewed due to chance encounters by the researcher nonetheless the researcher 
waswell-prepared with the questions to elicit their responses and they were known to 
the researcher to be involved in the ESSP. 
 
The method of recording information from interviews was mostly done by tapes and 
with a tape-recorder. Nonetheless, a few interview sessions were recorded through 
note-taking because they were carried out informally due to the chance encounter 
with the interviewees which included a few sessions with top officials in the earlier 
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stage before a formal appointment was set. The chance interview sessions or rather 
conversations generated some useful information for this study. Perhaps the informal 
situations of the chance encounters allowed the researcher to elicit spontaneous 
responses from the interviewees which would otherwise prove difficult to obtain in a 
formal interview setting. Chance interview sessions gave the researcher an added 
advantage in eliciting a more personal response to the questions asked than other 
possibility. Most of the interviewees were interviewed more than once in order to 
collect further clarifications and information regarding issues that had been brought 
up by other interviewees. The clarification obtained included the matters raised from 
documents provided during the interview sessions earlier. 
 
         5.3.4.     Focus Group  
 
Furthermore, in the case for domestic financing of the ESSP, the researcher included 
two focus groups at different project sites. At the sites, the contractors involved were 
interviewed. Simultaneously, through these interview sessions, the researcher 
obtained first hand impression of the progress of the projects. The other was the local 
communities of the area who stand to benefit from the building of primary school 
that expected to be completed on time or has been abandoned. The purpose of this 
focus group is to identify the cause of the failure of the project and its impact to the 
local communities. Questions for this focus group are also listed in the Appendix A. 
 
5.3.5.   Survey 
 
In this case study, the researcher also used the survey method in collecting data 
through the distribution of questionnaires to the respondents. The selected 
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respondents are the officers and supporting staff in the DPSD of MoE. The purpose 
of this survey is to triangulate with other sources of on the risks factors as according 
to a model stated in the „Orange Book‟ of the HM Treasury of UK on Risk 
Management in Public Sector. The survey was distributed in the morning of the final 
day for the data collection period and collected back from the respondents in the 
evening. The questionnaire was on impact of the risks in domestic financing failures 
discussed earlier in this study. 
 
5.3.6. Electronic Mails 
 
In instances where interview sessions were not able to be carried out, the researcher 
resorted to the used of the electronic mail (e-mail) as a medium of getting relevant 
and important information from the respondents. The two main factors that cause this 
mode of communication and interaction were due to distance and location. For 
instance, in the case of getting information from the World Bank financial 
management specialist who was involved in the project and Malaysian government 
officials from other Ministries. 
 
5.3.7. Documentation 
 
As content analysis is part of the getting evidence for this study, relevant supporting 
documentation materials were provided and analyzed. The materials were official 
documents such as, the World Bank and Government Procedures and Guidelines, 
Officials Contracts, Minutes and Memorandums, Financial/Project Management 
Reports, Progress Reports, Annual Report of the Ministry of Education, articles from 
newspapers and journals.  The researcher agreed with Yin (1989:87) who stated that: 
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„The systematic searches for relevant documents are important in any data collection 
plan‟.  
 
5.3.8.  Direct observation 
 
Direct observations were carried out during the field or site visits. Initially, there 
were 6 sites to be observed as proposed by the Deputy Secretary-General of 
Development and Finance, Ministry of Education, Malaysia. However, due to 
financial constraints, the researcher only managed to visit two sites in the Southern 
State of Johor. The selections of schools visited were based on the record of poor 
performance in terms of project completion and occupancy under the domestic 
financing projects. The visit involved two different schools near to the researcher 
hometown of Johor Baharu. The two primary schools were in the district of Pasir 
Gudang which another in Johor Bahru district itself. Other than that, the researcher 
has managed to observe a primary school project in Taman Danau Desa, Kuala 
Lumpur which was abandoned. 
 
5.4 Reliability 
 
According to Yin (1989: 84, 95-103) among the principles as guidance for data 
collection is the use of multiple sources of evidence, i.e. evidence from more than 
one source but converging on the same set of facts or findings. To achieve this 
objective, the researcher used multiple sources of evidence to ensure reliability of 
this study.  
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5.5  Confidentiality 
 
For confidentiality purposes, the researcher informed the respondents that all 
information given is confidential. Peil et al (1982: 22) have advised: „Those who 
have co-operated in the research should not suffer any ill-effects for it.‟  This is the 
best guarantee if nothing in the report can be traced to specific individuals or groups 
(ibid.). Respondents especially those working in the DPSD were informed to give 
their cooperation throughout the case study period through a memorandum issued by 
the Principal Secretary of DPSD to the staff involved. Sources are only revealed for 
those who were happy to have their views quoted (e.g. some World Bank officials). 
 
5.6 Linking Data to Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
The interviews sessions of those involve directly on the project management were 
asked about the problems normally raised by the contractors or suppliers. Questions 
that relates to financial management as in Appendix A, especially on the current 
practice of financial or project management reporting will be the key for the study 
with respect in looking at and anticipating the possibilities of failures in most 
projects. The purpose of this is to address the main objectives as well as the 
hypothesis 1 and 2. 
 
5.7    Analysis of Data 
 
For this study, the researcher needed to read the documents, interview transcripts and 
notes over repeatedly as stated by Silverman (1993).  Using the research questions as 
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tools for analysis, the researcher highlighted the relevant text critical for this study. 
As documentary materials proved useful, a content analysis was carried out to 
retrieve any useful information that addresses the questions and hypothesis. This 
study does not use factor analysis (or any nonparametric methods) and hence, the 
results should be taken with caution.  Further analyses are described below: 
 
5.7.1.   Content Analysis 
 
The use of documents often entails a specialized approach called content analysis. 
Content analysis is an analytic strategy that entails systematic examination of forms 
of communication to document pattern objectively.  According to Yin (2003) and 
Neuman (2006), with content analysis, a researcher could compare contexts across 
many texts and analyzed it with quantitative techniques (e.g. charts and tables). 
Furthermore, content analysis is a more objectivist approach than other qualitative 
methods. Subsequently, according to Berelson (1952) traditional content analysis 
allows the researcher to obtain an “objective and quantitative description”.  
 
Therefore, for the purpose of this study, the researcher will be using the pattern-
matching and time series analytic techniques for content analysis.  According to Yin 
(2003) for case study analysis, one of the most desirable techniques is using a 
pattern-matching logic. If the patterns coincide, the results can help a case study to 
strengthen its internal validity. Due to that, the researcher compare the procedures, 
guidelines, documents contracts of the World Bank financing and Malaysian 
Government financing for the ESSP especially in relation to financial and risk 
management. The financial management reporting as a tool of managing risk will 
also be analyzed. Furthermore, in comparing the financial management reporting, the 
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World Class Financial Management Elements and the Objective of Financial 
Reporting for Government Bodies as in Chapter 4 in this study will be used for 
analysis purposes.  
 
Through the findings, the researcher will later expect to find some similarities and 
non-similarity of the above. The non-similarities will be highlighted if they have a 
direct impact on the failures of the projects and may also be a contributor to related 
factors that contributed to the failure of a project. These findings will be significant 
in addressing the sub-objectives of this study. Other than that, newspapers articles 
such as the Prime Minister‟s speech and comments from the Auditor-General Office 
will also be analysed further in support of the study. 
 
The analysis of the content especially of the progress reports will consist of 
observations made in identifying the trend of time duration for progress payments 
made, the amount of approved and unapproved variation orders, date of beginning 
and completion of projects, the differences between the initial cost and actual cost, 
and the date of handing over and the occupancy of the building. The data from this 
trend or time series analysis will be collected and analyzed as supporting data for the 
factors that may contributed to project failures. Furthermore, it will be useful as a 
source of evidence for this study and for the interviewing process especially 
involving top management of the project implementation. 
 
In content analysis, the unit of analysis will vary accordingly; it can be word, a 
phrase, a theme, a plot, a newspaper article or a character. The measurement used in 
content analysis structured observation which is a systematic, careful observation 
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based on written rules that explained how to categorize and classify observations. 
The written rules make replication possible and help improve reliability. The coding 
systems therein identified four characteristics of text content consisting of frequency, 
direction, intensity and space.  
 
5.7.2. Interviews, Focus Groups and Site Visit 
 
In supporting the content analysis, the analysis of the interviews will be looking at 
any similarities on the factors that caused failures. This analysis also applies to the 
focus group especially in relation to meeting their expectations for project 
completion, and the cost and impact they faced in the case of project failures. In site 
visit done by the researcher has ascertain the evidence of the cause of the failures. 
 
 5.7.3.   Survey 
 
The survey was carried out with the aim to triangulate the evidences gathered from 
other sources such as interviews and reports on domestic financing of the ESSP. The 
questionnaire used the „Lickert‟ Scale of 1 to 4.  The analysis of the data collected 
from the survey was carried out using SPSS. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
 
In this study the researcher uses comparative or multiple case studies of World Bank 
and the Government of Malaysia to reveal their respective practices in managing 
infrastructure development of the ESSP. The comparisons focus on how risk and 
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financial management and financial management reporting for a project are carried 
out from the beginning of the project until its completions. 
 
The data collected will be analysed using content analysis of the various related 
documentations including those from the World Bank and the MoE, and supported 
by the interviews conducted, and on-site visits of the selected projects. 
 
In analysing the data, according to Yin (2003), in a case study, it is advisable that 
pattern-matching and time-series can be used for the analysis. The pattern-matching 
logic is considered more reliable than the comparative study. The researcher can 
readily compare and match, any similarities in the procedures that were carried out. 
In the content analysis, the unit of analysis varies as it can be a word, a phrase, a 
theme, a plot, a newspaper articles or a character.  
 
The measurement used in content analysis is the structured observation. The written 
rules make replication possible and help improve reliability. The coding systems 
have also helped identify four characteristics of text content consisting of frequency, 
direction, intensity and space. This also applies to the analysis of the interviews and 
focus group too. 
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PART 2 
ANALYSIS 
 
Part 2 of this study contains three chapters. It addresses the research framework 
questions as developed in Part 1 to the evidence regarding management of risks in 
project finance and implementation. The results compare the effectiveness of the 
approaches to risk management in Educational Sector Support Projects (ESSP) by 
the World Bank and Government of Malaysia for the ESSP. 
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Chapter 6 
 
How well do project management reports reduce risks? A Comparison between 
the World Bank and Government of Malaysia project management reporting in 
the Educational Sector Support Project (ESSP). 
 
 6.1 Introduction 
 
Part II of this study contains three chapters. It addresses the research framework 
questions as developed in Part 1 as evidence on the management of risks in project 
finance and implementation. The results compare the effectiveness of the approaches 
to risk management in Educational Sector Support Projects (ESSP) by the World 
Bank and Government of Malaysia for the ESSP. 
 
This chapter distinguishes the approaches to project management reporting and 
compares their impact on risks. Section 2 briefly outlines the purpose of the analysis; 
Section 3 includes the results, and Section 4 summarizes and concludes the findings 
of the chapter. 
 
6.2  Purpose 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to address the research framework questions in 
achieving the research question of no. 2; sub-objective no. 1; and hypothesis no. 1 as 
stated in Chapter 1 of this study. 
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6.3 Results of the Analysis 
 
This section will firstly identify the differences in approach of reporting between the 
World Bank and Government of Malaysia in preparing the Project Management 
Report or Financial Management Report (PMR/FMR). The difference in approaches 
of reporting will include the frequency in which the reports have been updated to the 
top management. Secondly, the effectiveness of the reports (PMR/FMR) between the 
World Bank and the Government of Malaysia were compared using the standards 
and criteria stated earlier that were related to effective project financial management 
system in mitigating risks related to public financial management and aid.  
 
Therefore, the results of the analysis are as follows: 
 
6.3.1.  Format and contents of PMR 
 
The World Bank Approach   
 
Generally, the results revealed that there were variants in terms of the format and 
content of the reports (PMR/FMR) prepared or implemented between the World 
Bank approach and the Government of Malaysia approach.  However, initial findings 
identified that the report prepared and implemented for the ESSP in the Eighth 
Malaysian Plan under the World Bank approach is different from the original 
components of PMR/FMR as proposed in the World Bank Financial Management 
Manual (1998) applicable to all World Bank financed projects.  The revised version 
of PMR/FMR format was approved by the World Bank and Government of Malaysia 
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during the negotiation meeting in Clause No. 9 and Clause No. 10 in the Guidelines 
of the Project Management Report. This is stated in the Agreed Minutes of 
Negotiations between Malaysia and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development for the purposed Educational Sector Support Project (ESSP) dated 
February 11
th
, 1999. The modification of the PMR content is also stated in the 
Exposure Draft of the World Bank Project Financial Management Manual (1999) on 
clause 2.2.2 page 16. The components of the main PMR/FMR as well as other 
supporting reports prepared in the World Bank approach are shown in Table 6.1.  
 
Table 6.1 – Component and content of PMR implemented in the World Bank 
Approach for the ESSP in Malaysia 
  
 Components  Report 
A Financial and Disbursements 
Reports (based on payments 
made 
1-A   Project Sources and Uses of Funds 
by Activity 
1-B Project Cash Withdrawals 
1-C Special Account Statement 
1-D Project Cash Forecast 
 
B Project Procurement and 
Progress Reports (based on 
expenditure incurred) – Output 
Monitoring Report 
2-A Procurement and Progress Reports 
on Execution of Works 
2-B Procurement and Progress Reports 
on Goods 
2-C Procurement and Progress Reports 
on Consultants Services 
 
C Additional reports prepared by 
sub-implementers  
Annex 1 - Progress Report 
Annex 2 - summary of 
Comparative Statement of Project Cost and 
Commitments 
 
 
The changes or modification of the PMR/FMR had shown that the World Bank as a 
donor is still flexible in their conditionality for the purpose of financial management 
reporting.  The main reports, consolidated PMR consists of A and B above, was 
prepared by the Project Accountant of Project Implementation Units (PIUs). The 
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sub-reports as in „C‟ above were prepared by the sub-implementers that used the 
fund for the purpose of ESSP. 
 
Government of Malaysia Approach 
 
In the Government of Malaysia approach, the findings revealed only two reports that 
were related to Project Management Reports were prepared by the implementers of 
Primary, Secondary and Supporting Units, Development Division, Ministry of 
Education. The reports are as follows: 
 
1- Progress Report of the Procurement of Works 
2- Monthly Estimated Cash Flow Report 
 
The contents of the “Progress Report of the Procurement of Works (No.1)” prepared 
by the three implementers varies among each other.  Subsequently, these variations 
were more obvious when they were compared to the World Bank approach. 
According to the officer-in-charge, the formatting and contents were based on the 
officers‟ own experience and instinct, and what inputs which were given by the 
previous officer in charge. (Source: email dated 19
th
 of April and 23
rd
 of April, 2007, 
and interview, refer Appendix A – Interview Session). Therefore, there were no 
consistency and harmony in reporting among the implementers even though they 
were from the same section. Furthermore, the situation was worsen when the 
findings also revealed that there was no standard format prepared or proposed by the 
Treasury or Government of Malaysia purposely for project management.  The 
variants or differences can be clearly seen as in Table 6.2 below: 
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Table 6.2 - Differences in content of „Progress Report for the Procurement of Works‟ 
prepared by World Bank and Government of Malaysia (Primary Unit, Development 
Division, Ministry of Education Malaysia) 
 
World Bank Approach Government of Malaysia Approach 
1. Name of Works/projects 
2. Estimated Cost 
3. Bids Invited Date – From 
4. Bids Invited Date – To 
5. Date of Award approved by GOM 
6. Date of no objection by the Bank 
(where required) 
7. Name of Contractor 
8. Adjusted Contract Value 
9. Agreement Number and Date 
10. Date of Start of Work 
11. Period of Completion (EOT) 
12. Expenditure as per Payment Certified 
13. Expenditure as per Actual Payment 
Made 
Remarks regarding current progress of works 
(original contract value RM) 
1. Name of Works/Projects 
2. Name of Contractor 
3. Contract Value 
4. Date as per contract – Start and 
End 
5. Progress Status in Percentage 
6. Status of project  
7. Name of PMC 
8. Final Account (empty) 
9.  Remarks regarding the current 
status such as date of operation 
10. Date of LI and LA 
Extension of Time (Numbers) 
 
 
The situation is more critical in the differences and inconsistency of reporting 
between the units responsible for the „Secondary‟ and „Supporting‟ Units under the 
Government of Malaysia approach. This is shown in Table 6.3. 
 
Table 6.3 – Variants in reporting in Government of Malaysia approach between Secondary 
and Supporting Unit of Development Division, Ministry of Malaysia 
 
Secondary Unit Supporting Unit 
1. Name of Works/Projects 
2. Name of Contractor 
3. Contract Value 
4. Date as per contract – Start and 
End 
5. Progress Status in Percentage 
6. Status of project  
      7.   Name of PMC 
1. Name of Works/Projects 
2. Name of Contractor 
3. Contract Value 
4. Date as per contract – Start and End 
5. Progress Status in Percentage 
6. Status of project  
7. Name of PMC 
8. Final Account (empty) 
9.  Remarks regarding the current status 
such as date of operation 
10. Date of LI and LA 
      11. Extension of Time (Numbers) 
 
  124 
6.3.2. Frequency of Reporting 
  
The World Bank Approach 
 
The main PMR/FMR was prepared by the Project Accountant and the Progress 
Report of Annex 1 and Annex 2 were prepared by the sub-implementers. The reports 
were prepared on a monthly basis even though the main PMRs/FMRs were 
submitted quarterly to the World Bank as required. The monthly updating of the 
progress reports was due to the demand by the top management in ensuring effective 
project monitoring and progress review of the World Bank ESSP both in terms of 
financial and non-financial aspects. The reports were presented in the Project 
Coordination Committee Meeting (PCC) which was chaired by the Deputy Secretary 
General (Finance and Development) of the Ministry of Education Malaysia. The 
committee also included representatives from the Treasury of Ministry of Finance; 
Economic Planning Unit of the Prime Minister Department; an appointed 
representative for the Auditor-General of Malaysia who is the external auditor and 
Head of Department and Divisions within the Ministry of Education, Malaysia.  
 
The practice of presenting the reports in a timely manner managed to overcome the 
issues of shortage of funding, projects failures and delays in producing the annual 
financial reports required by the Auditor General of Malaysia. Furthermore, the 
reports were also referred to in   the World Bank Supervision Mission Meeting held 
twice a year.  The consistency in reporting was supported through the interviews 
conducted on those involved in the preparation and implementation of the Reports 
such as Annex 1 and Annex 2. They agreed that the monthly held PCC meeting had 
demanded them to prepare the reports such as in Annex 1 and Annex 2 (as in Table 
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6.1 (c) page 121) in a timely manner. The report was a standard format prepared by 
all the implementers who were involved with the projects or programs. The 
effectiveness and usefulness of the reports were also supported by the Deputy-
Secretary General (Finance and Development) of Ministry of Education and the 
Auditor General for Educational Project.  
 
Furthermore, the consistency in the preparation of the report which included therein 
the latest reliable data was supported by the World Bank official through their 
„Implementation Completion Report (SCL-4451)‟ page 15, paragraph 7.6 on 
„Implementing Agency‟ as follows: 
 
„The Borrower‟s PCC also conducted monthly meetings to review the status of the 
project.‟ 
 
The Government of Malaysia Approach 
 
In the case of the frequency of preparing the report, the frequency of updating the 
progress report in the Domestic financing also varies even though it had been stated 
in the Manual Procedures of Works that the report must be prepared on a monthly 
basis. According to the evidence from the officers-in-charge from two of the three 
units of Domestic financing project, the updating of the reports depends on the 
progress report submitted to them by the appointed Project Management Consultants 
(PMC). Consequently, if the consultants delay the submission of the progress 
reports, then the Units will not be able to update in the preparation of their reports as 
required (source : Appendix A – Interview Session). 
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The difficulties in getting the progress status of the projects managed by the PMCs 
were lied behind the fact that when even after repeated calls and emails for the 
progress reports were made by the researcher with the help of the officers-in-charge 
of the projects, there was a lack of cooperation form the PMCs. The respond was 
discouraging and even frustrating in the sense that only 1 out of the 20 PMCs 
involved in the Primary Academic projects responded to the email.  The line of 
communication through emails were worst went some of the emails sent were 
rejected due to lack of recognition for email addresses.  
 
The aim of the researcher to obtain the reports personally from the PMCs was to 
triangulate the findings gathered from the officers-in-charge. The researcher tried to 
get more information on the current status of the respective projects managed by the 
PMCs from the officers-in-charge of the projects such as the actual expenditure 
incurred or cost of the projects as well as the target date of occupancy of finished 
projects.  However, this proved to be difficult and the researcher was advised to 
obtain it personally from the PMCs of the projects. 
  
Therefore, we can justify that the reports were not up-dated as they were supposed to 
be in the procedures manual. This situation is an indication of poor cash flow 
management which eventually contributed to the risks to the projects such as being 
abandoned or delayed due to the shortage of funds. 
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6.3.3.   Comparison of PMR/FMR effectiveness in managing risks related to 
public financial management and aid with reference to the “Objectives 
of Accounting and Financial Reporting for Government Unit” and 
“World Class Financial Management for Public Sector”. 
  
The aim of this section is to compare the effectiveness of the PMR implemented by 
the World Bank and Government of Malaysia in the ESSP under the Eighth 
Malaysian Plan.  
 
The PMR implemented by the World Bank and the Government of Malaysia were 
used as the basis for comparison. This comparison process is further supported by 
evidences gather from various sources such as interviews and supporting documents. 
The result of the analysis will serve as a basis for evaluating the effectiveness of the 
financial management systems between the World Bank and that of the Government 
of Malaysia in managing projects under the ESSP. The evaluation is carried out with 
reference to the study by Drebin, Chan & Ferguson (1981) on “Objectives of 
Accounting and Financial Reporting for Government Unit”.  Further, the standards 
and criteria set by the Audit Commission of the HM Treasury UK and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005) on “World Class Financial Management for Public 
Sector” are also referred to and used for the analysis.  
 
The purpose of using the two various studies between the study by Drebin, Chan & 
Ferguson (1981) on “Objectives of Accounting and Financial Reporting for 
Government Unit” and the standards and criteria set by the Audit Commission of the 
HM Treasury UK and Price Water House Coopers (2005) on “World Class Financial 
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Management for Public Sector” is because they complement each other and thus 
provide a better overall view for the researcher to use them as the basis for effective 
financial management system related to public financial management and aid in the 
public sector.  Analyzing as well as using these two approaches will increase the 
level of reliability that the reports prepared were more effective in managing risks 
related to public financial management and aid. 
 
Comparison of PMR effectiveness using the study by Drebin, Chan & Ferguson 
(1981) on “Objectives of Accounting and Financial Reporting for Government 
Units” 
 
In analyzing the effectiveness of the reports in reducing risks, 5 criteria been used 
from the study by Drebin, Chan & Ferguson above. The results revealed the 
followings: 
 
Short-term financial resources 
 
The short-term financial resources aims to provide financial information that are 
useful for determining and predicting the flows, balances and requirements of short-
term financial resources of the governmental unit involved in the ESSP (1981: pg 
126) 
  
Summary of findings:  The analysis of the PMR showed that the World Bank 
approach is more effective in reducing the risks as compared to the approach 
carried out by the Government of Malaysia. Thus, it is perhaps safe to deduced that 
the World Bank approach is more useful in avoiding the risks of projects delays and 
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abandonment as well as, in determining the requirement for short-term financial 
resources. 
 
The World Bank Approach 
 
The „Opening Cash‟ and „Closing Cash‟ Balances in the Sources and Applications of 
Funds by Activities (Report 1-A) is very useful as a basis for ensuring the amount of 
„cash in hand‟. This serves as an important indicator in monitoring flows as 
sufficient amount of cash helps to fulfil short-term demand situations. 
  
In addition, Report 1-A also disclosed the actual and planned expenditure amount for 
the current project with the variance analysis column if any. This is very useful in 
assisting the user in predicting the outflow of funds more accurately. The content of 
Report 1-A is also applicable in Annex 1 and Annex 2 as prepared by the sub-
implementers. In addition, Report 1-A is also coordinated with Report 1-C known as 
the „Special Account‟. The „Special Account‟ showed the amount of „Cash in hand 
or bank‟. This is to ensure that the amount of cash can be easily monitored and made 
available in anticipation of over-spending and meeting any future shortage of fund of 
future obligations especially in the short-term aspects. Therefore, expenditures were 
to be disbursed based on cash requirements rather than a result of uncontrolled 
spending.  
 
The „Special Account‟ also assisted the implementers especially the project 
accountant to prepare the Report 1-D of the PMR, known as the „Project Cash 
Forecast for cash requirement‟ for the next two quarters. The „Project Cash Forecast 
for cash requirement‟ is part of a financial management tool in ensuring that the 
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funds are available on requests which may help to avoid other impacts such as 
project delays and poor quality workmanship of buildings. The delay in payment as a 
result of the shortage of funds will also adversely affect service delivery planned 
earlier.  
 
The effectiveness of the above reports in the World Bank approach is supported with 
the evidence from the interview with 8 respondents who prepared the Annex 1 and 
Annex 2 in managing cash flow for short-term requirement. The respondents stated 
that the reports Annex 1 and 2 were very useful in assisting them to predict the 
needed amount for short-term obligations. This is because the reports themselves are 
very detailed containing the opening balance, allocation amount, the expenditure 
incurred and planned as well as closing balances. The reports were also fruitful as a 
management tool for project cash requirement for any expenditure incurred. They 
also agreed that the reports assist them in monitoring the progress of their respective 
projects or programs both financially and non-financially (Source: Appendix A – 
Interview Session). 
 
The Government of Malaysia Approach 
 
 
In the government approach, the nature of the reports prepared by the implementers 
had less impact in determining short-term financing. Besides, the non-consistent or 
harmonization of contents in the report prepared by the implementers i.e., the 
„Progress Report for the Procurement of Work‟ had failed to show the amount of the 
Opening balance; Closing balance; expenditure incurred for current, planned and the 
amount as to-date.   
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Furthermore, only one report was disclosed upon request by the researcher which 
was known as, „Progress Report of the Project‟. The report was prepared by the 
respective project implementing units. Even though the progress report is almost 
similar to the Progress Report 2-A in the World Bank approach, but the absent or 
non-existence of the expenditure-to-date and revised contract costs column are 
crucial in determining the amount paid and outstanding for any future payment.   
 
Therefore, the weakness of the report in the Government approach is crucial in 
determining and predicting the balance and availability of fund.  This resulted in the 
ability to predict the short-term obligations such as the demand for immediate 
payments by the contractors and supplies when they are due.  In the interviews 
conducted on enquiring about how they determined the short-term financial 
resources as there were no identifications of the actual expenditure to date in the 
report, the respondents stated that the amount of expenditure incurred were not under 
their control and could be obtained from the „Planning and Budget‟ Unit of DPSD or 
Project Management Consultants (PMCs) (Source: Appendix A – Interview 
Session). 
   
Furthermore, the weakness of the report prepared, as well as the delays by PMCs in 
producing the requested reports to the officers-in-charge impacted the current status 
of the projects both financially and non-financially. This affected the accuracy of the 
figures as they were outdated when it was needed for decision-making purposes. 
This made the officers-in-charge unable to determine and predict the short-term 
financial resources in the most effective manner. This development has significantly 
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contributed to the failure of the completion of most projects as it can be seen in 
Table 6.4. 
 
Table 6.4 - The comparison of the number of Primary Schools projects financed by 
the World Bank and Government of Malaysia for the New Primary Educational 
Infrastructure Development Project under the Eighth Malaysian Plan. 
  
 Domestic Financing  Phase 1 
(managed by PMC) 
World Bank 
(managed by JKR) 
 Unit Percentage Unit Percentage 
Completed on Schedule 93 31.84 30 88.24 
LAD 1 103 35.27 3 8.82 
LAD 2 46 15.75   
LAD 3 19 6.52   
LAD 4 3 1.03   
Postponed 20 6.85   
Terminated & Continued 4 1.37 *1 2.94 
Under Construction 4 1.37   
Total 292 100.00 34 100.00 
* Terminate and Withdraw from the World Bank due to non-compliance of Bank 
Procedures. 
 
Based from the above Table 6.4, the results showed that about 88.24 percent of the 
projects by the World Bank approach were completed on schedule as compared to 
31.84 percent by the Government approach. The results also indicate that out of 292 
of the total projects managed by the Primary Education Unit for in the Government 
approach, 103 or 35.27 percent were delayed, 20 were postponed and 8 projects were 
terminated earlier and were still under construction even after the end of the 8
th
 
Malaysian Plan.  
 
Furthermore, the failure in determining short-term financial resources that 
contributed to the projects being at risk was supported by other evidence obtained 
from the report as listed in the „List of claiming of exemption of LAD 
Bil.No.4/2006‟. In this report, there were about 197 schools consisting of 191 
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primary and 6 secondary schools in the Government approach managed by the 
Project Management Consultants (PMCs) claimed for exemption of the LAD. The 
reasons or justifications of the claims by the contractors involved according to the 
PMCs are shown in Table 6.5 below. 
 
Table 6.5 - Justifications of the contractors in claiming the 90 days exemptions of 
„LAD‟ 
 
 Justifications / Reasons for delay and exemption of LAD Primary 
School 
1 Delay in Initial Payment by the MOE. 47 
2 Delay in Progress Payment by the MOE. 37 
3 Delay in soil and other matters by IKRAM. 7 
4 Failure of PMC in managing the project. 0 
5 Unpredictable weather. 11 
6 Lack of experience in managing project. 4 
7 Delay due to insufficient Cash flow by the contractor. 3 
8 Delay in locating the project location by the School authority 
and the District Education Department. 
43 
9 Delay and shortage of material supplies. 56 
10 Delay in starting the work by the contractor. 29 
11 Delay by the Electrical Power Authority (TNB). 3 
12 Delay and red tape by the Local Authority. 37 
13 Shortage of Labour 8 
14 No. Reasons but requested for LAD exemption. 32 
15 Simply to avoid losses in proceeding the project 1 
 
The findings from Table 6.5 above, discovered that 47 primary education projects 
were not completed according to schedule which were due to the delay in making the 
initial payment by the Ministry of Education (MoE). In addition, 37 of the projects 
delayed were due to a delay in making progress payment by MoE. The incompletion 
of projects according to schedule brought a significant impact on service delivery. 
  
The issue of delays in making payments to the contractors, regarding the fact that 
even though the projects were completed, caught the attention of the Prime Minister 
of Malaysia in 2005 (Source: Utusan Malaysia, February 17
th
, 2005). He instructed 
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the ministries to make immediate payments of the amount outstanding. The Prime 
Minister statement was stated in the Malaysian national newspapers including the 
„Utusan Malaysia‟ dated February 17th, 2005. Subsequently, the Minister of 
Education, Malaysia promised to make the payment amounting to a total of RM15 
million which would be made with the initial amount of RM3 million to RM6 
million.  
 
The above problem of the shortage of funds and delays in payments in the 
Government approach was also highlighted in the implementation strategies of the 
„Ministry of Education - National Education Policy‟ (2005:pg.153). In the New 
Policy Statement, the Development and Supply Division suggested effective 
financial management strategies as below: 
 
No. 7 - Enhancing process of payment; and 
No. 10 - Expand and enhance the proficiency and expertise of the Ministry‟s                        
                      staff in the field of development and procurement. 
 
Economic condition 
 
Can the PMR provide financial information useful for determining and 
predicting the economic conditions of the governmental unit and changes 
therein (1981: pg. 127) 
 
As the project life will take more than a year, it should have a long term economic 
value. Likewise,  a full disclosure of the projects through reporting will be helpful in 
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determining the value and predicting the potential resources for future outflows 
which results from existing commitments.  
 
Summary of findings:  The full disclosure in the World Bank approach proved that 
the PMR can provide useful information to determine and to predict the economic 
condition. As detailed in the Report 2-A in anticipation of future obligations such as 
maintenance of the assets. 
 
The World Bank Approach 
 
The findings revealed that the Report 2-A known as the „Progress Report on 
Procurement of Works‟ is prepared in detail and comprehensively. It complies with 
the full disclosure of a good financial reporting which includes reporting on both 
financial and non-financial aspects of the project implemented. Information on the 
projects provided included the completion date, date of occupancy, revised contract 
sum and the actual expenditure. In addition, as the report is updated monthly, it is 
useful for the users, especially the decision-makers to determine the economic well-
being of the government unit such as predicting the amount of maintenance needed 
for future outflows or commitments. Consequently, it achieved the objective of 
determining and predicting the cost of programs or services provided by the 
government unit involved. This would be useful for accounting and financial 
reporting purposes when the actual figures are disclosed in the report.  This involves 
information regarding the „Contract Date‟; „Date of Occupancy‟; and „Final Contract 
Sum‟ for the project. This information have significant impact on the future cash 
obligation such as retention funds, deposits as well as the warranty period of parties 
involved i.e. between the Government of Malaysia and the suppliers or contractors. 
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Therefore, information given is helpful in determining the amount to be paid by the 
government when the time is due. 
 
Furthermore, the idea of determining the cost of programs or services provided by 
the government is to ensure that the government has enough funds in meeting the 
cost of the programs in the future such as the cost of maintenance after the lapse of 
the warranty period. The idea is to avoid risk in cash flow management in the future 
which will affect not only the current projects but also the future projects which had 
been planned. 
 
The effectiveness of the Report 2-A is supported by the evidences from the Senior 
Assistant Secretary (Technical Unit) of the DPSD who is also the senior architect; 
and the PIUs Team (Project Manager, Architect, Procurement Officer, Civil 
Engineer and Accountant) for the World Bank approach (Source: Appendix A –
Interview Session). According to them, the effectiveness in decision-making for 
planning was due to the transparent and detail reporting.  The reports proves to be 
useful for other various purposes too including determining the amount and the date 
of when the retention fund need to be refunded to the contractors and suppliers. 
 
The Government of Malaysia Approach 
 
The findings revealed that the limitations of the report prepared by the implementers 
were unable to assist the users to make better decisions regarding matters for 
example, predicting the amount needed for future commitment to be bear by the 
government entities in terms of the cost of maintenance. As we compare the 
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approaches between the World Bank and Government of Malaysia, the differences 
can be seen as in Table 6.6 below.  
 
 
Table 6.6 – Comparison of Content of Tthe Progress Report for Procurement of 
Works 
 
Content of Progress Report for Procurement of Works 
(Primary Education Project) 
 
World Bank Approach 
 
GoM Approach 
1.  Name of Works/projects 
2. Estimated Cost 
3. Bids Invited Date – From 
4. Bids Invited Date – To 
5. Date of Award approved by GOM 
6. Date of no objection by the Bank (where 
required) 
7. Name of Contractor 
8. Adjusted Contract Value 
9. Agreement Number and Date 
10. Date of Start of Work 
11. Period of Completion (EOT) 
12. Expenditure as per Payment Certified 
13. Expenditure as per Actual Payment Made 
14. Remarks regarding current progress of 
works (Original contract value RM) 
 
1. Name of Works/Projects 
2. Name of Contractor 
3. Contract Value 
4. Date as per contract – Start 
and End 
5. Progress Status in Percentage 
6. Status of project  
7. Name of PMC 
8. Final Account (empty) 
9.  Remarks regarding the 
current status such as date of 
operation 
10. Date of LI and LA 
11. Extension of Time 
(Numbers) 
 
 
In Table 6.6 above, we can see that there is no „Revised Contract Cost‟; „Actual 
Expenditure‟; „Final Accounts‟; and the „Date of Completions‟ for the GoM 
approach as compared to the World Bank approach particularly for the Primary 
Education Unit. This difference also applied for other units such as Secondary and 
Supporting unit of DPSD. 
 
Therefore, the non-disclosure of the revising contract cost and the actual amount of 
expenditure which were incurred through out the projects will contribute to the 
difficulties in determining and predicting the economic conditions of the government 
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unit such as predicting the amounts and timing of future outflow. This included 
difficulties in determining and predicting the cost of programs such as the future cash 
commitment by the government especially in forecasting the future maintenance cost 
or any penalty charges. This may also resulted in unauthorized amount paid to the 
contractors or suppliers which will then have a significant impact on the cash flow 
management. This situation can lead to overpaying or shortage in underpaying the 
contractors that will eventually put the projects at risks. 
 
The weaknesses of the report are supported with the evidence gathered from 
electronic mails and interviews from the officers-in-charge of the reports. They 
stated that the non-standardization of reports prepared were due to the content of 
report which was handed down from a previous senior officers. One of the officers 
stated that the report was created by himself based on the needs of the projects 
(source: Appendix A – Interview Session). 
 
Furthermore, during the interview sessions, according to the officers-in-charge, in 
order for the researcher to get more information about the project especially the 
figures that shows the actual cost and expenditure to-date as well as the date of 
occupancy, the researcher thus had to contact the Project Management Consultants 
(PMCs) who were responsible for the projects.  The information can also be obtained 
through the „SPPII‟ from a special unit in the DPSD.  Therefore, it will be difficult 
and more risky in the Government of Malaysia approach in determining and 
predicting the demand for refund of the retention fund and future maintenance. 
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Legal, Contractual and Fiduciary Requirements 
 
Can the PMR provide financial information that are useful for monitoring 
performance under terms of legal, contractual and fiduciary requirements? 
(1981: pg.127) 
 
This objective refers to the need of the project by programs or activities which are 
paid according to the terms of agreement in the contract. It ensures that the report is 
useful for monitoring the progress payment made to the respective project in 
accordance with the legal or contractual requirement. 
 
Summary of findings:  The evidence stated in the World Bank „Implementation 
Completion Report‟ and the top management comments on the role of PCC and PIU 
had contributed to the successful implementation and completion of the ESSP in 
ensuring that the funds were disbursed only on approved activities. 
 
The World Bank Approach 
 
The comprehensiveness of the main PMR/FMR is useful for project monitoring that 
only authorized projects or programmes will be paid for when demanded. For 
example, The Progress Report for Procurement of Works (Report 2-A), Progress 
Report for Procurement of Goods (Report 2-B) and Progress Report for Procurement 
of Consultants (Report 2-C) showed the name of the contractors/suppliers and 
contract references. In addition, as it was complemented with the other reports, i.e. in 
the case where any charges for payments would also be noted in the Project Cash 
Withdrawals (Report 1-B) and on the allocated projects or programs or activities 
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(Report 1-A). Any unauthorized charges can be detected when the balance of the 
reports did not match each other. This also applies to the expenditure in the Annex 1 
prepared by the implementers of the World Bank financing.  
 
Therefore, the consistency and the comprehensiveness of the reports will assist in 
ensuring that only authorized and approved programs or projects were accounted for 
the payments made. This measure assisted in avoiding any misleading of fund to 
unauthorized activities or programs. It avoids risks in mismanagement of fund such 
as in the case of „virement‟ and non-authorized projects or activities as well. 
Furthermore, it will be very useful for the auditors to proceed with their auditing 
duties.  
 
The effectiveness of this report is supported with the evidence from the officers-in-
charge for the soft component program such as „Training‟ in the World Bank 
approach. They agreed that the Annex 1 and Annex 2 supplementary reports they 
prepared were really useful in ensuring that payments would be made according to 
activities or programs that had been approved as in terms of contracts. With the 
reports, they can also monitor the performance of both financial and non-financial 
components in their respective programs or activities so as to ensure that they 
reached the stipulated target (Source: Appendix A – Interview Session).   
 
The main PMR/FMR is also supported by a statement from the ex-Deputy Secretary 
General (Finance and Development), Ministry of Education that is also the Chairman 
of the Project Coordination Committee (PCC) of the ESSP World Bank. According 
to him, the monthly PCC meeting held with the intention of monitoring the progress 
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of the programs or projects both financial and non-financial closely. This was to 
ensure that the funds were spent according to the programs or projects approved 
earlier. Furthermore, the reconciliation exercises carried out between the Project 
Accountant and the sub-implementers were useful in ensuring that expenditure made 
was only for authorized activities as in the terms of contract.  
 
The commitment of the PCC is supported by the World Bank Task Manager, as 
reported in the Implementation Completion Report (SCL-44510), page 13, paragraph 
6.2. on „Transition arrangement to regular operations‟. Among the content of the 
report is as following: 
 
„MOE/MOHE uses a formal process to manage the transition of project activities to 
regular operations. Each project activity must first be fully completed under the 
project‟s budget and authority of the PCC and the PIU. After completion, each 
project activity must be reviewed and inspected by the PCC/PIU to ensure that all 
project objectives have been met for that activity, including required civil works and 
the procurement of goods and services. Concurrently, PCC/MOE and 
State/Institutional authorities must also review and inspect each activity, and must 
agree that all project objectives for that activity have been reached and that the 
quality of the work is satisfactory‟.  
 
The report above reflected the commitment of those involved in the World Bank 
approach for the ESSP in Malaysia especially the PCC, in ensuring that only 
approved activities were authorized for payments when demanded. 
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The Government of Malaysia Approach 
 
The inconsistency in updating the reports which rely on the Project Management 
Consultants (PMCs) made a back lock in updating the current status of the projects 
in the GoM approach. Even though with the availability of the names of the 
contractors or suppliers as well as the contract cost and contract period but the non-
existence of the expenditure incurred to-date contributed to difficulties in 
determining the actual amount paid and any future amount to be paid accordingly. 
Furthermore, the non-inclusion of the completion date and the date of occupancy had 
further contributed to the inability of determining the actual amount to be paid or 
reimbursed in the case for retention fees and deposits as well as penalties. Therefore, 
this can result in the risk of over-payment and unauthorized progress payment for a 
particular project.  
 
The risks created in the GoM approach on unauthorized progress payment were 
supported with evidences from the electronic mails and interviews conducted with 
the officers-in-charge. They agreed that the lack of exposure in reporting and the 
non-standardization of the reports contributed to the problem in making payment. 
The situations worsen when officials claimed having difficulties in updating the 
reports due to difficulties in getting the necessary information requested from the 
PMCs (Source: Appendix A – Interview Session).  
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Planning and Budgeting 
 
Can the PMR provide useful information for planning and budgeting, and for 
predicting the impact of the acquisition and allocation of resources on the 
achievement of operational objectives? (1981: pg. 128) 
 
Summary of findings:  Financial planning and budgeting are crucial in ensuring that 
enough resources for future obligations can be met and help reducing the risks in 
managing public fund. The comprehensiveness of the reports prepared in the World 
Bank approach is capable of assisting those involved in the project to do their 
planning and budgeting effectively as compared to the Government of Malaysia 
approach.  
 
The World Bank Approach 
 
In achieving the above objective for planning and budgeting, the result showed that 
the reports in the main PMR consisting of Report on Project Sources and Uses of 
Funds by Activity (Report 1-A); Report on Project Cash Withdrawals (Report 1-B); 
Report on Special Account Statement (Report 1-C); Procurement and Progress 
Report on Execution of Works (Report 2-A); Procurement and Progress Report on 
Goods (Report 2-B); and Procurement and Progress Reports on Consultants Services 
(Report 2-C)  provided very useful financial information for the Project Accountant 
to prepare the Project Cash Forecast (Report 1-D) for the purposed of financial 
planning and forecasting.  
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In the Project Cash Forecast (Report 1-D), the financial for cash requirement for the 
next two quarters is accounted for. The report also has the current closing balance as 
in the Report on Special Account Statement (Report 1-C), and is useful in 
determining the amount of additional cash required for the next two quarter based on 
the expected financial planning and forecasting. Through this mechanism the 
implementers can avoid mismanagement of cash in hand or in the bank especially at 
the end of the year. 
 
The effectiveness of the report prepared in the World Bank approach was also 
supported by the sub-implementers who prepared Annex 1 and Annex 2. The 
respondents stated that the disclosure of financial and non-financial information such 
as actual, planned and targeted as in the Annex 1 and Annex 2, contributed to the 
effectiveness of preparing their financial planning and forecasting. They added that 
the reports were very useful as a guideline in requesting additional fund from the 
Project Accountant especially during the beginning of the financial year.  The reports 
also boost their capabilities in controlling the financial aspect of the ESSP World 
Bank under the Eighth Malaysian Plan (source: Appendix A – Interview Session). 
 
The Government of Malaysia Approach 
 
  
The nature of the Progress Report that does not include the expenditure incurred to-
date contributed to a failure in effective financial planning and forecasting. The 
failure thus affected the ability of meeting short-term obligations when demanded by 
the contractors and suppliers. This inability has serious consequences toward the 
progress of the projects.  
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This inability in meeting these short-term financial obligations has resulted in 
complaints by the contractors and suppliers.  For instance, in the analysis of findings, 
47 out of 197 projects as reflected in the list of claiming for exemption of LAD 
Bil.No.4/2006 stated that delays of the projects were due to delay in initial payment 
by the MOE to the contractors. Furthermore, 37 of them claimed that the delay of 
progress payments affected the progress of the project simultaneously.  Interviewed 
respondents agreed that the problem in shortage of funds during the Eighth 
Malaysian Plan in the Government of Malaysia approach had affected many projects 
resulting in delays, postponement and abandonment.  
 
This situation is also supported by evidence gathered from documents of the Primary 
Unit Office File dated 19
th
 of January, 2006, from one of the officers-in-charge of the 
project. From the document there was an overview status of project implemented in 
the Eight Malaysian Plan managed by this unit has shown in Table 6.7.below.  
 
Table 6.7 - Overview Status of Implementation Project in the Eighth Malaysian 
Plan (Source: Officer file from Primary Academic Unit, DPSD, 19 January 2006) 
Program Total Completed  Construction  Postponed  
Pre School 6103 2803 496 2804 
Primary Academic 1867 1583 14 270 
Teachers Training 
College 
20 2 0 18 
Capital Assistant Depends on Application 
Special Education 3 1 0 2 
TOTAL 7993 4389 510 3094 
 
The above table showed that about three thousand and ninety four (3,094) or 38.71 
per cent of the overall total projects managed by Primary Unit were postponed and 
five hundred and ten (510) or 6.38 percent were under construction. For the Primary 
Academic Schools projects, about 270 or 14.46 per cent of the total 1,867 projects 
were postponed.  
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The huge numbers of projects were postponed and still under construction for both 
Primary Academic Schools and Pre-Schools with earlier plans were a great blow and 
failure to the MoE. This contributed to an increase level of risks in managing the 
original allocation amount which may have to be diverted to other non-priorities 
projects. This situation of insufficient fund may be due to bad cash flow management 
such as misleading in financial planning and forecasting or budgeting. This 
consequently impacted the delivery of the services planned nation-wide and 
subsequently teaching and learning process. 
 
The impacts of the delay of the projects were also gathered from a focus group 
interviews carried out with the parents and teachers of two different schools. 
(Source: Appendix A – Focus Group). According to the parents, they were delighted 
and set high expectations when the MoE began the school project in their areas. This 
is because the school that their children were attended was quite far and they had to 
incur additional transportation expenses. But the delay of the project disappointed 
them until the project was completed at the end. Even though the school project were 
completed at a later date, the physical conditions of the buildings were not totally 
safe for the students who occupied the premises.  
 
Furthermore, the delay in the completion and occupying of the schools had resulted 
in the MoE incurring additional cost such as cost for further repairs as most of the 
facilities were stolen and were destroyed due to vandalism. In general, the quality 
and the physical conditions of the schools visited were deteriorated. The visits and 
observations carried out by the researcher in interviewing the focus group (i.e. the 
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teachers and parents) and was supported by the statement given by the teachers and 
the officer from the Educational State District during the visits (Source: Appendix A 
– Focus Group). The issue was the complaint being carried out long time ago, but 
until the visits such further action not been taken. 
 
ORGANISATIONAL AND MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE 
 
Can the PMR provide useful information for evaluating managerial and 
organizational performance? (1981: pg. 128) 
 
Summary of findings:  The evidence from various sources supported the World Bank 
financing approach which provided information needed for performance and 
managerial evaluation. The details of the report as in Annex 1 and Annex 2 were 
proven useful in the preparation of the final completion report as stated in the 
Implementation Completion Report. 
 
The World Bank Approach 
 
The results revealed that the comprehensiveness of the PMR such as, the 
Procurement and Progress Reports on Execution of Works (Report 2-A); 
Procurement and Progress Reports on Goods (Report 2-B); and Procurement and 
Progress Reports on Consultants Services (Report 2-C) as prepared by the Project 
Accountant of the PIU and the contents of the Progress Report by Program or 
Activities as in Annex 1 and Annex 2, prepared by the sub-implementers using the 
World Bank funds had been the significance in not just providing critical information 
for effective decision-making but in evaluating managerial performance. The reports 
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also served as useful key performance indicators in evaluating the effectiveness of 
the fund being allocated for the planned programs or activities. 
 
For instance, the content of Report 1-A, Annex 1 and Annex 2 contain the actual, 
plan and variance which were useful in project or program monitoring either 
financial or non-financial objectives. Through the reports, the implementers and 
other users involved in the projects, especially the top management in MoE, the 
auditors and the World Bank itself can utilize them as evaluation tool in evaluating 
effectiveness fund management.  
 
Furthermore, as reports were prepared on a monthly basis, they served as useful 
inputs and references for the Project Coordination Committee which consisted of 
representatives from the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) of the Prime Minister 
Department, the Treasury of the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Auditor-General 
from the National Audit Office as well as from the World Bank.  The reports proved 
to be significant in evaluating the performance of the MoE as an organisation in 
general, and more specifically its managerial performance in managing the allocated 
funds for the ESSP under the Eighth Malaysian Plan. This development was 
especially critical during the PCC monthly meetings, and the meetings with the 
World Bank Supervision Mission which were held twice a year through out the 
duration of the project. Even though profit is not a relevant measure of performance 
of governmental units, some reasonable measures of performance, such as the 
disclosure of critical information through reporting are deemed necessary. The 
reports presented had subsequently contributed in reducing the risks of 
mismanagement of funds.  
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The above mentioned benefits of preparing up-to-date reports were supported 
through the evidences gathered from the sub-implementers, project manager, the 
Head of Technical Unit of DPSD, and the Ex-Chairman of the PCC. They agreed 
that the monthly reports for PCC made them aware of the progress rate of their 
respective programs in achieving their stated main objectives or targets. The officers-
in-charge, who were also the PCC members, stated that the strength of the reports 
such as the Annex 1 and Annex 2 were useful in monitoring the performance of their 
respective projects or programs or activities. The effectiveness of the reports were 
also supported by Dato‟ Islahudin Baba, the ex-Deputy Secretary General (Finance 
and Development) who was also the Chairman of the ESSP World Bank and chaired 
the PCC meeting. According to Dato‟ Islahudin Baba, the reports presented by the 
implementers during the PCC meeting were a critical reference for the purpose of 
maintaining and improving managerial performance and program evaluation. This is 
because from the reports the progress of the programs and activities managed by the 
implementers can be monitored effectively (Source: Appendix A – Interview 
Session).   
 
In addition, the respondents recommended that the reports be used in other non-
World Bank financing in the future. This is because the reports themselves provided 
critical information in determining the cost of programs, functions and activities in 
such a manner that they facilitated analysis and provided valid comparisons with 
established criteria, within specific time periods set, and with other governmental 
units. 
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Furthermore, according to the Financial Management Specialist of the World Bank, 
Ms. Nipa Sri Buddimas who was responsible in project monitoring and evaluation, 
the PMR is able to produce reports in a timely manner with reliable information. The 
reports ensured that the projects were managed within an efficient financial 
management system. Ms. Nipa added that the implementation of the PMR or FMR 
had resulted in effective project monitoring, project evaluation, project financial 
planning and forecasting, programme evaluation, internal control systems and cash 
flow management for the sub-implementers involved directly with the ESSP of 
World Bank financing (Source: Appendix A – Electronic Mail). In addition, as stated 
in the, „Implementation Completion Report of the ESSP‟ in page 15, paragraph 7.6, 
the subcomponents reports prepared by these implementers were comprehensive, 
accurate and well-written.  The statement issued was as follows: 
  
„In preparation of the Implementation Completion Report (ICR), the PCC 
coordinated the preparation of the ICR and insured that all implementing units 
within the ministry submit their contribution on a timely basis. These detailed inputs 
were then combined under the PCC Secretariat and submitted to the Bank as part of 
the Borrower‟s input to the ICR preparation process. The ICR preparation team 
found these subcomponent reports to be comprehensive, accurate and well written 
(See Annex 7).‟ 
 
Government of Malaysia Approach 
 
As stated earlier, the content prepared by the implementers in the Government of 
Malaysia approach varied and was limited in terms of the availability of current and 
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accurate data or information. The inability of the relevant parties to cooperate with 
the MoE in the preparation of the reports as made the management of funds and risks 
difficult for the implementers. The non-existence of the financial figures required 
was crucial in helping top management in decision-making.  
 
Furthermore, faced with the presence of the inexperience staff in managing the 
project contributed in the failure to prepare a good financial management report such 
as the progress report of works. As stated earlier, according to the respondents 
involved in the preparation of the projects, the report were prepared by themselves 
based on either own experience and understanding or inputs given from the previous 
officer in charge (Source: Appendix A – Interview Session and Electronic Mails).  
 
Comparison of PMR effectiveness between World Bank and Government of   
Malaysia approaches in managing risks using the Best Practice of „World Class  
Financial Management for Public Sector‟ by Audit Commission of HM  
Treasury UK and PricewaterhhouseCoopers (2005)  
 
The study done by Drebin, Chan & Ferguson (1981) as in section 4.2.2 was used to 
measure the effectiveness of PMR.  In addition, the researcher used the „World Class 
Financial Management for Public Sector‟ by the Audit Commission and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005). The additional criteria used were on financial 
reporting which were not stated in the study by Drebin, Chan & Ferguson. The 
researcher does not select other criteria for the purpose of this study as a review of 
related literature revealed that they were quite similar to those in the study by 
Drebin, Chan & Ferguson. 
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Financial Reporting 
 
Summary of findings: The evidences especially from the Auditor-General Office 
claimed that the World Bank financing approach is practical and can be 
recommended for use in Domestic financing. The comprehensiveness and 
consistency in reporting at the Ministry of Education (MoE) level as presented in a 
timely manner.  
 
The PMR in the World Bank approach was prepared and updated on a monthly basis 
even though the report needed to be submitted quarterly to the World Bank. The 
practice of monthly reporting was done and presented by the Project Accountant and 
sub-implementers in the PCC meeting. The report generated financial and non-
financial information discussions on the current status or progress of the projects 
implemented. 
 
The consistency in updating and preparing the related reports on a timely manner 
have assisted the project accountant to prepare the consolidated yearly financial 
report or financial statement for auditing purposes. The final yearly reports to be 
audited by the Auditor-General of Malaysia are the main PMR and the Source and 
Application of Funds.  The reports were submitted upon request by the Auditor-
General Office and World Bank every year on a timely basis. The preparation of the 
final financial report is also based on the International Accounting Standard (IAS) as 
required in the Financial Management Manual in the World Bank financing (1998).  
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The effectiveness of the PMR is supported by the evidence from the interviews 
conducted with the Head of Auditor for Education Sector of the Auditor-General 
Office of Malaysia. According to the auditor, the PMR prepared in the World Bank 
approach is very comprehensive and useful that can be used in Domestic financing.  
The consistency of the reporting ensured that the progress of the funding can be 
easily monitored by the World Bank. Furthermore, this also helped ensuring that the 
Government of Malaysia (GOM) would not have to face any difficulties in getting 
future funding from the World Bank (Source: Appendix A – Interview Session).   
 
In comparing between the World Bank and the Government of Malaysia approach, 
the auditor commented that there was a lack in special reporting for projects whereby 
the prepared reports were submitted for auditing. Furthermore, she stated that the 
report prepared in the Government approach focused more on the status of the 
expenditure required. She added that the World Bank approach of PMR and other 
additional reporting such as the Source and Application of Funds are recommended 
in the future for Government of Malaysia approach. 
 
The above statement from the auditor is supported with evidence from the World 
Bank in the „Implementation Completion Report‟ (ICR) page 15, paragraph 7.5 on 
„Government implementation performance‟, which stated the following: 
 
„The Borrower is in full compliance with all loan covenants, and all audit reports 
have been submitted without negative comments.‟ 
 
 
  154 
6.4 Summary and conclusion  
 
The effectiveness of financial reporting in managing risks can be substantiate and 
evaluated through the standard and criteria in the study by Drebin, Chan & Ferguson 
on „Objectives of Accounting and Financial Reporting for Government Units‟ (1981) 
and also in the „Best Practice of World Class Financial Management for Public 
Sector‟ by the Audit Commission of HM Treasury UK and Price Waterhouse 
Coopers (2005). The comparison of reporting known as Project Management Reports 
(PMR) implemented through the World Bank and Government of Malaysia 
approaches for the ESSP under the Eighth Malaysian Plan were carried out using the 
above standards and criteria.  
 
The result of the analysis revealed the differences in reporting between the World 
Bank and the Government of Malaysia (GoM) approaches. This study also identified 
that the World Bank approach is more effective in reducing risks related to public 
financial management and aid as compared to the Government of Malaysia 
approach. The results were based on evidences from various reliable sources 
including the views from the implementers of the projects. The views were than 
supported with data gathered as to show the effectiveness of one approach as 
compared to another. 
 
Among the criteria met in the World Bank approach is that the PMR have disclosed 
useful information both from the financial and non-financial data gathered for short-
term financial planning and forecasting, project or program monitoring, and 
performance evaluation. They served as key performance indicators that proved 
useful for those involved especially the top management in decision-making 
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purposes. This simultaneously reduces the risks of the fund being mismanaged and 
aid in the preparation of the annual financial statements or reports.  The 
comprehensiveness and transparency of the reporting was also useful for internal 
control systems and served as a good basis for a move to accrual accounting as it can 
reduced the risks in managing public funds such as shortage of funds, fraud and 
corruption.  
 
In conclusion, as stated by the World Bank Financial Specialist, Ms. Nipa that „the 
function of the PMR of the World Bank approach is similar to performance-based 
budgeting system and monitoring according to the results. With the implementation 
and submission of PMR to the World Bank at quarterly, it is to ensure that the 
reports are prepared in a timely manner that nothing to be neglected. This enables us 
to produce a report in a timely manner with reliable information is a key measures to 
ensure that the project have efficient financial management system‟.  
 
Therefore, the results managed to achieve the objectives of addressing the research 
questions and the hypothesis set earlier in this chapter. This supports the claim of the 
effectiveness of the PMR of the World Bank in managing risks such as fraud and 
corruption.  
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    Chapter 7 
 
How well does the financial management system reduce risk and why?  
Comparison of the World Bank and the Government of Malaysia financial 
management system for the ESSP 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, we discovered the effectiveness of the Project Management 
Reports (PMRs) implemented in the World Bank approach as managed by the 
Project Accountant of the PIU as compared to the Government of Malaysia approach 
for the ESSP under the Eighth Malaysian Plan. It also addresses one of the issues in 
the Paris Declaration on the need of harmonization in financial reporting.   
 
This chapter aims to deliberate not only the importance of timely and accurate 
reporting but also the financial management system as a whole in managing risks 
between the World Bank approach and the Government of Malaysia approach.  The 
implementation of the PMR in the World Bank approach of financial reporting had 
revealed the critical role which has been played by the Project Accountant as a team 
member of PIU.  The PMR was used as a financial management tool or mechanism 
in managing or reducing risks related to public financial management in comparison 
with the Government of Malaysia approach. 
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In this chapter, we will compare, identify and deliberate further the findings related 
to effectiveness of either the World Bank or the Government of Malaysia Project 
Implementation Unit (PIU) in managing risks related to other issues such as 
procurements for the ESSP in Malaysia. This chapter also addresses the issues of the 
financial management system related to procurement procedures, and the abolition of 
PIU as debated in the Paris Declaration 2005.  The results will revealed how and 
why PIU is still required in the public sector.  
 
This chapter aims to distinguish the approaches to project financial management 
system and compares their impact on risks management. first of all, it outlines the 
purpose of the analysis in section 2 and presents its results on the factors that 
contributed to the success of the ESSP in the World Bank approach.  Finally, Section 
4 summarizes and concludes the analysis of the results and findings.  
 
7.2 Purpose 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to apply the research framework criteria (see Chapter 4 
pages 86) to the Malaysian experience with ESSP in order to achieve the main 
objective; sub-objective no. 2 and 3; research questions no. 3 and 4; and hypothesis 
no. 2 (see Section 4 of Chapter 1 in this study). The criteria for an effective financial 
management system used in the research framework are based on the „governance 
and leadership‟ criteria set in the, „Best Practice of World Class Financial 
Management for Public Sector‟ by the Audit Commission of the UK and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005). 
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7.3 Results of the Analysis  
 
 The findings revealed that there were differences in the project financial 
management system between the World Bank and the Government of Malaysia 
approaches implemented in the ESSP.  The differences were identified as the factors 
which contributed to the success in the World Bank approach in reducing risk as 
compared to the Government of Malaysia. The factors are as follows: 
 
a) The Involvement and Commitment of Top Management; 
b) The Significant Role of the Project Coordination Committee; 
c) The effectiveness of the Project Implementation Unit; 
d) The Full Commitment of the World Bank Team; 
e) The World Bank Additional Conditions and Procedures on Financial  
Management of the Project, and 
f) The World Bank conditions and procedures related to Non-Financial 
Management of the Project. 
 
The results of (a) to (d) were analyzed further through using the criteria stated in 
Section 2 of this chapter. In the analysis the followings findings were revealed: 
 
7.3.1. The Involvement and Commitment of Top Management  
 
World Bank Approach 
 
Summary of findings:  Based on the Audit Commission (2005) on the criteria of 
financial governance and leadership, the evidence showed that the involvement and 
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commitment of the top management contributed to the success of the World Bank 
financing as compared to Domestic financing. 
 
The quality of financial governance and leadership is determined by the top 
management. This includes the understanding of the financial environment and 
fostering an organizational culture in which financial skills are valued and developed 
by individuals (Audit Commission, 2005). 
  
Top management involvement and commitment with full understanding of their 
responsibilities and being accountable for the decisions and actions taken proved to 
be a significant contributing factor to the success of an organization.   For instance, 
the commitment given by the Deputy-Secretary General for Finance and 
Development at the highest level of management in the MoE in ensuring that the 
World Bank funds be fully utilized accordingly as stipulated in the contract 
agreement is exemplary and worthy of be an excellent role model for effective 
leadership in project management to other government bodies.  He took the initiative 
to set up a coordination committee known as the Project Coordination Committee 
(PCC) in ensuring that the financial flow of fund in the World Bank approach is 
well-managed. The PCC was assisted by a Secretariat from the Educational Planning 
and Research Division (EPRD) of the Ministry of Education. The Deputy Secretary-
General (Finance and Development), Ministry of Education, Malaysia has been 
assigned as the Chairperson for PCC as well as, the Director the ESSP World Bank 
under the Eighth Malaysian Plan.  
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As Director of the ESSP World Bank, one of his priorities was to ensure that the 
projects were successfully implemented and completed as scheduled through proper 
and appropriate utilization of the funds procured. To this effect, the Director has 
taken the necessary steps such as chairing monthly PCC meetings of the ESSP 
projects. These meetings ensured that progress of the projects was well-monitored. In 
the meetings, officers reported and discussed the progress of the projects in areas of 
finance and physical development. These meetings thus facilitate decision making 
which will affect the progress of the project financially or non-financially. The 
Director also took the initiative to personally visit sites in remote areas as to keep tab 
of their progress status. 
 
This high level of commitment from the top management in the Ministry of 
Education in managing large amount of funds should not be underestimated. The 
track records showed and proved that the objectives of the ESSP as planned were 
met within the specific time. Subsequently, cost savings had been successfully 
accrued at the end of the project.  
 
The commitment of the Deputy-Secretary General (Finance and Development), 
Ministry of Education was supported with the statement given by those involved in 
the ESSP World Bank. From the feedback of interviews carried out, all ten 
respondents agreed that the success of the ESSP World Bank was due to the full 
involvement of the Ministry‟s top management especially the Deputy Secretary-
General playing his role as the Chairman of PCC (Source: Appendix A – Interview 
Session). 
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The commitment of the top management in the Ministry was also stated by the 
World Bank in the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) in paragraph 6.1 page 
24 on Bank and Borrower Performance as below: 
 
„The Ministry of Education wishes to express appreciation to members of both the 
World Bank and the MoE for having successfully implemented the ESSP. The success 
is attributed to the close cooperation forged between the Bank team and MoE 
personnel entrusted with the ESSP as well as the manifestation of the series of 
thorough and effective supervision on the Bank part, the commitment of MoE 
personnel towards the project and close monitoring and leadership of the Project 
Coordination Committee (PCC).‟ 
 
In addition, in page 15, paragraph 7.6 of the Implementation Completion Report 
(SCL-44510), it is stated on „Implementing Agencies‟ such as: 
  
„In its support of Bank supervision missions, the PCC/PIU often prepared 
operational studies, project performance audits, financial analyses, and 
architectural plans necessary to support the supervision process. The PCC/PIU also 
consistently provided advanced planning to improve Bank efficiency during its visits 
to remote project site. It can be safely said that the quality of the PCC and the PIU 
was a major factor in the success of the project.  
 
Furthermore, with exemplary leadership and full commitment from the top 
management, the Government of Malaysia (GOM) managed to have some savings 
from the total amount of loan from the World Bank. It is stated in the World Bank 
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ICR paragraph 5.4 page 13 on „Cost and Financing‟, paragraph 5 of Major Factors 
Affecting Implementation and Outcome‟ as below: 
 
„As mentioned above (5.1) the Asian economic crisis in 1997-1998 created an 
unstable situation which, in the early stages of the project, made it difficult to 
estimate future costs and foreign exchange requirements. The initial estimates of 
project cost were reasonably accurate. The Government disbursed 
US$216,709,941.12, or about 88.82% of the original loan amount of US$244.0 
million. All of the components were adequately financed for full project 
implementation. During the project period, only minor adjustments to the budget 
were required. 
 
The Government of Malaysia Approach 
 
In the Government of Malaysia approach, even though the Deputy Secretary-General 
(Finance and Development) is responsible for the projects development of the MoE, 
but he delegated his role to the Principal Secretary of the Development Division.  
Furthermore, in the case for Primary Education development projects, the Principal 
Secretary will then delegate his responsibilities to the Senior Assistant-Secretary of 
the Primary Unit of the Development and Procurement Division (DPSD) of MoE.  
This can be clearly seen in the Chart 1 below. 
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Chart 1 – Development and Procurement Division of MoE Organization 
Structure (Source: List of Reference from Government of Malaysia – Fail Meja 
Bahagian Pembangunan dan Perolehan, Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia) 
 
 
This is because in the Domestic financing, the top management entrusted their 
responsibilities to be delegated to middle grade officers through empowerment. 
Therefore, the officers-in-charge have the authority in managing the projects which 
also included the awarding of projects.  The possibility of the fund will be 
mismanaged as the officers-in-charge has the authority to make his/her own decision 
in awarding projects via like Direct Negotiation.  
 
7.3.2.  The Significance Role of the Project Coordination Committee (PCC) 
 
Summary:  Based on the financial governance and leadership criteria of the Audit 
Commission (2005), the evidences gathered proved that the setting up and the 
significant role of the Project Coordination Committee (PCC) consist of internal and 
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external members also contributed to the success of the World Bank approach as 
compared to the Government of Malaysia approach. 
 
The World Bank Approach 
 
The Deputy Secretary-General (Finance and Development) of the Ministry of 
Education, Malaysia, who is also the Project Director of the ESSP World Bank 
reflects a dynamic and committed work culture as demonstrated through monthly 
coordination meetings under the Project Coordination Committee (PCC). 
 
The PCC is a governing board which consists of those who were directly accountable 
or involved in the ESSP World Bank financing at the Ministry level. The PCC were 
also represented by other external agencies that had interests in managing the 
funding from the World Bank. Among the external committee members were 
representatives from the Treasury of Ministry of Finance, the Economic Planning 
Unit of the Prime Minister‟s Department, the Public Works Department and also the 
National Audit Department or Auditor-General Office.   
 
The Secretariat of the PCC was from the Strategic Planning Unit of the Educational 
Planning and Research Division (EPRD) of the Ministry of Education, Malaysia. The 
function of the Secretariat is to liaise with the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) in 
coordinating the PCC monthly meetings chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General 
(Finance and Development) of the Ministry of Education. Other than that, the PCC 
Secretariat was also responsible in ensuring that all reports such as those in Annex 1 
and Annex 2 be submitted as required for the PCC meeting.  
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Chart 2 – ESSP World Bank Project Coordination Committee Organization 
Structure   
 
 
Through PCC meetings, those involved in the projects or programs or activities were 
requested to present both their financial and non-financial progress reports such as in 
Annex 1 and Annex 2. This is also a part of the monitoring tool and internal control 
system in ensuring that the allocation of funds provided for was used responsibly in 
achieving the objectives of the funding. Any requests for additional allocation will be 
pre-approved and any problems faced will be solved through this meeting.  
 
On the basis of the evidence, the PCC meetings promote a culture of transparency 
and accountability among those involved in the projects. The committee members 
became fully committed especially, in the preparation or implementation of the PMR 
or FMR according to the World Bank requirements. This transforms into compliance 
to World Bank terms and conditions and thus discrepancy in reporting and delays of 
projects or programs were avoided.  
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Furthermore, with the involvement of external parties such as Economic Planning 
Unit of the Prime Minister‟s Department, the National Audit or Auditor-General 
Office which also acted as the external auditor of the World Bank financing, and the 
Treasury Office of the Ministry of Finance, Malaysia, as committee members, has 
shown commitment and responsibilities that is exemplary.  The makeup of the 
committee then acts as a part of an internal control mechanism which increases the 
effectiveness of reducing risks in managing public fund in the ESSP and heightened 
the reliability and effectiveness factor. Thus, the funds provided were effectively and 
efficiently utilized. 
 
The above result is also supported by the statements given during an interview with 
the Deputy Secretary-General (Finance and Development), Ministry of Education of 
Malaysia, is also the Project Director of ESSP World Bank. According to him, the 
success of the project was due to the full commitment he received from team 
members of the PCC in presenting their monthly progress reports. He added that the 
reports presented in the monthly PCC meeting were very useful for the purpose of 
project monitoring and decision-making (Source: Appendix A – Interview Session). 
 
Furthermore, in an interview with all the ten (10) respondents who were directly 
involved in the World Bank approach, including the Head of Auditor for Educational 
Sector of the Auditor-General Office, a consensus was reached the project success 
was due to the effectiveness of the PCC meetings held monthly (Source: Appendix A 
– Interview Session).   
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In addition, the Head of Auditor stated that the monthly Project Coordination 
Committee (PCC) meeting was very useful and helpful and it contributed to the 
success of the ESSP.  The consistencies of the PCC meetings held at various 
locations were also part and parcel of the project internal control system where 
project progress being evaluated and monitored (Source: Appendix A – Interview 
Session).  
 
The effectiveness of the PCC was also mentioned in the World Bank  
Implementation Completion Report (SCL-44510), page 13, paragraph 6 regarding to 
„Sustainability‟ as in paragraph 6.2 on „Transition arrangement to regular operations‟ 
as below:  
 
„MOE/MOHE uses a formal process to manage the transition of project activities to 
regular operations. Each project activity must first be fully completed under the 
project‟s budget and authority of the PCC and the PIU. After completion, each 
project activity must be reviewed and inspected by the PCC/PIU to ensure that all 
project objectives have been met for that activity, including required civil works and 
the procurement of goods and services. 
 
Concurrently, PCC/MOE and State/institutional authorities must also review and 
inspect each activity, and must agree that all project objectives for that activity have 
been reached and that the quality of the work is satisfactory. Unfinished work and 
quality concerns noted during this process must be corrected by the PIU, with the 
oversight of the PCC, before final acceptance and transition to regular operations is 
allowed. Once the acceptance agreement is reached between all parties, the new 
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institutions, upgraded institutions, new staff, etc will be shifted to regular budgets as 
required by MOE/MOHE operational policies. This transition arrangement is well 
facilitated because responsible individuals for regular operations have been selected 
as PCC members. As these activities become fully implemented within the project 
these PCC members take over more and more responsibilities for their transition 
into regular operations. This approach has proven to be effective without issuse. All 
project activities, suitable for transitioning, are now fully transitioned into regular 
operations.‟ 
 
As in page 15, paragraph 7.6 on „Implementing Agencies‟ it also stated the 
following: 
  
„In its supports of Bank supervision missions, the PCC/PIU often prepared 
operational studies, project performance audits, financial analyses, and 
architectural plans necessary to support the supervision process. The PCC/PIU also 
consistently provided advanced planning to improve Bank efficiency during its visits 
to remote project site. It can be safely said that the quality of the PCC and the PIU 
was a major factor in the success of the project.  
 
In addition, as in the ICR page no. 25, paragraph 6.5 on Borrower Performance it 
mentioned the following: 
 
„The coordination sub-committees set-up under the training component to monitor 
the progress of the programs at the various levels was crucial to the efficient 
management of the programs. The Project Coordination Committee and its 
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Secretariat were established to monitor the overall development of the ESSP which 
was effective in providing general oversight to project implementation and was 
instrumental to the overall success of the ESSP.‟ 
 
This is further emphasized by the World Bank again in the ICR in paragraph 7 page: 
25 on the „Lessons Learned‟, which stated that the successful implementation of the 
Project was attributed to its effective management and coordination. This also 
included the organisation structure in the ESSP World Bank such as stated in the 
statement in paragraph 7.1 mentioned below: 
 
„The Project Coordination Committee and its Secretariat were established to 
monitor the overall development of the ESSP which was effective in providing 
general oversight to project implementation. The effectiveness and success of the 
projects also depended on the mechanism and organisation structure within the 
implementing agencies.‟ 
 
Therefore, due to the above high commitment, the World Bank in its Implementation 
Completion Report (SCL-44510) rated „highly satisfactory‟ on the overall Borrower 
performance which should not be underestimated. This was due to higher rating by 
the World Bank in the achievement in managing public fund.  The achievement can 
be seen in the output indicators as stated in the Implementation Completion Report 
(ICR) as in Table 7.1 below: 
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Table 7.1 – World Bank Implementation Completion Report Output Indicators: 
                    
Indicator/Matrix Projected in last PSR 
(End of Project) 
Actual/Latest Estimate 
 
Component 1. Basic 
Education 
Output Indicator – All 
schools and associated 
facility construction 
completed on schedule by 
End of Project (EOP). 
Target was: 
33 primary schools; 
26 secondary schools; 
600 units teacher quarters; 
and 2750 units students 
hostels. 
 
Completed were: 
33 primary schools 
(100% of target); 
26 secondary schools 
(100% of target); 
447 (units) teachers 
quarters (75% of target); 
and 
2700 (units) student 
hostels (98% of target) 
 
Same as in last Project 
Status Report (PSR). 
(Source: Implementation Completion Report (SCL-44510) 
 
From the above output indicator, we can see that the projects for the primary and 
secondary education achieved the 100% target. This achievement is very significant 
especially in relation to providing basic or primary education needs especially for 
children in remote areas. This augurs well with the Education for All movements of 
UNESCO. The construction of school facilities were completed on schedule by the 
end of the project deadline. This was again due to the working culture of those who 
were involved in the project which included close monitoring of the project progress 
through out the project period. 
 
The Government of Malaysia Approach 
 
Unfortunately, the results as in Section 3.1.2 for the Government of Malaysia 
approach for the Domestic financing significantly showed how poor the performance 
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was when it is being compared to the World Bank approach in the ESSP. This is 
because the implementation of the ESSP and meeting were carried out among 
internal staff at Department or Division level. There was no special committee set up 
like the PCC in the World Bank approach.   
 
The non-effectiveness of the PCC in the Government of Malaysia approach can be 
observed through evidence from the interview with an Officer from the Educational 
Planning, Research and Development Division (EPRD), MoE who was also involved 
in both types of financing. She stated that even though there was a PCC but it was 
not as effective and efficient as it was in the World Bank approach. This is because 
in the domestic financing the projects were led by the Under Secretary of the 
Development and Procurement Division (DPSD) or even by its Senior Assistant 
Secretary of every unit (Source: Appendix A – Interview Session).  The effect of this 
situation is decision making in selecting and awarding projects which will not based 
on collective decision-making like  the World Bank. Therefore, the possibility that 
the fund will be mismanaged as non-priority projects will be awarded. 
 
7.3.3.  The Effectiveness of the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) 
 
Summary of findings:  Based on the evidences gathered, the Project Implementation 
Unit (PIU) worked effectively in ensuring that the World Bank financing were 
managed in an effective and efficient manner. By comparison in the Government of 
Malaysia approach, there was no specific PIU but dependence on a Project 
Management Consultant in managing and monitoring the projects. 
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The World Bank Approach 
 
The setting up of PIU with senior professional staff within the Ministry of Education 
in the team contributed to the success of the project and as well as the proper 
allocation of funds which was in the form of a Loan from an external source. The 
success was supported by the Deputy Secretary-General (Finance and Development) 
of the Ministry of Education, Malaysia. He added that the implementation of the 
ESSP World Bank such as how the organisation structure worked and the 
appointment of professional team member as PIU should be a lesson learned by the 
Government of Malaysia approach. In addition, the reasons of failures in the 
Government of Malaysia approach was the lack of professional staff that one officer 
had to in-charged of many projects (Source: Appendix A – Interview Session). 
 
The effectiveness of PIU is stated in the World Bank Implementation Completion 
Report (ICR) (SCL-44510), Report No. 31822-MA, page 13, paragraph 5.3. (June 
9
th
, 2005) as regarding the „Factors generally subject to implementing agency 
control‟ that is: 
 
„The PIU was generally responsible for planning, monitoring & evaluating, and 
processing of tenders, contracts, etc. Early in the project, due to some inadequacies 
in staff, there were some difficulties with schedule slippage in these areas. However, 
as the project progressed, these concerns were systematically reviewed. Staff and 
procedural changes were made to resolve the problems. It is noteworthy to mention 
that the PCC and the PIU were able to effectively address all these issues in a timely 
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manner, even when many were located in remote sites. This demonstrates the quality 
of oversight and control that the PCC and PIU maintained during the project.‟ 
 
Subsequently, the World Bank also rated the performance of the PIU as highly 
satisfactory in their „Overall Borrower Performance‟ as reported in paragraph 7.7, 
page 15 of the Implementation Completion Report (ICR). The rating was based on 
the World Bank ICR in paragraph 7.6 on „Implementing Agency‟ starting from line 
no. 5 as below: 
 
„The PIU was well-staffed with experienced, well-trained, and dedicated members 
who, for the most parst, remained in place throughout the duration of the project 
implementation period. Even with some early delays in civil works and procurement, 
the PIU was consistently effective in the management and coordination of the 
project. During the early phases of project implementation, the PIU was able to 
identify and reach agreement with the Bank on the ways to address each of the 
delay-related issues.‟ 
 
The Government of Malaysia Approach 
 
In the Government of Malaysia approach, there was no special team like PIU set in 
the World Bank approach. This is supported by the claim of the Deputy Secretary-
General (Finance and Development), Ministry of Malaysia which stated earlier in 
3.3.1 that weaknesses in the government approach was due to lack of staff especially 
qualified professionals in the PIU. Furthermore, the work load and responsibilities of 
the officer-in-charged was very high since the officer had to manage many projects 
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simultaneously which often were beyond their capacities and capabilities. This 
consequently resulted in problems such as delays and wastage in most projects 
(Source: Appendix A – Interview Session). 
 
The weaknesses in the Government of Malaysia approach were supported by most of 
the staff in the DPSD. The management of projects highly depends on the 
consultants known as the Project Management Consultants (PMCs). Most of the 
PMCs lacked expertise and experienced staff compared to the dedicated PIU staff in 
the World Bank approach who managed the projects permanently. This created 
problem in cash flow management. For instance, the shortage of funds was due to 
under estimation of the costs related to certain projects managed by the Project 
Management Consultants (PMCs). According to one of the officer-in-charge, the 
PMC had many projects on their hands to supervise and monitor resulting in out 
dated reports (Source: Appendix A – Interview Session).  
 
Furthermore, in the findings, the minimal involvement of qualified professional staff 
such as the accountants in the project management team in every unit of the DPSD 
had caused problems for effective financial planning and forecasting. This is 
supported with the evidence through interviews with the accountants in the DPSD. 
The accountants agreed that they were assigned to jobs pertaining to approving 
payments to the suppliers and contractors which have reached the final stage of the 
process rather than at the earlier which involved budgeting, financial planning and 
forecasting.  This also included the shortage of staff who was assigned to manage the 
projects for all primary schools at the Ministry of Education Malaysia level. This can 
be clearly seen in Table 7.2 below: 
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Table 7.2 - Number of Staff in the Primary Education Unit, DPSD of MoE 
(Source: List of Government of Malaysia – Fail Meja Unit Rendah Akademik, 
Bahagian Pembangunan dan Perolehan, Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia) 
 
Position Allocated Occupied Vacant 
Head of Principal Secretary 1 1 0 
Senior and Principal Secretary 5 4 1 
Senior and Executive Officer 5 3 2 
Administrative Assistant 5 5* 0 
Junior Administrative Assistant 2 2 0 
Total 18 15 3 
Note: Allocated – Number of staff approved to be allocated for the position. 
Occupied – Number of staff been occupied for the allocated position. 
Vacant – Number of position still available 
. 
Based on the above information, there were about 7,993 projects that needed to be 
managed by only 18 staff for the Primary Unit of DPSD. This included coordinating 
with the appointed PMCs that managed the projects. It is very risky to manage so 
many projects with limited number of staff, especially since most appointed PMCs 
lack the needed experience in managing projects. If compared to the World Bank 
approach of the ESSP, it was managed accordingly with the appointment of proper 
PIU team and also working together with other experienced implementers such as 
the Technical Unit of MoE and Public Works Department (JKR), performance would 
have been much better if the situation was replicated in DPSD. 
 
As a result, most projects failed to be completed as schedule. Table 7.3 below 
showed the list of projects contractors that were managed by the PMCs.  
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Table 7.3 – Primary School Projects managed by Project Management 
Consultants 
 
No List  of PMC/ 
Region 
North East Central South Sabah Sarawak Postpone Total 
1 Ambang Heights 21      1 22 
2 DPIK Project 
Management Sdn. Bhd. 
     4 1 5 
3 East Design 2      1 3 
4 Elementrade (M) Sdn. 
Bhd. 
 3 1    1 5 
5 HSS Project 
Management Sdn. Bhd. 
    1 2  3 
6 Ikhtisas PMC Sdn. Bhd.       1 1 
7 Key Class Sdn. Bhd.       1 1 
8 Kinta Samudera   41     41 
9 KIP Management Sdn. 
Bhd. 
    10 8  18 
10 Kumpulan Wibawa 
Consultant Sdn. Bhd. 
    1   1 
11 NAZ Progressive 
Consultant Sdn. Bhd. 
1  5    2 8 
12 Opal Development Sdn. 
Bhd. 
   3   2 5 
13 PB-PMC Sdn. Bhd.  4      4 
 
14 Pengurusan PMN Sdn. 
Bhd. 
  1     1 
15 Prices Resources   2     2 
16 Professional Themes 
Sdn. Bhd. 
  2     2 
17 Prowatch Mgt. Sdn. 
Bhd. 
    4   4 
18 PZK Mgt. sdn. Bhd.   1     1 
19 Rapihan Sdn. Bhd.    6    6 
20 Triomac Engineering      8  8 
21 Urusbudi Sdn. Bhd. 
(PKMM) 
6 4 7 7    24 
22 Urusbudi Sdn. Bhd.  1  2    3 
23 Urusbudi Sdn. Bhd. 
(DPMM) 
8 2 13 6    29 
24 Urusbudi Sdn. Bhd. 
(Pemaju) 
5 1 8 4    18 
25 Urusbudi Sdn. Bhd. 
(Zon Selatan) 
   
 
27    27 
26 Venture Sdn. Bhd. 1       1 
27 Wawasan utama Sdn. 
Bhd. 
 43     7 50 
 
Based from Table 7.3 above, the total project managed by each PMC varied. Some 
had more whereas others had only a few to manage. For instance, the project 
managed by the Urusbudi Sdn. Bhd. amounted to 101 or 34.59 per cent out of 292 
projects. This is followed by Wawasan Utama Sdn. Bhd. having 50 projects or 17.12 
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per cent and Kinta Samudera with 41 projects or 14.04 per cent out of the total 
projects.  The imbalance distributions of projects to the PMC in supervising and 
monitoring finally led to the incompletion of the projects within the stipulated time.  
 
This is supported with strong evidences from the top management and the Auditor-
General Office. According to them, the appointment of the PMC and also contractors 
were due to political influences. It was also supported through interviews with the 
immediate officers-in-charged of the projects within the Ministry of Education.  The 
appointments of the PMCs were done by the Treasury, Ministry of Finance 
Malaysia. The awarding of contracts in the Government approach was through 
Direct Negotiation between the Ministry of Finance and the PMCs (Source: 
Appendix A – Interview Session). 
 
7.3.4.  The Full Commitment of the World Bank Team 
 
Summary:  Based on the evidences gathered, full commitment, guidance and 
cooperation also contributed to the success of the World Bank financing as 
compared to the Domestic financing. 
 
The full commitment of the World Bank team members also played an important 
role in ensuring that the ESSP in the Eighth Malaysian Plan were implemented and 
completed as according to the terms and conditions of the contract agreement 
between the Government of Malaysia and the World Bank. The researcher believed 
that without the commitment from the project leaders and cooperation of team 
members through out the loan period, the project might have been a failure due to 
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leadership and management issues as the project was huge not only in terms of 
money but also in terms of magnitude of implementing them out. 
 
The high commitment of the World Bank team is stated in the evidences collected 
from interviews carried out with those were involved in the ESSP World Bank. 
According to them, the World Bank team was very helpful in assisting those who 
were involved in ensuring that the project would be on track (Source: Appendix A – 
Interview Session). This is also mentioned in the Implementation Completion Report 
(ICR) as in paragraph 6.2, page 24 on Bank Performance as below: 
 
„The Bank‟s supervision mission team under the leadership of the task manager had 
provided constant encouragement and motivation to the GOM officials involved in 
the ESSP. The supervision mission had also been very responsive and supportive in 
resolving implementation issues that required Bank approval or NOL. Their 
continuous support and assistance as well as their helpful comments and feedback 
had also assisted the implementers to be consistent in their project implementation, 
especially with respect to monitoring and evaluation, which are important aspects of 
the project cycle.‟ 
 
Paragraph 6.3 page 24 on Bank Performance as below: 
 
„The team also helped to improve implementers‟ understanding of the Bank‟s 
guidelines and procedures in operating the projects.  This is especially true during 
the initial stage of the project, when newly recruited Government officials entrusted 
with the projects were unfamiliar with the Bank‟s procurement procedures.‟ 
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Furthermore, as stated below in one of the paragraph 7.2 on Supervision of the Bank 
and Borrower Performance on page 14 commented that the close working 
relationship of the PIU members have contributed to the World Bank Team to the 
success of the project as described below: 
 
„The supervision team was able to maintain an intensive and pro-active relationship 
with the PIU throughout the duration of the project. Relations with the Borrower 
were good during the early stages of the project and grew to excellent in the later 
stages of implementation. This relationship under the last task team and the 
Borrower grew over time to become closely collaborative. It should be noted that the 
supervision teams gave significant advice and showed considerable flexibility in 
solving implementation problems.‟ 
 
7.3.5. The World Bank Conditions of Negotiations  
 
Summary:  Based on the evidences gathered the findings showed that the additional 
conditions and procedures set by the World Bank during the Negotiation had also 
contributed to the success of the World Bank financing as compared to Domestic 
financing. 
 
The World Bank additional conditions during negotiations in getting the funding 
from the World Bank had also influenced the success of the World Bank financing 
project. For instance, in order to secure the funding, the Government of Malaysia 
(GOM) had to accept the IRDB additional conditions and procedures through out the 
funding period.  The conditions were stated in the Agreed Minutes of Negotiations 
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between Malaysia and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
for the Proposed Education Sector Support Project, February, 11
th
, 1999. The 
conditions have been stated earlier in section 4.1 of chapter 3 in this study.  Part of 
the conditions set by the World Bank have been discussed the effectiveness such as 
PMR in Chapter 6, the setting up of a PIU in the earlier section. But in this section, 
the findings now emphasized on the impact of the differences in procurements 
criteria between the World Bank and Government of Malaysia approaches. 
  
The Impact of Differences in Procurement Procedures and Conditions      
between the World Bank and Government of Malaysia approaches 
 
Summary of findings: The evidences showed that the differences in procurement 
procedures especially in the method and awarding of contracts to contractors, 
project management consultants, as well the special conditions exclusively for 
„Bumiputra‟ had contributed to an increase in managing risks of public fund in the 
Government of Malaysia approach as compared to the World Bank approach in the 
ESSP. 
 
As noted above, the World Bank approach is managed by PIU and also Public Works 
Department (JKR), whereas in the Government of Malaysia approach, the projects 
were managed by the Development Division and also by Project Management 
Consultants (PMCs). The appointments of the PMCs were done by the Treasury, 
Ministry of Finance Malaysia. The awarding of contracts in the Government 
approach was through Direct Negotiation between the Ministry of Finance and the 
PMCs. 
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The differences in procedures on procurements in the Government of Malaysia 
approach can be noted from the early evidences stated in the „Strategic Planning 
Meeting of the Ministry of Education in 2004 on Methods and Infrastructure Projects 
Implementation Strategic for the Ninth Malaysian Plan‟. 
 
The meeting noted that the financial performance of the development expenditure 
showed had exceeded the allocated ceiling. There were 20,632 projects that had been 
planned earlier had failed to be completed on time. Furthermore, 6,264 projects or 
30.36 per cent of the total projects were postponed due to insufficient funds. 
 
Insufficient funding has been blamed for the failures. For instance, the findings 
revealed the Federal Government of Malaysia (GOM) has allocated approximately 
one fifth of the total annual allocation of the public sector to the Ministry of 
Education (MOE). Though the amount is increased annually, the allocation is 
insufficient to fulfil the needs of the country in developing the education sector.  The 
Ministry of Education (MoE) is responsible in making sure that financial allocations 
were optimally utilized and that they are efficiently and effectively managed.  
 
The insufficient funding is noted in the Education Development Plan 2001-2010. It 
stated that „the budget allotted by the Treasury of Ministry of Finance (MoF) for the 
MoE in its annual allocation and Five-Year Development Plan is always lower than 
the amount requested.‟  Although the estimated budget for the Seventh Malaysia 
Plan was RM42.3 billion, the amount received was RM17.1 billion but the additional 
amount was only received during its Mid-Term Review.  The amount received for 
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the Eighth Malaysia Plan was RM18.7 billion, although the estimated budget was 
RM49.5 billion‟ (source: Education Development Plan 2001-2010: pg. 6.8). 
 
Furthermore, the strategies planned by the Division of Development responsible for 
educational infrastructure projects in the Government of Malaysia approach reflected 
the slow progress of primary education physical or infrastructure projects under the 
Eighth Malaysian Plan for the Domestic financing as illustrated in the table below:  
 
Table 7-4 Overview Status of Implementation Project under Eighth Malaysian Plan 
(Source: Academic Primary Unit Files, 19 January 2006) 
Program Total Completed Under-Construction Postponed 
Pre School 6103 2803 496 2804 
Primary Academic 1867 1583 14 270 
Teachers Training 
College 
20 2 0 18 
Capital Assistant Depends on Application 
Special Education 3 1 0 2 
TOTAL 7993 4389 510 3094 
 
Based on the above table, there were about 3,094 or 38.74 per cent of the total 7,993 
projects that were postponed. This figure included the 2,804 or 35.08 per cent of 
projects for Pre-School and about 14 per cent from the total Primary Academic 
schools that had been postponed. The figures indicated the inefficient management 
of fund which finally resulted in only 55% or 4,389 projects being completed – a far 
cry from the expectation of the nation.  
 
The weaknesses of the Government of Malaysia approach contributed to restrictions 
in the number of project scheduled for the Ninth Malaysian Plan for domestic 
financing, as in Table 7.5 below. 
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Table 7.5 - Project Plan in the Ninth Malaysian Plan (NMP) 
(Source: Table 6.1 Infrastructure Plan Under The NMP In Strengthening the 
National Schools, page 28, of the Education Development Blue Print 2006 – 2010) 
 
Primary 
Schools 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
Project 
Total Cost 
(RM) 
New Project 35 54 89 - - 178 1,296,855,000 
Additional 
Project 
- 203 113 21 - 337 656,828,000 
Replacement 
Project 
22 360 375 133 - 890 2,170,507,000 
Continuation 
Project 
206 - - - - 206 229,870,111 
Total 263 617 577 154 - 1,611 4,354,060,111 
 
Table 7.5 indicates that the numbers of projects planned in the Ninth Malaysian Plan 
were below expectation if compared to Table 7.4 on Overview Status of 
Implementation Project under Eighth Malaysian Plan. For instance, the number of 
continuation projects is only 206 compared to 284 under the Eighth Malaysian Plan 
for Primary Schools projects. This means that there was a shortage of 78 projects or 
24.46 per cent from the total number of projects under the Eighth Malaysian Plan. 
  
The additional conditions set up by the World Bank in the Agreement for Loan 
between the World Bank and the Government of Malaysia stated in the Procurement 
of Works all project tenders should be opened to the public irrespective of their 
status i.e. Bumiputra or Non-Bumiputra.  The impact of the non-compliance with the 
World Bank additional conditions in the domestic financing can be clearly seen in 
Table 7.6 below. 
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Table 7.6 - The comparison of the number of Primary Schools projects financed by 
the World Bank and Domestic financing for the New Educational Infrastructure 
Development Project in the Eighth Malaysian Plan for ESSP 
 
Stage of Progress Domestic Financing  
Phase 1 (managed by 
PMC) 
World Bank 
(managed by JKR) 
 Unit Percentage Unit Percentage 
Completed on Schedule 93 31.84 30 88.24 
LAD 1 103 35.27 3 8.82 
LAD 2 46 15.75   
LAD 3 19 6.52   
LAD 4 3 1.03   
Postponed 20 6.85   
Terminated & Continued 4 1.37 *1 2.94 
Under Construction 4 1.37   
Total 292 100.00 34 100.00 
* Terminated and Withdrew from the World Bank due to non-compliance of Bank 
Procedures. 
  
From Table 7.6, only 93 units or 31.84 per cent of the total 292 projects were 
completed on schedule. In comparison, 88.24 per cent of the total projects were 
completed on schedule based in the World Bank approach. The postponements and 
delays of the projects as shown in Table 7.4 earlier have resulted in the inability to 
provide and expand educational opportunities.  
  
The Maintenance of a Special Account 
 
The introduction of a Special Account in a commercial bank for the World Bank 
financing in this ESSP Eighth Malaysian Plan is a new approach since the 
implementation of the PMR-based was proposed and was used in the project. The 
idea of having the Special Account is to ensure that the project will be not be 
experiencing difficulties such as a shortage of fund through out the project period. 
Prior to this ESSP, the Government of Malaysia (GOM) used the traditional method 
of reimbursement from the World Bank by using the Statement of Expenditure 
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(SOE). In the PMR environment, all the disbursements of funds will be channelled 
through the Special Account.  
 
With the PMR, the reimbursement procedure as in the World Bank Loan 
Administration Change Initiative (LACI) implementation Hand Book (September, 
1998) in page 13, paragraph 4.10 stated that under the PMR-based disbursements the 
only supporting documentations will be the quarterly PMR. However, all supporting 
documentation authenticating the expenditure reported in the PMR will be 
maintained by the Borrower and made available for review by auditors and Bank 
missions as indicated in the Loan Agreement. Where direct payment and Special 
Commitment procedures are used, existing documentation requirements, outlined in 
the Disbursement Handbook, will apply. 
 
But the usage of a Special Account in a local commercial bank for the ESSP was not 
clearly understood by the officers in the Federal Government such as the Treasury 
and the Economic Planning Unit. This was stated in the lessons learned in the 
Implementation Completion Report (ICR) page 25; paragraph 7.4 stated the 
following: 
 
„The Special Account method of disbursing allocations for projects funded under the 
Bank loan must be clearly understood by all parties involved in the project. This is 
especially important to the central agencies (the Treasury and the Economic 
Planning Unit) in order to optimize its benefit and in ensuring adequate funds are 
made available for payments to the contractors within the stipulated time.‟ 
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The implementation of Project Management Reports (PMR-based) rather than 
Statement of Expenditure (SOE-based). 
 
The implementation of PMR-based was introduced for the ESSP in the Eighth 
Malaysian Plan. Previously the Government of Malaysia was using the Statement of 
Expenditure Model (SOE) proposed by the World Bank. As in the earlier chapter 6 
has discussed the effectiveness of PMR-based, therefore it will not be discussed 
again in this chapter.  
 
7.4 Summary and conclusion 
 
The financial governance and leadership criteria from the best practice of „World 
Class Financial Management for the Public Sector‟ by the Audit Commission of HM 
Treasury UK and PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005) were used in testing the 
effectiveness of financial management system in World Bank and Government of 
Malaysia approaches. The testing including the involvement and commitment of top 
management; the function of project coordination committee; World Bank conditions 
such as PIU, Project Management Report (PMR-based), maintenance of Special 
Account and the procurements of goods and services.  
 
The findings revealed the effectiveness of the World Bank approach as compared to 
the Government of Malaysia approach for the ESSP under the Eighth Malaysian 
Plan. The effectiveness in reducing the risks is justified by evidences from various 
sources especially from the Deputy Secretary-General (Finance and Development) of 
MoE; Head of Auditor for Education from the Auditor-General Office; and the Head 
of Technical Unit of DPSD that involved both type of approaches.  
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Furthermore, the respondents‟ views were also supported with data tables through 
out this chapter such the appointment of contractors through direct negotiation and 
political influences which are the problems in the Government of Malaysia approach 
that had contributed to failures of most projects. Therefore, the conditions set by the 
World Bank, including open procurement procedures proved valuable in improving 
and strengthening the financial management system for the World Bank funded 
projects. This also reduces the risks that the fund will be mismanaged which will 
lead to subsequent projects failures.  
 
Therefore, in this chapter, based on the evidences with specific evidences in Chapter 
6 regarding the greater effectiveness of World Bank financial reporting, we can 
conclude that the financial management system for this ESSP in the World Bank 
approach as compared to the Government of Malaysia is more effective in managing 
risks related to public financial management and aid. 
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Chapter 8 
 
What are the risks factors that contribute to the difference in performance 
between the Government of Malaysia approach and the World Bank approach 
and why? 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapters have studied the comparison of how effective the Project 
Management Report (PMR) were and how the financial management system 
between the World Bank and Government of Malaysia approach in managing risks 
related to public financial management and aid were.  The results have shown that 
the World Bank approach was more effective as compared to the Government of 
Malaysia approach of the ESSP in the Eighth Malaysian Plan.   
 
This chapter seeks to provide further evidence for what has contributed to the 
performance in the Government of Malaysia approach. It firstly defines the purpose 
of this chapter. Secondly, it presents the research findings related to the awareness 
and knowledge of risks among DPSD staff. Thirdly, it analyses the perceptions of 
risks factors as in the Risk Management Model of the HM Treasury UK (2004) and 
Canadian Treasury (1999), among the DPSD staff. The final section will summarize 
and conclude. 
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8.2.  Purpose 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify and discuss the risk factors which 
determined the performance of the Government of Malaysia approach as compared 
to the World Bank approach in the ESSP. This addresses the research framework 
questions in achieving the research question no. 5; sub-objective no. 4; and 
hypothesis no. 3 as also stated in Chapter 1 of this study. 
 
The source of the evidence on which the analysis in this chapter is based is the 
survey carried out among the DPSD staff of MoE. The survey is described in 
Chapter 5. The questionnaire for the survey is at Appendix 2. The tables 
summarizing the results of the survey are presented in this chapter. 
 
8.3  Results of the Analysis 
 
8.3.1.  Summary of the Results 
 
Based on the evidences gathered through the survey carried out for this chapter, as 
well as those supported with other sources of evidences such as interviews and 
supporting documentations, it can be summarize that the results of the findings 
revealed about more than fifty percent (50%) of the respondents in the survey agreed 
that the level of risks associated wit all the internal and external environmental 
factors as proposed in the „PESTLE MODEL‟ of the HM Treasury UK (2004) were 
above average or specifically at „Medium‟ and „High‟ levels of risks (Refer Table 
8.1 and 8.2 in page 186). 
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The summary of the internal and external environment factors as the sources of risks 
will be discussed further below. 
 
Factors in the Internal Environment  
 
The Development and Procurement Division (DPSD) of   Ministry of Education, 
Malaysia (MoE) 
 
The causes of failures of the projects were due to the following related risks such as 
lack of  i) staff with technical expertise; ii) high turnover of staff at the officer level,; 
iii) lack of supporting staff; iv) exposure to work procedures; v) lack of appropriate 
staff training; and vi) delay in payment due to checks-and-balance procedures within 
the DPSD. 
 
State Education Departments (SED) and District Education Offices (DEO) of 
MoE. 
 
The causes of failures identified  were due to the related risks such as i) not entirely  
involved in monitoring the project; ii) being unable to submit progress report in a 
timely manner; iii) lack of technical expertise staff; and iv) acceptance of proposals 
for an inappropriate project sites. 
Contractors and Suppliers 
 
The causes of failures identified here were due to i) being inexperienced in managing 
projects; ii) not enough skilled workers; iii) too many projects to be managed; and 
iv) insufficient fund or cash flow difficulties. 
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Project Management Consultants (PMC) 
 
The causes of failures identified were due to related risks such as i) too many 
projects to manage; ii) lack of skilled and experience staff; iii) delayed in processing 
payments to be paid; iv) not monitoring the projects closely; and v) not submitting 
progress report accordingly. 
 
External Environment Factors: 
 
Local Authorities (LA) 
 
The causes of failures identified were due to related risks such as i) delay in project 
approval to start the projects; ii) inclusion of additional conditions during mid-way 
of project implementation; and iii) delays in approving the Certificate of Occupancy. 
 
Intervention from Others 
 
The failures from other sources were due to the related risks such as interventions of 
certain interested parties in,  i) bids for building contracts; ii) obstructing the 
termination of projects; iii) demanding exemptions of penalties; and iv) selections of 
contractors based on Direct Negotiation. 
 
The findings showed that more than fifty percent (50%) of DPSD staff needed a 
proper introduction to risks awareness in public expenditure by their superiors.  
Issues on the sources or types of risks that affected the failures of Domestic 
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financing for the ESSP are illustrated from the Table 8.1 and 8.2 of the summary 
below. 
 
Table 8.1  - Internal Environment Factors: 
 Main Source of 
Risks 
Sources or types of risks Detail in 
page no. 
1 Development and 
Procurement 
Division (DPSD) 
of Ministry of 
Education, 
Malaysia (MOE)  
The failures were due to related risks such as  i) lack 
of technical expertise among  staff; ii) high turnover 
of staff at officer level; iii) lack of supporting staff; 
iv) exposure to work procedures; v) lack of staff 
training; and vi) delays in payment due to checks-
and-balance procedures within DPSD. 
 
 
198 
- 
204 
2 State and District 
Education Offices 
(SDE) of MOE. 
The failures were due to related risks such as i) not 
involved monitoring the projects entirely; ii) unable 
to submit progress report accordingly; iii) lack of 
non-technical expertise among staff; and proposed 
of an inappropriate project site.  
 
204 
- 
215 
3 Contractors and 
Suppliers 
The failures were due to related risks such as lack of 
i) inexperience in managing project; ii) not enough 
skill workers; iii) too many projects to be managed; 
and iv) insufficient fund or cash flow difficulties. 
 
215 
- 
226 
 
 
 
4 Project 
Management 
Consultants (PMC) 
The failures were due to the related risks such as i) 
too many projects; ii) lack of skill and experienced 
staff; iii) delays in processing payments; iv) not 
monitoring projects closely; and not submitting 
progress report accordingly. 
 
226 
- 
240 
 
Table 8.2 External Environment Factors: 
 Main Source of 
Risks 
Sources or types of risks Detail in 
page no. 
1 Local 
Authorities (LA) 
The failures were due to related risks such as i) delays 
in approval to start the projects; ii) inclusion of 
additional conditions at mid-way of projects; and iii) 
delays in approving the Certificate of Occupancy. 
 
240 
- 
247 
2 Intervention 
from Others 
The failures were due to related risks such as 
interventions of certain interested parties for i) 
building contracts; ii) obstructing termination of 
projects; iii) exemptions of penalties; and iv) 
selections of contractors based on Direct Negotiation. 
 
 
247 
- 
258 
(Source: Appendix A – Survey: Research Questionnaires) 
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8.3.2.   Details of the analysis of findings 
 
To what extent was there awareness and knowledge of risks among DPSD staff  
on public expenditure management in the ESSP? 
 
The success or failure of any particular stage of project management and 
implementation were also dependent upon the extent of the knowledge and 
awareness of the risks involved in public expenditure management among the staff 
especially those in the DPSD of MoE. The idea of identifying the level of knowledge 
and awareness is to ascertain whether they have had other experience in risks 
management. Earlier results collected had shown that the level of risks knowledge 
and awareness among the DPSD staff involved were as in Table 8.3 below. 
 
Table 8.3 - Level of Staff Perception or Knowledge and Awareness on Risks in 
managing public fund 
 Variables / Level 
of Problems 
0 1 2 3 4 Total 
1 On getting the job 
offer in DPSD 
- Professional  
 - Supporting 
 
 
0 
0 
 
 
15 
14 
 
 
19 
35 
 
 
10 
18 
 
 
1 
9 
 
 
45 (37.2%) 
76 (62.8%) 
  0 
(0.0%) 
29 
(24.0%) 
54 
(44.6%) 
28 
(23.1%) 
10 
(8.3%) 
121 
(100.0%) 
2 On holding the 
current position 
-     Professional 
76. Supporting 
 
 
1 
0 
 
 
22 
23 
 
 
21 
36 
 
 
1 
13 
 
 
0 
4 
 
 
45 (37.2%) 
76 (62.8%) 
  1 
(0.8%) 
45 
(37.2%) 
57 
(47.1%) 
14 
(11.6%) 
4 
(3.3%) 
121 
(100.0%) 
3 As a Government 
Servant 
77. Professional 
78. Supporting 
 
 
1 
0 
 
 
18 
18 
 
 
19 
42 
 
 
5 
14 
 
 
2 
2 
 
 
45 (37.2%) 
76(62.8%) 
  1 
(0.8%) 
36 
(29.8%) 
61 
(50.4%) 
19 
(15.7%) 
4 
(3.3%) 
121 
(100.0%) 
(Source: Appendix A – Survey: Research Questionnaires) 
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Based on the above Table 8.3, the results revealed the levels of knowledge and 
awareness of risks in managing public expenditures were as followings: 
  
On getting the Job Offer 
 
The perception of risks of new DPSD staff has shown that about 54 respondents or 
44.6 percent out of 121 respondents had „Average‟ level of knowledge on risks in 
public expenditure management. This is followed by 29 respondents or 24 percent 
who had a „High‟ knowledge level, while 28 respondents or 23.1 percent had „Low‟ 
level. There were 10 respondents or 8.3 per cent had „Very Low or almost non 
existent‟ knowledge level of risks awareness. Therefore, it can be stated that more 
than fifty (50) percent or seventy six (76) respondents were at an „Average‟ 
knowledge level and below.  
 
From the above results it can be concluded that about 92 respondents or 76.03 
percent out of 121 respondents had the least awareness of risks in a public sector 
organization such as in the DPSD of MoE. 
 
On holding the current position 
 
In analysing the level of knowledge and awareness of risks among the respondents 
who hold the current position, the results shown that about 57 respondents or 47.1 
percent believed that their perceptions of risks were at a „Lower‟ level as compared 
to 45 respondents or 37.2 per cent which perceived their knowledge of risks were at 
a „High‟ level as soon as they hold the position in the unit or division of DPSD.  
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As a Government Servant 
 
The reason for analysing this variable is because some of the staff in the DPSD may 
have had working experience in other departments or ministry before joining the 
DPSD.  It is assumed that, their knowledge, experience and awareness as a 
government servant may influence and contribute to their work performance that 
would affect the ESSP. The results showed that about 61 respondents or 50.4 per 
cent of the total 121 respondents agreed that their level of knowledge or perceptions 
on risks were at the „Lower‟ level while 36 respondents or 29.8 percent were at a 
„High‟ level. 
 
In conclusion, we can summarize that the overall results of the three variables 
indicate that the DPSD staff who were involved in this study had little awareness of 
how important their roles were in managing public funds.  
 
Have the staff been instructed on risk management in the organization, and if so 
when, and by whom? 
  
In correlating the above findings in relation to the knowledge and awareness of risks, 
the study also aimed to ascertain if it has been introduced to the staff in the DPSD by 
their superiors. The staff should be introduced to the importance of the knowledge 
and awareness of risks in an appropriate and official manner. This exposure is crucial 
as it involved various projects irrespective of its sizes and the due to the huge amount 
of money involved.  Furthermore, the influences exerted by interested parties in 
obtaining contracts tended to lead to risks in bribery.  
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The three variables that were included in this study are i) when was the matter 
relating to risks management introduced by the top management; ii) if there was any 
briefing given, which officers should be informed about the risks matters; and iii) if 
the briefing was given, to which officers should the information related to risks be 
given?  The results can be seen in Table 8.4 below. 
 
Table 8.4 - Introduced to matters relating to risks management in the organization 
 
Variable Respondents 
Q4. How were you introduced to matters relating to 
risks management? 
1. Briefing upon reporting for duty 
2. In weekly or monthly meeting by superior 
3. Memos of letters to staff 
4. Notes circulated to staff 
  5.   Not informed at all 
 
 
25 
23 
21 
39 
10 
Q5. If briefing been given, so which officers the 
information on risk management should be 
conveyed? 
1. Only to those officers of DG48 and above 
2. Only to those officers of DG41 and above 
3. Only to Executive Officers and Chief clerks 
4.    All staff 
 
 
 
1 
6 
1 
108 
Q6. If briefing not given, so to which officers the 
information on risks management should be given? 
1. Only to those officers of DG48 and above 
2. Only to those officers of DG41 and above 
3. Only to Executive Officers and Chief clerks 
4. All staff 
 
 
 
23 
5 
2 
91 
(Source: Appendix A – Survey: Research Questionnaires) 
 
Introduction of Risks Management among DPSD by their Superiors 
 
The findings in Table 8.4 show that the results were inconsistent and vary in terms of 
when and how the awareness of risks related management were introduced to the 
staff of DPSD. Based on the analysis, the results show that about 39 respondents or 
32.2 percent of the 121 respondents stated that they knew about the risks involved 
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through „Notes circulated to staff‟; 25 respondents or 20.7 percent on „Briefing upon 
reporting for duty‟; 23 respondents or 19.0 percent stated that „In weekly or monthly 
meeting by their superiors‟, 10 respondents or 8.3 percent of the respondents 
indicated they were „Not informed at all‟ and about 3 respondents or 2.48 percent of 
them did not respond to the questions.  
 
Appropriate DPSD staff that should be informed on risks matters. 
  
There were two variables tested in this study:- firstly, if a briefing was given, then 
which groups of officers should be informed on the risks, and secondly, if briefing 
was given, to which officers should the information related to risks be given. 
 
In the case of the first variable, the results of the analysis showed that 108 
respondents or 89.3 per cent of the 121 respondents preferred that the briefing should 
be informed to „All staff‟. This meant that all levels of staff irrespective of their 
positions should be made aware of the risks related to their duties in the DPSD. The 
agreement that all staff should be introduced on the risks matter was also supported 
by the results on the findings related to „if the briefing was not given‟ to all staff that 
about 91 respondents or (75.21 %) of the respondents agreed with it.  
 
In summary, more than fifty percent (50%) of DPSD of MoE staff surveyed agreed 
that there was a need to educate DPSD of MoE staff in the managing of public fund 
risks. This is to avoid misuse of the huge public funds managed by DPSD for the 
development of ESSP. 
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8.3.3. The impact of risks factors to Domestic financing of the ESSP 
 
The Internal Factors as Sources of Risks 
 
The results of the findings that are associated with the following bodies such as i) 
DPSD of MOE; ii) State and District Education Offices (SDE) of MOE; iii) 
Contractors and suppliers; and iv) Project Management Consultants (PMC) as the 
internal factors or the main sources of risks as indicated earlier in this chapter will be 
elaborated as below in this study. 
 
The Development and Procurement Division (DPSD), Ministry of Education 
(MOE) 
 
The role of all the DSPD staff is very crucial in the Ministry of Education because 
they are directly involved either financially or non-financially in the development of 
the ESSP infrastructure. Failure or delays in certain aspects of their role will have a 
significant impact on the educational development carried out like incompletion of a 
project as per schedule. 
 
In this study, the researcher believed that needs analysis related to the sources of 
risks elaborated in detail below contributed to the failure of most Domestic financing 
ESSP as compared to World Bank financing. Among the risks that will be discussed 
here are i) lack of technical staff; ii) high turnover of staff at the officer-level; iii) 
lack of supporting staff; iv) lack of exposure to work procedures; v) lack of staff 
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training; and vi) late payment to contractors due to check-and-balance procedures. 
The results of the analysis can be clearly seen in Table 8.5 below. 
 
 Table 8.5 – Risk factors: Opinions of staff in Ministry of Education (Development 
and Procurement Division) 
 
 Source of Risks Risk Level Professional Supporting Total 
1 Lack staff with technical 
expertise for project 
management 
High 
Medium  
Low 
No risk at 
all  
12 
19 
9 
2 
16 
32 
18 
6 
28 
51 
27 
8 
2 Frequent change of staff at 
the officer level during tenure 
of project  
High 
Medium  
Low 
No risk at 
all 
16 
19 
6 
2 
24 
38 
10 
1 
40 
57 
16 
3 
3 Lack of support staff High 
Medium  
Low 
No risk at 
all  
14 
19 
7 
2 
23 
31 
15 
3 
37 
50 
22 
5 
 
4 Lack of exposure to work 
procedure 
High 
Medium  
Low 
No risk at 
all  
14 
24 
4 
0 
19 
35 
15 
1 
33 
59 
19 
1 
5 Lack of training for staff 
involve in the project 
High 
Medium  
Low 
No risk at 
all  
9 
27 
7 
0 
21 
34 
15 
3 
30 
61 
22 
3 
6 Late payment to supplier or 
contractor due to checks-and-
balance procedures within 
Divisions. 
High 
Medium  
Low 
No risk at 
all  
13 
18 
12 
0 
22 
28 
20 
3 
35 
46 
32 
3 
(Source: Appendix A – Survey Research Questionnaires) 
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Lack of staff with technical expertise for project management 
 
Based on the Table 7.5, 79 respondents (65.2%) agreed that the lack of staff with 
technical expertise for project management in the DPSD contributed to the medium 
and above risks of failure in Domestic financing project. Out of that, 28 respondents 
(23.1%) believed that the lack of technical staff is a „High‟ contribution to the failure 
and 51 (42.1%) had a „Medium‟ perception level of risks due to lack of technical 
staff in the MoE.  
 
High turnover of staff at the officer level during tenure of project 
 
The high turnover of staff at the officer level during tenure of the project, lack of 
supporting staff and as well as lack of exposure to work procedures to the DPSD 
staff as stated in Table 5.5 below were found to have contributed to the failure of 
most of the projects in the domestic financing of ESSP. For instance, the survey 
revealed that about 97 respondents (80.2%) felt that the risks to development and 
completion of the projects as per schedule caused by too frequent changing of staff at 
the officer level were „Medium‟ or „High”. 
 
Lack of supporting staff 
 
This is followed by the lack of supporting staff. The results showed that about 87 
respondents (71.9%) consisting of 33 professional staff and 54 supporting staff 
agreed that the lack of supporting staff caused both the „High‟ and „Medium‟ level of 
  201 
risks that might have contributed to the failure to complete all projects planned under 
the Eighth Malaysian Plan. 
 
Lack of exposure to work procedures related to projects 
 
The findings above also correlated with the lack of exposure to work procedures and 
lack of training for staff involved in the project at both professional and supporting 
staff level. In the findings, it was revealed that 92 respondents (76.1%) agreed that 
this factor is another source of risks.  
 
Lack of training for staff involved in the projects 
 
The staffs employed with experience were invaluable especially in the DPSD of 
MoE. This is to avoid the risks that contributed to project failures as well as 
misleading of public fund. However, the lack of experience among the staff can be 
overcome with proper related exposure and training.   
 
Therefore, in the case of „lack of training for staff involved in the projects‟, the 
results shown that about 91 respondents (75.2%) felt that the lack of training for staff 
involved in the projects was a risk factor that also contributed to the failure to 
complete most projects as per schedule. For instance, 38 respondents of the 
professional staff and above „Medium‟ level agreed that the lack of exposure to work 
procedures had contributed to the risks of project failures in Domestic financing. 
This is supported with the 54 respondents of the supporting staff which accounted for 
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a higher number of respondents in this category of lack of training for staff involved 
in the projects. 
 
Late payment to suppliers or contractors due to checks-and-balance procedures 
within Divisions 
 
The study further seeks to identify if the source of risks such as „late payment to 
suppliers or contractors due to check-and-balance procedures within the Division of 
DPSD‟ is another contributory factor that leads to the failure of most of the projects 
under Domestic financing. Based on the findings, the results had shown that more 
than 50 percent or 60 respondents agreed that it was a legitimate source of risk. 
There were 35 respondents among both professional and supporting staff levels with 
28.9% who stated to cause „High‟ level of risks and 46 respondents (38.0%) who 
stated to have „Medium‟ level of risks. 
 
The evidence of risks caused by late payment can be supported with the claims made 
by the contractors and suppliers under the ESSP Domestic financing in the Eighth 
Malaysian Plan as reported in the exemption claims list of LAD Bil.No.4/2006, 
which involved 197 schools consisting of 191 primary and 6 secondary schools 
respectively.  According to the contractors, the justifications for the delay were due 
to the following shown in Table 8.5.1 below.  
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Table 8.5.1 - Justifications of the contractors in claiming the 90 days exemptions 
of „LAD‟ 
 
 Justifications / Reasons for delay and exemption of LAD Primary 
School 
1 Delay in Initial Payment by the MOE. 47 
2 Delay in Progress Payment by the MOE. 37 
 
The results in the above Table 8.5.1 has shown the extent of the risk impacts 
involved in late payments as claimed by the contractors and suppliers who 
contributed to delay in completing the project as per schedule. Based on the above 
information too, we can state that the delays caused at least 37 Primary School 
projects in ESSP to break off from their original schedule. This had also impacted 
other service delivery of the education system especially in relation to the provision 
and access to opportunities for primary education which is important in achieving the 
„Education for All‟ objectives. Furthermore, the delays have left an impact not only 
at the national level but also at the international level since the schools were unable 
to be used as planned. This undoubtedly impacted the end-users of the projects i.e. 
the children and the local communities.  
 
The statement is also supported by the evidence showing that many projects were 
delayed and abandoned under the Eighth Malaysian Plan, according to the Report on 
Lessons Learned by the DSPD during the Ninth Malaysian Plan as shown in Table 
5.5.2 below. 
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Table 8.5.2 Overview Status of Implementation Project under Eighth Malaysian 
Plan (Source: Fail Meja Unit Rendah Akademik , 19 January 2006) 
 
Program Total Completed Construction Postponed 
Pre School 6103 2803 496 2804 
Primary 
Academic 
1867 1583 14 270 
Teachers 
Training 
College 
20 2 0 18 
Capital 
Assistance 
Depends on Application 
Special 
Education 
3 1 0 2 
TOTAL 7993 4389 510 3094 
 
The table above showed that there were 3,094 or 38.74 per cent of the total 7,993 
projects were postponed. This figure included the 2,804 projects or 35.08 percent for 
Pre-School projects and about 14 percent from the total Primary Academic schools 
projects. The figures indicated the extent of poor management of fund, as the total 
number of completed project which is 54.91 percent or 4,389 projects was far from 
the expectations of the nation.  
 
The State and District Education Offices (SDE) of MoE 
 
The roles played by the State and District Education Officers through out Malaysia 
are very important in ensuring the success or failure of any development or 
infrastructure projects. This is because every State and District Education Officers 
has a special unit mainly for the purpose of ensuring smooth implementation and 
development of the projects either under construction or completed. The purpose of 
the appointment of this unit at the state and district educational offices is to support 
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the DPSD of MOE in ensuring that all projects either in existing premise such as 
school buildings and facilities that are in good conditions and are safe for use. 
 
In this section, the researcher suggests four variables which may be related to the 
State and District Education offices in contributing to the risks that had impacted the 
Domestic financing infrastructure projects. The variables are the following: 
 
a) Non-involvement in project management; 
b) Non-submission and delay in submission of report to DPSD of Ministry 
of Education (MoE); 
c) No staff with technical expertise; and 
d) Selection of a hazardous or inappropriate site for school projects. 
 
The summary of the results as related to the above risks can be seen in the Table 8.6 
below. 
 
Table 8.6 – The Result related to State and District Education Officers of Ministry of 
Education. [The respondents are DPSD staff involved in the survey] 
 
 Variables / Causes Risks Level Professional Supporting Total 
1 Were not requested to be 
involved in monitoring of 
projects 
High 
Medium  
Low 
No risk at all  
6 
23 
10 
3 
15 
36 
16 
4 
21 
59 
26 
4 
2 Did not submit progress 
reports or late in submitting 
the progress reports of the 
projects to the MOE 
High 
Medium  
Low 
No risk at all 
8 
23 
9 
2 
12 
42 
16 
3 
20 
65 
25 
5 
3 No staff with technical 
expertise were involved with 
infrastructure projects 
High 
Medium  
Low 
No risk at all  
22 
15 
5 
1 
25 
26 
16 
4 
47 
41 
21 
5 
4 Proposed a hazardous or 
inappropriate site for school 
projects 
High 
Medium  
Low 
No risk at all  
21 
12 
5 
5 
24 
22 
18 
6 
45 
34 
23 
11 
(Source: Appendix A – Survey: Research Questionnaires) 
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Non-involvement in project management by the State and District Education 
officials 
 
The result of the analysis revealed that about 106 (87.60%) of the 121 respondents 
consisting of the DPSD staff in this survey agreed that the „non-involvement of the 
state and district officials in the project management‟ had contributed the risks of the 
failure to the Domestic financing from the „Low‟ to „Higher‟ level.  Out of that, 21 
respondents or 17.4 percent agreed that it was at a „High‟ level and 59 respondents or 
48.8 percent agreed it was at „Medium‟ level which consists of 23 professional staff 
and 36 non-professional or supporting staff. The overall number of agreement for 
this variable should be given serious consideration as it was above average. The 
purpose of this section is to try to triangulate the results from the survey above with 
the interviews and electronic mail carried out to the implementers such as officers-
in-charge at the State and District as well as officers-in-charge at Ministry level of 
DPSD.  
 
The above survey result correlated with the evidence gathered from interviews and 
electronic mail carried out to the officers-in-charge both at the state and district level 
as well as from the DPSD officers at federal level. For instance, according to the 
officers-in-charge of the Development Unit of the Educational District Office, the 
role of the officer was minimal which only refers to work focused on existing 
schools where the allocations were for repair and maintenance purposes. However, in 
the case of new development projects, it will be in the control of the DPSD at the 
Ministry of Education level.  
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The findings were also supported by a few officers through the interviews in the 
Domestic financing of the DPSD on the minimal involvement of officers at the state 
and district level in managing the projects. This was because of the perception that 
the project was managed by Project Management Consultant (PMC) appointed by 
the Ministry of Finance (MoF).  Furthermore, according to the interviews, the district 
and state education officers were involved in monitoring the physical development 
aspect but not its finance. However, the role of the state and district officers in 
effectively monitoring the projects can be questioned because there were many 
occurrences of project delays and incompletion which were included among others 
issues of quality workmanships which subsequently lead to safety issues of the 
buildings for the end-users. Evidence from the observations made to the site-visits by 
the researcher in a few schools during the data collection period indicated that the 
problems of these schools had been highlighted by the Deputy Secretary-General of 
the Ministry of Education too. However, the expected improvements to the situations 
were late or unattended to. 
 
Failure or delay in submitting progress report to MoE 
  
The information provided by the state and district offices to the DPSD on the 
progress of projects should involve both physical and financial aspects. The progress 
report should reflect the current status when requested since any delays or non-
submission will have an impact on the subsequent cash flow and financial planning. 
The direct implication of the shortage of cash flow will be the delay in project 
completion. The delay in completion will lead to other related impact especially on 
the service delivery of the educational system. Due to that, the study also tries to 
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identify if the „delay in submission of reports to the MoE‟ had also contributed to the 
failure of domestic projects. This is because any delays in submission will inevitably 
resulted in outdated information. 
  
Therefore, this study tries to identify if the non-submission or delay in submission of 
reports to the DPSD was another risk factor that have contributed to the projects 
failure in most domestic financing. The results of the findings revealed that about 
110 (90.90%) of the 121 respondents believed that the delay or non-submission of 
the progress reports of the projects to the MoE had indeed contributed to the risks 
that caused the failure of the Domestic financing project to be completed per 
schedule as shown in the above Table 8.6.  Furthermore, the results also shown that 
about 85 (77.27%) of the 110 respondents had stated that the risks were at medium 
and higher level.   
 
The evidence obtained from the officers-in-charge who were as respondents also 
varies. According to officers at the district level, there were actually no reports 
prepared. But according to the officers at the state level there were reports prepared 
on the progress of the projects. According to an electronic mail as in Appendix 7.1 
received from one of the respondents who was formally an officer-in-charge at the 
DPSD of MoE, all the state and district development units were directly involved in 
monitoring the progress of the projects (on behalf of the MoE), on site but only 
relating to the physical development of the projects only because the development 
occurred in their districts or states. 
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The above evidence contrasted with the results from the survey carried out on the 
DPSD staff as stated above. An analysis correlating with the results for the first 
sources of risks which was „non-involvement in project monitoring‟ the results 
correlated with about 106 of the respondents agreed with their non-involvement in 
project monitoring and 110 agreed with the non-submission of the progress report 
(Refer to Table 8.6). Further investigation through observation during the data 
collection had discovered that the DPSD was depending more on the Project 
Management Consultant (PMC) for the progress report rather than the state and 
district officers.  
 
Therefore, the claimed made by the state and district officers that they were 
responsible for close monitoring of the projects, and preparation and submission of 
progress report for the projects that would be similar to the management reports in 
the World Bank ESSP can be questioned. These findings showed one of the reasons 
that contributed to most of projects being delayed or abandoned. For instance, the 
evidence obtained from the focus group of two different schools in the state of Johor 
showed that both parents and teachers faced problems such as building safely due to 
the delay in occupying the school as per schedule (Refer to Appendix 2).  According 
to the parents, their expectations that the school would be ready as planned were not 
met and as a result, they still had to send their children to another school which was 
quite a distance away and thus they had to incur additional expenses. The parents 
were very disappointed due to the delay of the project until finally the school was 
completed and was occupied. After occupying the school, issues about the safety 
conditions of the schools relating to workmanships were again raised by the parents.  
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In addition, the non-occupancy of the schools for quite sometimes had also 
contributed to additional cost such as cost for further repairs since much of the 
facilities were stolen while some were destroyed due to vandalism. Other than that, 
the quality of the schools was in a bad condition and some parts of the school 
buildings were still not safe to be occupied. This was identified and confirmed 
during the visits and observations carried out by the researcher and the situations 
were supported by the statements given by the teachers and the officers from the 
State Educational Department and the District Education Office.  It was also noted 
that complaints had been made by the parents and teachers to the State Education 
Department and the District Education Office but until the visits no such follow-up 
actions had been taken. The issue was later reported to the top management of the 
ministry by the researcher for further actions.  
 
An interview with the Deputy Secretary-General (Development and Finance) of the 
Ministry of Education confirmed that some of the projects failures were due to the 
recommendation and selection of inappropriate lands for the schools. This 
contributed to the increase in risks to the constructed schools structure making 
unsafe for occupation. Some of the schools were only used for a short time, and one 
of the schools needed to be demolished after part of its building collapsed. 
 
Lack of staff with technical expertise to monitor infrastructure projects 
 
The role played by staff with technical skills especially related to the infrastructure 
project such as the ESSP is very useful for project monitoring. This is to ensure that 
the building will be built according to the specifications set as well as in determining 
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that safety standards are met upon its completion. Therefore, the study tries to 
identify that if the lack of technical expertise staff involved in the infrastructure 
projects at the State and District level had contributed to the risks of failure to most 
of the domestically financed ESSP projects.   
 
The results shown indicates that 47 (38.80%) of the respondents consisting the 
DPSD staff in the survey agreed that the lack of technical staff was a problem at the 
„High‟ level. The data also showed that 41 (33.90%) agreed at „Medium‟ level of 
risks. Meanwhile, at the „Low‟ level of risks, 21 (17.40%) agreed, followed by 5 
(4.1%) agreed that there was „No Risk‟ at all from this factor (Refer to Table 8.6).  
The overall result shown that 109 (90.08%) stated that the non-existence of technical 
expertise staff at the State and District Officers through out the country contributed 
to the risks of projects failure which included failure to complete the projects as per 
schedule  and irrespective of whether it is small or big development project. 
 
The above results were confirmed by the personal observation of the researcher and 
personal interviews with some of the staff. It was found that there were no 
professional technical staffs such as engineers or quantity surveyors under the 
officers-in-charge at the state and districts Education Offices. Most of the staff were 
trained as teachers with other backgrounds but they were attached to the 
development unit at the state and district education offices.  
 
Most of the present technical staffs were seconded to the Technical Unit of the 
DPSD in MoE. Furthermore, accounting personnel like an accountant did not exist at 
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the state level.  This brought difficulties for DPSD in doing the financial planning 
and forecasting at the state and district level.  
 
The lack of technical and accounting staffs have indeed contributed to the delays and 
postponement of most domestic financing as indicated in Table 8.7 below. The table 
shows that about 171 (58.57%) of similar projects in the domestic financing as 
compared to World Bank financing were delayed.  The evidences can also be seen in 
the „Liquidated Ascertained Damages (LAD)‟ claimed made by the contractors.  In 
addition, there were many domestic financing projects such as computer laboratories 
and small size schools that were also delayed in abandonedment under the Eighth 
Malaysian Plan which had become a national issue in the Parliament.  
 
Table 8.7 - The comparison of number of Primary Schools projects financed by the 
World Bank and Domestic for the New Educational Infrastructure Development 
Project under the Eighth Malaysian Plan for the Education Sector Support Project 
(ESSP)  
 
Status of Projects Domestic Financing  
Phase 1 (managed by 
PMC) 
World Bank (managed 
by JKR) 
 Unit Percentage Unit Percentage 
Completed on Schedule 93 31.84 30 88.24 
LAD  171 58.57 3 8.82 
Postponed 20 6.85   
Terminated & Continued 4 1.37 *1 2.94 
Under Construction 4 1.37   
Total 292 100.00 34 100.00 
* Terminate and Withdraw from the World Bank due to non-compliance of Bank 
Procedures. 
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Proposing of a hazardous or inappropriate sites for school projects 
 
The location of a school project is also an important consideration in providing a 
conducive learning and teaching environment. Normally, the location of the school 
projects either primary or secondary schools were proposed by the State and District 
Education Offices.  The role played by the state and district officers in proposing and 
being responsible for selecting an appropriate site for the project is stated in the 
electronic mail as the evidence as in Appendix 7.1 by one of the officer-in-charge at 
the ministry level in the DPSD of MoE. According to officer-in-charge, the state and 
district educational officers were also responsible in determining the lands/sites and 
setting the priority of the projects which included preparing the project‟s briefs. 
 
The result for the findings had shown that about 102 (84.30%) of the respondents in 
the survey consisting of the DPSD staff who agreed that the proposed of hazardous 
or inappropriate sites for school projects as one of the risks that have contributed to 
the failure of most projects to be completed on schedule under the Domestic 
financing. The situation was considered critical when further analysis revealed that 
about 45 of the 121 respondents agreed at „High‟ level of risks factor.  
 
The above problem in locating hazardous or inappropriate location is supported 
through a statement made by the Director-General of Public Services in the daily 
national newspaper „Berita Harian‟ dated 27th of February, 2008. It was mentioned 
during the Officiating Ceremony of the „Danau Kota Dua Primary School‟, which is 
one of the 268 abandoned educational sector projects for domestic financing. The 
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Director-General of Public Service also emphasized on all government agencies to 
be very careful in the selection of land at the earlier stage of planning as well as 
selection of potential contractors to be awarded for the projects. 
 
The failures due to the risks of allocating inappropriate site were also stated in the 
lesson learnt under the Eighth Malaysian Plan in the 2004 Strategic Planning 
Meeting (Persidangan Perancangan Strategik), Ministry of Education, Malaysia by 
the DPSD. The report of the meeting stated the followings which were related to 
acquisition of land for educational infrastructure development projects: 
 
a) The selection of a suitable location for a particular ESSP infrastructure 
projects was not being attended to during the initial planning of the projects. 
Due to that, the project incurred higher cost in construction and maintenance. 
  
b) Some of the locations proposed lacked basic facilities such as access road, 
electricity and water supplies. 
 
c) The data terminal known as the SPPII as the source of information for the 
issues related to educational land or location at the district level that included 
the parliament constituency were found to be incomplete and inaccurate. 
 
The above risks were also supported with the claims made by the contractors and 
suppliers in the ESSP Domestic financing in the Eighth Malaysian Plan. According 
to reports, the list of claiming of exemption of LAD Bil.No.4/2006, consisting of 197 
schools include 191 primary and 6 secondary schools.  According to the report, 43 
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contractors blamed that delays were caused by project location by the school 
authority and district office for selecting an inappropriate site such as being away 
from the main road and lack of water and electricity.  
 
Selection of contractors 
 
The selection of potential contractors in an infrastructure project is important for the 
success of either big or small projects. This is to ensure that the appointed contractor 
can successfully manage the project as per schedule as well as to provide excellent 
quality workmanship of the completed building especially in relation to building 
safety. This aspect of the contractors‟ ability to deliver quality workmanship of 
completed project is important because their performance will affect the whole 
planning of the MoE in the achieving its „Education for All (EFA)‟objectives. This 
situation will have a consequential impact on the planning of financial and non-
financial resources such as the training and posting of the teaching personnel, 
supporting staff and as well as potential students. Further, parents in the local 
community where the project was built had set themselves high hopes and 
expectations that the school project would be completed on time. They were hoping 
that the timely delivery of the school helped improve their future costs and benefits 
in monetary terms as the case of the incurred transport cost of sending their children 
to a school situated further than the currently under construction school. Therefore, 
the selection of the contractors should be done with great care and consideration 
especially in relation if they have a strong financial foundation as well as the ability 
to manage non-financial aspects of getting the project done such as having ample 
skilled workers.  
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Therefore, in this section, the researcher seeks to identify four variables believed to 
have contributed to the risks that had an impact on the domestically financed 
infrastructure projects. The summary of the analysis is shown below in Table 8.8 and 
the risks associated with the contractors for this study are as follows. 
 
a) Less than 2 years of experience in handling infrastructure projects 
b) Not having enough skilled workers 
c) Managing too many projects within the same stipulated timeframe 
d) Not having adequate financial resources for revolving working capital 
 
Table 8.8 – The Result related to the Contractors 
  
 Source of risks Level of 
Risks 
Professional Supporting Total 
1 Less than 2 years 
experience in handling 
infrastructure projects 
 
High 
Medium  
Low 
No risk at all 
16 
21 
3 
3 
23 
39 
10 
1 
39 
60 
13 
4 
2 Not having enough 
skilled workers 
High 
Medium  
Low 
No risk at all  
16 
22 
4 
1 
28 
34 
8 
2 
44 
56 
12 
3 
 
 
3 Managing too many 
projects within the 
same stipulated 
timeframe  
High 
Medium  
Low 
No risk at all 
20 
12 
11 
0 
42 
25 
5 
2 
62 
37 
16 
2 
4 Not having adequate 
financial resources for 
revolving working 
capital 
High 
Medium  
Low 
No risk at all  
29 
9 
2 
2 
47 
19 
5 
1 
76 
28 
7 
3 
(Source: Appendix A – Survey: Research Questionnaires) 
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The contractors had less than 2 years experience in handling infrastructure 
projects 
 
As been stated earlier, the selection of contractor is crucial. If the contractor is 
inexperience the risks of the project failure will be high. The project will not be 
successfully completed as per schedule but issues of safety of the completed 
buildings may be questionable. This may also contribute to the perception of a 
misuse of public fund since the cost incurred in repairing the completed building will 
be higher.  
 
Complaints on the contractors‟ performance in completing the projects awarded to 
them under the ESSP during the Eighth Malaysian Plan, is one of the focus of this 
study. The study also seeks to identify if the contractors‟ length of working 
experience such as less than two years in handling infrastructure projects is a 
contributory factor of risks. 
  
In the earlier analysis, the results showed that the overall level of risks contributed by 
this variable were 92.50 percent that 39 or 32.20 percent of the respondents agreed 
that it were at a „High‟ level and 60 or 49.60 percent aid that it were at „Medium‟ and 
12 or 10.70 percent said it was at „Lower‟ level of risks.  
 
The above results were also supported by evidence obtained from the interviews 
carried out with the officers-in-charge of the Domestic financing. According to these 
officers, the delays and failure of most Domestic financing projects were due to most 
in most situations because of hiring inexperience contractors with less than one year 
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experience in carrying out a construction project. This put the project at a high risks 
level.  This was further supported by a statement from one of the Head of Unit in the 
DPSD that some of the contractors which were selected politically such as those 
under the Dewan Perniagaan Melayu Malaysia (DPMM) had even less that six 
month experience in construction work.  Due to this political intervention, most of 
the projects were  actually awarded to contractors that did not have a proven track 
record in construction and subsequently which finally led to project delays and 
abandonment with potential end-users facing the consequence.  
 
The above findings obtained from the officers-in-charge should not be 
underestimated because based on the findings obtained from the Report of Claims 
for Exemptions for „Liquidated and Ascertained Damages (LAD)‟ No. 4/2006 dated 
9
th
, January 2007, one of the reasons that the contractors requested for the 
exemptions was due to lack of experience in managing the project physical or 
financial development. The findings also revealed that about 165 or 93.22 percent of 
177 primary school and 33 secondary projects were affected as stated in the same 
report of the LAD Bil. No.  4/2006.  The details can be seen in the Table 8.9 below. 
 
Table 8.9 - Claimed for exemption for the Liquidated and Ascertained Damages‟ or 
normally known as (LAD) 
 
Types of Projects 
Number of 
Project 
Less 
than  
90 days 
More than  
180 days 
Out of 
More 
than 180 
days 
were 
more 
than 365 
days 
Minimum 
Amount 
Exemption of 
LAD per 
contract for 
90 days 
Primary School 177 42 84 39 RM2,883.60 
Secondary School 33 6 26 17 RM5,046.30 
Total 210 48 110 56  
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The above practices creating risks in most projects were delayed and even 
abandoned were criticized by the Director-General of the Malaysia Public Services, 
Tan Sri Sidek Hassan during the officiating ceremony of the Danau Kota Dua 
Primary School in February 27, 2008.  According to his statement which was quoted 
in the national newspaper, the Berita Harian dated February 27, 2008, that 
„government agencies should be more careful in the selection of the contractors 
during the initial stage of planning. This is to avoid abandonment and delays in many 
projects such as the above primary school which should had been completed year 
back in 2002 but took about another seven (7) years to be completed with additional 
cost of RM3.1 million with three different contractors involved in its completion. 
The Danau Kota Dua Primary School was one of the 268 known as „Sick Projects‟ 
by the Government of Malaysia (GoM) that  were supposed to be completed under 
the Eighth Malaysian Plan that ended in December, 2005. 
 
Issues of lack of skilled workers to complete the projects 
 
Having skilled workers is an important requisite in any project implementation. This 
is to ensure that projects can be completed according to the planned schedule and 
specifications. This would also include that the projects are delivered in acceptable 
conditions and meeting the necessary safety standards for occupation as required by 
laws. This study also seeks to identify if the failure of Domestic financing projects 
were also due to the risks of a lack of sufficient skilled workers provided for by the 
contractors. The results of the analysis showed that the lack of skilled workforce had 
an impact to the project completion. About 100 (80.70%) of the 121 respondents 
which consisted of both professional and supporting staffs of the DPSD agreed that 
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the level of risks was at a „Medium‟ level and above, which consisting of 44 
(36.36%) at the above level of risk.  Lacking skilled workers among the contractors 
had not only contributed to the risks in completing the Domestic projects as per 
schedule, as shown in Table 8.10 below, but have also contributed to the risks that 
the projects were completed with poor workmanship quality even though the projects 
were at last completed.  
 
The above findings can be also justified from the interviews carried out with the 
officers-in-charge from the State and District Education Offices as well as the DPSD. 
According to the interviewees, most project failures were also due to the shortage of 
labour especially skilled labour faced by most of the contractors. This situation is 
also supported by the report on justification for exemption of „Liquidated 
Ascertained Damages (LAD) Bil.No.4/2006 as shown in Table 8.10 below in which 
8 of the contractors agreed that the delayed were due to shortage of labour.  
 
Table 8.10 - Justifications of the contractors in claiming the 90 days exemptions of 
„Liquidated Ascertained Damages (LAD)‟  
 Justifications / Reasons for delay and exemption of 
LAD 
Primary School 
1 Delay in Initial Payment by the MOE. 47 
2 Delay in Progress Payment by the MOE. 37 
3 Delay in soil and other matters by IKRAM. 7 
4 Failure of PMC in managing the project.  
5 Unpredictable weather. 11 
6 Lack of experience in managing project. 4 
7 Delay due to insufficient Cash flow by the contractor. 3 
8 Delay in locating the project location by the School 
authority and the District Education Department. 
43 
9 Delay and shortage of material supplies. 56 
10 Delay in starting the work by the contractor. 29 
11 Delay by the Electrical Power Authority (TNB). 3 
12 Delay and red tape by the Local Authority. 37 
13 Shortage of Labour 8 
14 No. Reasons but requested for LAD exemption. 32 
15 Simply to avoid losses in proceeding the project 1 
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Furthermore, as correlated evidence gathered from supporting documentations, 
indicated that about 93 units (31.84%) of the total 292 projects were able to be 
completed on schedule for the Domestic financing, compared to about 88.24 percent 
of the total projects completed on schedule for the World Bank financing. This can 
be clearly seen in Table 8.11 below.  
 
Table 8.11 - The comparison of number of Primary Schools project financed by the World 
Bank and Domestic (MoE) for the New Educational Infrastructure Development Project 
under the Eighth Malaysian Plan for the (ESSP)  
 
 Domestic Financing  Phase 1 
(managed by PMC) 
World Bank 
 (managed by JKR) 
 Unit Percentage Unit Percentage 
Completed on Schedule 93 31.84 30 88.24 
LAD 1 103 35.27 3 8.82 
LAD 2 46 15.75   
LAD 3 19 6.52   
LAD 4 3 1.03   
Postponed 20 6.85   
Terminated & Continued 4 1.37 *1 2.94 
Under Construction 4 1.37   
Total 292 100.00 34 100.00 
* Terminate and Withdraw from the World Bank due to non-compliance of Bank 
Procedures. 
 
The above failures of most Domestic financing projects are also supported by the 
frustrated parents who were part of the focus groups during the data collection 
period. The parents expected that the completed school project can provide education 
for their children as well as help to reduce part of their cost of sending their children 
to the current school which was quite a distance away. But unfortunately the school 
project in their communities was abandoned for sometimes and was completed very 
late. Furthermore, the quality of the school buildings as well as other related facilities 
were unsafe for occupation to schools children.   
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Moreover, the very bad condition and quality of workmanship of some of the school 
buildings at selected locations for this study had also created complaints from the 
focus groups consisting of parents and teachers. As to obtain first-hand information 
and to personally look into the complaints, the researcher had visited the project site 
accompanied by an officer from the District Education office. The visit indicated that 
the project was in dire need of further repair before it is safe for occupancy. 
  
It was very stressful to all parties involved especially the Parents and Teachers 
Association of the schools involved since their complaints after a few years earlier 
about the condition of the school projects were not been taken seriously even though 
top officials from the MoE had visited the schools and who had also voice their 
concerns about the quality of workmanship of the school.  The top officials and 
subsequent researcher‟s visits to the schools were really timely and most welcomed 
by the parents and teachers involved in the focus groups of the schools. The 
complaints brought up by the parents and teachers concerning the poor conditions of 
the schools have been brought up to the Deputy Secretary-General (Development 
and Finance), of the Ministry of Education (MoE) and immediate follow-up actions 
were taken during the closing of the data collection period.  To ensure that the 
corrective measures were carried out accordingly, the Deputy Secretary-General 
(Development and Finance) of MoE had suggested to the researcher to visit a few 
schools which were involved.  
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Too many projects to be managed within the same stipulated time frame 
 
The delays in completion of the projects and their poor quality of the school 
buildings might also be due to the inability of the contractors who were awarded 
many projects simultaneously under the Eighth Malaysian Plan for the Domestic 
financing. 
 
Due to that, the researcher also seeks to identify if the above risks in managing too 
many projects were a contributing factor to the failure of most Domestic financing 
projects. The results of the analysis showed that about 62 or 51.20 percent of the 
respondents agreed at a „High‟ level of such risks and 37 or 30.60 percent at a 
„Medium‟ level and 16 or 13.20 percent at a „Low‟ level of risks. These findings 
showed that about more than fifty (50) percent had agreed that this variable was part 
of the source of risks that had caused the failure of most Domestic financing projects 
in terms of its completion as per schedule and their unsatisfactory level of quality 
and safety.  
 
The above result of the findings is further supported by the evidences from most of 
the officers-in-charge of the projects at various levels of authority. According to the 
officers interviewed, the failure of Domestic financing was also due to the inability 
of the contractors to manage too many projects that were awarded to them.  The 
evidence pointing to this risk factor lies in the report obtained from the Briefing to 
the new Secretary-General of MoE in March, 2006 by the Principal Secretary of 
DPSD.  In the briefing, it was stated that many contractors have to sub-contracts 
their projects and in the case of the computer laboratory projects, there were two 
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thousand one hundred and twenty seven (2,127) projects were given to five (5) 
contractors. 
 
Therefore, it can be anticipated that, the burden of handling too many projects which 
is similar in nature have contributed to the risks that projects will later fall under the 
category of problematic projects as mentioned in the Report on Sick Projects. 
 
Inadequate financial resources for revolving working capital 
 
Contractors that are financially strong in their cash flow throughout the 
implementation of the projects would have the least problems in managing their 
working capital needs. This is because with the financial stability, the contractors 
have managed to buy the materials and pay the wages and salaries of their 
employees.  
 
Due to that, in the final section of the variables related to the contractors, the study 
also seeks to identify if the shortage of cash flow by the contractors is a contributory 
risks to the failures of most Domestic financing. The findings revealed that about 76 
or 62.80 percent of the 121 respondents of the DPSD staff agreed at a „High‟ level 
and 28 or 23.10 percent at a „Medium‟ level and 7 or 5.80 percent at a „Low‟ level. 
  
The above were also supported by evidences from the report of the Domestic 
financing in the „Blueprint‟ of the „Aims of Development in Education Financing 
2001-2010‟. In this „Blueprint‟, the DPSD has stated that one of their policy 
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statements is to offer business opportunities to capable “Bumiputra” entrepreneurs in 
planning and implementation of development and procurement projects.  
 
The policy statement  stated above can be translated to mean that the DPSD of MoE 
were instructed to assist the selection of capable “Bumiputra” contractors and 
suppliers in carrying out the projects under the ESSP. The contractors and suppliers 
should possess strong financial capability.  This criteria served as an early indicator 
that the will be managed in the most effective and efficient manner. 
 
The evidences stated in the „Report on Claimed for Exemption of LAD Bil. No. 4, 
2006‟ as shown in the Table 8.12 below showed that about 47 contractors made the 
LAD claims stating delays in initial payment, while 37 contractors stated that it was 
due to delays in progress payment by the MoE.  The above claims for exemptions by 
the contractors for LAD as subsequently resulted in delays in the completion of their 
respective projects as per contract. This situation could be avoided if they started the 
projects with a strong capability in their cash flow management or working capital. 
 
Table 8.12 - Justifications of the contractors in claiming the 90 days exemptions of 
„LAD‟ 
 
 Justifications / Reasons for delay and exemption of LAD Primary 
School 
1 Delay in Initial Payment by the MoE. 47 
2 Delay in Progress Payment by the MoE. 37 
 
Under the World Bank project, the Government of Malaysia had to comply with one 
of the World Bank terms and conditions which were brought up during the 
negotiation in getting the funding from the World Bank. Among the conditions were 
related to the selection of the contractors were as follows: 
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a)  All bidders shall be treated equally, and preferential treatment will not be 
granted to any bidder or group of bidders. Specifically, civil works contracts 
valued below 50,000 Ringgit will not be reserved for Bumiputra contractors. 
 
b)  The “two envelope” system for technical and financial proposals in bid 
submissions will not be used. 
 
The above, conditions as in (a) was to ensure that the selections of the potential 
contractors or suppliers were based not only on one criteria of contractors but was 
opened to everybody who were interested and had the capacity in terms of expertise 
and finance. Whereas the second condition or (b) that refers to the „two envelope‟ 
system, the selected contractors or suppliers should have the capability and strength 
in both the technical and financial aspects of managing the project. This second 
condition might not apply in the Domestic financing project that had resulted in an 
increase in risks that eventually became a factor that contributed to project failure 
due to bad cash flow by most contractors.  
 
Project Management Consultants (PMCs) 
 
In the Eighth Malaysian Plan of the ESSP, there were projects being managed by the 
government agency that is the Public Works Department and by the private sector 
organization known as the Project Management Consultants (PMCs). 
 
In the case of the World Bank financing, all their projects which were similar to the 
Domestic financing such as primary and secondary schools were managed or 
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supervised by the Public Works Department or normally known as „Jabatan Kerja 
Raya‟ (JKR), on behalf of the Ministry of Education besides the appointment of the 
Project Implementation Unit (PIU) team members.  
 
The question the researcher seeks to answer is, “Why do many of the projects under 
the supervision or management of the Project Management Consultants (PMCs) in 
the Eighth Malaysian Plan for the Domestic financing failed to be completed as per 
schedule and were costlier than a similar type of projects under the World Bank 
financing?”  
 
The study thus seeks to identify and to investigate further if any of the following 
variables which were considered as sources of risks had impacted the Domestic 
financing of projects under the ESSP. The variables and the analysis of the findings 
are shown in the Table 8.13 below. 
 
a)  Managing too many projects 
b) Lack of skill and experienced staff 
c) Frequently late in processing approved payments to be forwarded to the 
DPSD of MoE. 
d)   Not closely monitorng the projects undertaken 
       e)    Not submitting monthly reports according to stipulated datelines 
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Table 8.13 – The Variables and Findings related to Risks under the Project 
Management Consultants (PMCs) 
 
  Source of Risks Level of Risks Professional Supporting Total 
1 Managing too many 
projects 
High 
Medium  
Low 
No risk at all  
25 
13 
3 
1 
32 
30 
8 
1 
57 
43 
11 
2 
2 Lack of skill and 
experience staff 
High 
Medium  
Low 
No risk at all  
23 
15 
3 
1 
28 
35 
9 
0 
51 
50 
12 
1 
3 Frequently late in 
processing approved 
payments to be 
forwarded to the 
DPSD of MOE. 
High 
Medium  
Low 
No risk at all  
13 
18 
8 
3 
18 
33 
18 
4 
31 
51 
26 
7 
4 Did not closely 
monitor the projects 
undertaken 
High 
Medium  
Low 
No risk at all  
21 
13 
8 
0 
32 
29 
11 
1 
53 
42 
19 
1 
5 Not submitting 
monthly reports 
according to stipulated 
datelines 
High 
Medium  
Low 
No risk at all  
9 
20 
10 
3 
15 
37 
16 
4 
24 
57 
26 
7 
(Source: Appendix A – Survey: Research Questionnaires) 
 
Managing too many projects 
 
The respond to managing too many projects by the project management consultants 
(PMCs) showed that about 111 or 91.73 percent of the respondents agreed that one 
of the factors most projects in the Domestic financing failed to be completed was due 
to the risks of giving to many projects to the same Project Management Consultant. 
In the analysis, across a spectrum of „Low‟ to „High‟ levels of risks, 57 or 47.10 
percent agreed at the „High‟ level and 43 or 35.50 percent at the „Medium‟ level. The 
number of respondents and the percentage amounted to above average which are 
considered as an important contributor of risk with about 100 respondents or 82.64 
percent of the respondents agreeing on it.  
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The above result is supported by evidences obtained from new projects managed by 
the PMCs for Phase I of the Domestic financing in the Eighth Malaysian Plan of the 
ESSP.  Based on an initial analysis carried out from the list of projects obtained from 
the Primary Unit of DPSD, the projects managed by the PMCs were divided into 
different zones or area as shown in Table 8.14.1 to 8.14.4 below. 
 
Table 8.14.1 - Northern Zone 
  PMC Number of  Projects 
1 Ambang Heights 21 
2 East Design 2 
3 Naz Progressive Consultant Sdn. Bhd. 1 
4 Urusbudi Sdn. Bhd. (PKMM) 6 
5 Urusbudi Sdn. Bhd. (DPMM) 8 
6 Urusbudi Sdn. Bhd. (Pemaju) 5 
7 Venture Sdn. Bhd. 1 
 Total Projects 44 
 
 
Table 8.14.2 - Eastern Zone 
 PMC Number of  Project 
1 Elementrade (M) Sdn. Bhd. 3 
2 PB-PMC Sdn. Bhd. 4 
3 Urusbudi Sdn. Bhd. (PKM) 4 
4 Urusbudi Sdn. Bhd. 1 
5 Urusbudi Sdn. Bhd. (DPMM) 2 
6 Urusbudi Sdn. Bhd. (Pemaju) 5 
7 Wawasan Utama Sdn. Bhd. 43 
 Total Projects 62 
 
 
Table 8.14.3 - Central Zone 
 PMC Number of  Project 
1 Elementrade (M) Sdn. Bhd. 1 
2 Kinta Samudera 41 
3 NAZ Progressive Consultant Sdn. Bhd. 5 
4 Pengurusan PMN Sdn. Bhd. 1 
5 Price Resources 2 
6 Professional Themes Sdn. Bhd. 2 
7 PZK Mgt. Sdn. Bhd. 1 
8 Urusbudi Sdn. Bhd. (PKMM) 7 
9 Urusbudi Sdn. Bhd. (DPMM) 13 
10 Urusbudi Sdn. Bhd. (Pemaju) 8 
 Total Projects 81 
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Table 8.14.4 - Southern Zone 
 PMC Number of Project 
1 Opal Development Sdn. Bhd. 3 
2 Rapihan Sdn. Bhd. 6 
3 Urusbudi Sdn. Bhd. (PKMM) 7 
4 Urusbudi Sdn. Bhd.  2 
5 Urusbudi Sdn. Bhd. (DPMM) 6 
6 Urusbudi Sdn. Bhd. (Pemaju) 4 
7 Urusbudi Sdn. Bhd. (Zon Selatan) 27 
 Total Projects 55 
(Source: Appendix A – List of References from Government of Malaysia) 
 
The tables above showed that the distribution of contracts awarded to the Project 
Management Consultants (PMCs) varies from zone to zone and in terms of the 
number of projects awarded. Some of the PMCs got only one or two projects but 
there were those who got more than twenty (20) projects. For instance, in the 
Northern Zone, the PMC known as Ambang Heights had to manage about 21 or 
47.72 percent out of 44 projects, while in the Eastern Region or Zone, 43 or 65.15 
per cent projects out of 66 were managed by Wawasan Utama Sdn. Bhd. Further, in 
the case for the Central Zone, 41 or 50.62 per cent out of 81 projects by Kinta 
Samudera while 46 or 83.63 per cent out of 55 projects in the Southern Zone were 
managed by Urusbudi Sdn. Bhd. 
 
This showed that the awarding of contracts may be influenced by elements that may 
reflect biased and which may not done in a fairly manner in terms of meeting the 
stated terms and conditions of the selection and awarding of contracts. This situation 
had contributed to an increased level of risks in the effective and efficient 
management of the projects.  The findings were correlated with the agreement of the 
staff of DPSD with 111 or 91.73 percent of the 121 respondents agreeing that the 
risks of managing too many projects by the PMCs amounted to an increased level of 
risks.   
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Some of the Project Management Consultants (PMCs) had to manage too many 
projects at one particular period of time which stretched their financial and 
workforce capabilities to the limit. This situation developed into high-risk situations 
which finally left a negative impact on the delivery of the projects and subsequently 
the planning and implementing of the teaching and learning process.  
 
In an interview with one of the respondents was understood that the appointment of 
the PMCs were carried out by the Treasury of the Ministry of Finance (MoF).  The 
bias and unfair distribution of contracts to the PMCs as well as the contractors 
involved were also stated in the Lesson Learnt in the Domestic financing projects 
report. Other than that, in the presentation of the new Secretary-General of the 
Ministry of Education, Malaysia by the Principal Secretary of the DPSD in March, 
2006, it was stated that the problem of the most projects delays and failures as in the 
case of the IT Computer Laboratory Projects was because of the inability of the 
contractors and PMCs in managing too many projects which were awarded to them 
by the Treasury. According to the report, about 2,127 projects were awarded to only 
5 contractors for the Phase 1 and 4,044 projects to only 1 PMC. The situation was 
getting worse when most of the Class F contractors who awarded the contracts faced 
the difficulties in managing their limited working capital. 
Lack of skill and experience staff in PMCs 
 
The study also seeks to study if the lack of skill and experience staff in the PMCs 
was one of the factors affected the Domestic financing projects. The findings showed 
that about 113 or 93.38 percent of the respondents agreed that this factor had 
contributed to the risks of project delays and failures. The figure included that 51 or 
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42.10 percent agreed that it is at a „High‟ level of risks while 50 or 41.30 percent 
agreed at „Medium‟ level and 12 or 9.90 percent at „Low‟ level of risks from a total 
of 121 respondents. 
 
Therefore, from the above findings we can conclude that more than the half of the 
respondents of the DPSD staff agreed that „lack of skill and experience staff of the 
project management consultants‟ is a part of the risks that had contributed to the 
failure of most Domestic financing in the Eighth Malaysian Plan of the ESSP. 
 
The above evidence is further supported from the results of the interview sessions 
with the Domestic financing officers from the various units of the DPSD. According 
to the officers who were also involved in the World Bank financing projects, most of 
the PMCs staff were inexperience and lack the essential knowledge and skills in the 
work associated with project management.  Some of them were new to the job and 
there was also a high turnover of staffs in the PMCs.  
 
Frequent delay in processing approved payments to be forwarded to the DPSD  
of MoE. 
 
In the World Bank financing projects, the initial process for approval for payments 
were carried out by the Public Works Department before handing it over to the 
DPSD for the progress payment. The Public Works Department which is a 
government agency have many professional technical staff in every states and 
districts through out Malaysia. But in the case of the Domestic financing, the 
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approval for progress payment will be from the appointed independent Project 
Management Consultants (PMCs) before being submitted to the DPSD for approval.  
 
The situation showed that most of the PMCs, managing too many projects of the 
ESSP as compared to the Public Works Department for the World Bank financing. 
Furthermore, the numbers of staff between the two were really obvious in terms of 
size and professionalism or expertise as well as experience with the PMCs at a 
serious disadvantage.  Therefore, any delay in processing the progress payment for 
the contractors for work done will affect the delivery of the said projects. 
 
The study, thus, also seeks to find out if „the frequently late or delays in processing 
approved payments to be forwarded to the DPSD of MoE‟ was a contributory risk 
factor that had caused failures to most Domestic financing. The results of the 
findings revealed that about 108 (89.26%) of the respondents agreed that it was a risk 
factor. 26 (21.50%) considered it as a „Low‟ risk, 51 (42.10%) stated that it was at a 
„Medium‟ level and 31 (25.60%) agreed that it was at a „High‟ level of risks.  
 
The results of the findings indicates that it was a high risk factor as more than fifty 
percent (50%) of the respondents agreed that the inefficient of the PMCs processing 
approved payments to be forwarded to the DPSD is one of the risks that had in time 
contributed to the failure of the Domestic financing projects as compared to the 
World Bank. 
 
The above result was also supported by most of the officers-in-charge of both types 
of financing, that is, with the World Bank and domestic financing who were 
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interviewed during the data collection process. According to the officers especially 
those from the Payment Unit of DPSD quoted the lack of experience staff and 
managing too many projects simultaneously by the PMCs were the reasons cited as 
to the occurrence of delays and late payments. For instance, seeking approval of 
payments the supporting documentations and other non-compliance with stated 
procedures were not completed. There were occasions when submissions for 
payment approval were made with repeated mistakes in documentation. Therefore, 
these resulted in delays in most Domestic financing and most contractors faced 
insufficient fund or working capital to progress with their projects.  
 
Furthermore, according to the respondents interviewed, due to the PMCs 
experiencing shortage of experienced technical staff, the submission of the 
documents for payments needed to be corrected and resubmit and this had taken 
more time to process and approved the payments. However, the DPSD especially, 
the Payment Unit were always wrongfully blamed for the delays in payments by the 
contractors or even the public. This was stated in the Report on the Claims of 
Exemption for Liquidated Ascertained Damages (LAD) Bil. No. 4.2006, where the 
contractors involved were to be charged a penalty for project delayed. According to 
the report, the justification for the exemption should be given due to the delays of the 
MoE in making payment when demanded as shown in Table 8.15 below. 
 
Table 8.15 - Justifications of the contractors in claiming the 90 days exemptions of 
„LAD‟  
 Justifications / Reasons for delay and exemption of LAD Primary 
School 
1 Delay in Initial Payment by the MOE. 47 
2 Delay in Progress Payment by the MOE. 37 
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The above findings are also supported by the report given in a presentation by the 
Principal Secretary of the DPSD to the new Secretary-General of Ministry of 
Education, Malaysia in March 2006. One of the reasons mentioned with regards to 
the caused of „Sick or Problem Projects‟ was that the PMC was managing too many 
projects simultaneously and this had resulted in the delay in authorizing payments to 
the contractors involved. 
 
The frustration of getting payment on time was voiced out by one of the contractors 
involved in Domestic financing. According to the contractor, some PMCs were 
delaying the process of their claims because they were stretched in terms of ability in 
managing too many projects.  Therefore, this resulted in the delay for the contractors 
to get their payments for work which has been done.   
 
Absence of project progress monitoring 
 
The study also seeks to identify if the PMC had closely monitor the progress of 
projects undertaken as this factor had contributed to the risks of failure in Domestic 
financing. According to the findings, 53 or 43.80 percent of the 121 respondents 
agreed that this factor was a „High‟ level risk, while 42 or 34.70 percent agreed that 
it was at a „Medium‟ level, and 19 or 15.70 percent considered it to be at a „Low‟ 
level risk. This showed that a total of 114 or 94.21 percent agreed that this factor was 
a risk at all the three levels above. 
 
From the above findings, the result correlated with the variables or sources related to 
„too many projects managed by the PMC‟ which was 111 or 91.74 percent and to the 
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„PMC had lack of skill and experience staff‟ as shown by 113 or 93.34 percent have 
agreed that  these factors do account for the problems in most Domestic financing. 
 
The above findings are also supported by the Domestic financing officers-in-charged 
of the projects. Therefore, it would not be possible for the PMCs to closely monitor 
the progress of the projects undertaken by them. These findings were also mentioned 
in the report on „Lesson Learnt‟ from the Eighth Malaysian Plan as presented in the 
Strategic Planning Meeting held by the DPSD for the Ninth Malaysian Plan Projects.  
According to the report, there were too many projects managed by the PMCs and this 
factor that affected the payments due to the contractors.  It was also mentioned that 
the expertise of the staff in the Technical Unit of the DPSD should not be 
underestimated in ensuring the completion of the ESSP. 
 
Furthermore, the evidence from the Primary Unit report has shown that the projects 
which managed by the PMCs varies.  Based on the different zones or areas within 
Peninsular Malaysia for the Phase One of the ESSP of new schools in the Domestic 
financing, it clearly shows that at a certain point a specific PMC were awarded with 
contracts of more than 2 projects.  
 
Table 8.16 – Project Management Consultants (PMCs) with highest projects awarded 
 
No. Zone Project Management 
Consultants (PMCs) 
Number of 
Primary School 
project Managed 
Total 
Projects 
1 Northern Ambang Heights 21 44 
2 Eastern Wawasan Utama Sdn. 
Bhd. 
43 62 
3 Central  Kinta Samudera 41 81 
4 Central  Urusbudi 28 81 
5 Southern Urusbudi 46 55 
(Source: Primary Unit Report) 
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Other than that, the impact of the lack in closely monitoring and too many projects to 
be managed by the PMCs can be justified by the evidence from the Table 8.17 below 
during the briefing session to the new Secretary-General of the Ministry of 
Education Malaysia. 
 
Table 8.17 – Briefing on Development Projects in the Eighth Malaysian Plan by the 
Principal Secretary of DPSD to Secretary-General of MoE on 13
th
 March 2006 
 
No. Unit Responsible Plan Complete Construction Postpone 
1 Primary 292 262 9 21 
2 Secondary 324 275 18 31 
3 Teachers‟ Quarters 1,037 606 3 428 
4 Hostels 465 250 7 208 
5 Others 104 26 1 77 
 Total 2,222 1419 
(63.90%) 
38 
(1.70%) 
765 
(34.40%) 
 
Based on the above table, we can see that about 1,419 (63.90%) of the 2,222 projects 
that had been planned for the Eight Malaysian Plan achieved their objectives.  Even 
though the figures shown that more than fifty percent of the target were achieved, 
unfortunately only 93 (31.84%) were completed on time or as per schedule stipulated 
in the original contract for the Primary School projects as shown in Table 8.18 
below.  
 
Table 8.18 - Breakdown of New Primary Schools Projects in Domestic financing for 
the New Educational Infrastructure Development Project under the Eighth Malaysian 
Plan for the Education Sector Support Project (ESSP). 
 
Project Status Domestic Financing  Phase 1 (managed by PMCs) 
 Unit Percentage 
Completed on Schedule 93 31.84 
LAD  171 58.57 
Postponed 20 6.85 
Terminated & Continued 4 1.37 
Under Construction 4 1.37 
Total 292 100.00 
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The above table reflected an overall level of risks of the projects in relation to being 
delayed or abandoned as they were managed by the PMCs.  These findings had 
drawn the criticism of the Director-General of the Malaysian Public Services, Tan 
Sri Sidek Hassan.  His disappointment was mentioned in the national newspaper, the 
Berita Harian dated February 27, 2008, whereby 268 schools projects were 
announced as „Sick Projects‟ by the Ministry of Education.  These were the projects 
that were supposed to be completed under the Eighth Malaysian Plan that ended in 
December 2005. 
 
The inability to meet monthly reports submission within the stipulated datelines 
 
Initially, all PMCs were required to submit their progress reports of their respective 
project on a monthly basis. The purposed of the submission was to ensure that 
projects closely monitored in terms of finance and physical progress. Their inability 
to meet this basic requirement significantly affected the financial and non-financial 
planning and forecasting for the projects and had disrupted the overall effectiveness 
and efficiency of project management and public financial management of the 
Domestic finance.  
 
Consequently, in this study, the researcher also seeks to identify and ascertain 
whether if the non-submission of the monthly progress reports according to the 
stipulated datelines is a contributory risks factor that eventually resulted in the failure 
of most Domestic financing. The findings revealed that about 107 or 88.43 percent of 
the 121 respondents in the DPSD agreed at differing levels that had contributed to 
the failure in most Domestic financing projects. 
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The above findings which were revealed through the responds given to the set of 
questionnaires administered to officers and staff involved in ESSP, is supported with 
evidences  obtained from the interviews carried out with the officers-in-charge of the 
Domestic financing. According to the officers, the PMCs have failed to comply in 
submitting the required progress reports at the stipulated datelines. This non-
compliance resulted in the ability in ensuring effective financial planning and 
forecasting since the report has become out-dated and unreliable.  
 
The delay in the submission of the progress reports by the PMC had contributed to 
projects failure in terms of delays in project completion on schedule. This was 
because the reports affected the financial planning and budgeting ability at the 
ministry level. Furthermore, it had also impacted the project in terms of the cash 
flow management of the DPSD itself.  This situation has also contributed to the 
shortage of fund for domestic financing as mentioned in the „Lesson Learnt and 
Problems‟ in the Ninth Malaysian Plan Strategic Planning Meeting by the DPSD.  
 
The outdated data provided in the reports by the PMC had created problems in the 
DPSD as the Department cannot use the „Project Monitoring System‟ or the „Sistem 
Pemantauan Projek (SPP2)‟ as recommended by the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) 
of the Prime Minister Department. In short, the system was not fully utilized under 
the Eighth Malaysian Plan.  
 
The difficulties in getting the project progress reports were also faced by the 
researcher even with the assistance from the officers-in-charge during the data 
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collection period.  The PMCs had been notified through electronic mailing and 
telephone calls to submit the progress report of the projects managed by them. But 
unfortunately, only one of the PMCs managed to respond appropriately.  The other 
PMCs were late in their responses to the electronic mails queries sent by the DPSD 
while some gave an invalid email address. When contacted through the telephone, 
some of the PMCs promised to reply to the email queries later. Therefore, it can be 
shown that most of the appointed Project Management Consultants (PMCs) were 
quite irresponsible in managing public fund effectively and efficiently. 
 
External Factors that had contributed to the failure of Domestic Financing in 
the ESSP 
 
Local Authorities 
 
All educational infrastructure projects such as the ESSP must get the approval of the 
local authority before any construction work can be carried out. The approval 
process normally started from the acquisition of land until the project is completed 
and has met the specifications. All construction approvals lay with the local authority 
where the project was carried out. 
 
Therefore, the local authority played an important role in ensuring that the proposed 
planned project such as the ESSP can be carried out without any unnecessary 
hindrances. Any delay in the approval of the project will contribute to the risks of the 
project being delayed.  Project delay will affect the overall system of the ministry in 
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posting teachers to the schools as well as providing the convenience for parents to 
send their children to a school located within their communities.  
 
The study also seeks to identify if local authority interventions contributed to the 
risks of most projects in Domestic financing.  In this case, there were three (3) 
variables related to the local authorities which were considered as sources of risks as 
listed in Table 8.19 below: 
 
a)  Lateness or delay in giving approvals; 
b)  Inclusion of extra or additional conditions at mid-way of the projects; and 
c)  Lateness or delay in approving the certificate of occupancy. 
 
Table 8.19 –The Result related to the Project Management Consultants (PMC) 
 
 Source of Risks Level of Risks Professional Supporting Total 
1 Late in giving 
approvals 
High 
Medium  
Low 
No risk at all  
20 
18 
3 
2 
30 
23 
15 
3 
50 
41 
18 
5 
2 Inclusion of extra 
conditions at mid-way 
of  the projects 
High 
Medium  
Low 
No risk at all  
18 
18 
5 
2 
17 
38 
16 
0 
35 
56 
21 
2 
3 Late in approving the 
Certification of 
Occupancy 
High 
Medium  
Low 
No risk at all  
16 
17 
8 
2 
25 
25 
19 
0 
41 
42 
27 
2 
(Source: Appendix A – Survey: Research Questionnaires) 
 
Local authorities lateness or delay in giving approvals 
 
The results of the analysis shown that more than fifty percent of the respondents in 
this survey agreed that the delay was related to the risks that the local authorities 
lateness or delay in approving the said projects at the initial stage had contributed to 
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the failure of domestic financing projects. Out of 121 respondents in the DPSD of 
MoE, 91 (75.20%) which consists of 50 or 41.30 percent considered this factor or 
variable contributed a „High‟ level of risks, followed by 41 or 33.90 percent at 
„Medium‟ level and only 18 or 14.90 percent at the „Low‟ level of risks. The delay in 
giving approvals also will cause the project delay to complete as per contract. This 
might also made the potential projects be postponed to another date that affected the 
planning stage in the MoE.   
 
The delay in giving approval by the local authority to proceed with construction is 
supported by the officers-in-charge of Domestic financing through the evidences 
obtained from interviews during the data collection period. In support of both 
findings, the data collected from questionnaires and interviews, as well as from the 
report related to „Lesson Learnt in the Eighth Malaysian Plan by the DPSD‟ in the 
Strategic Planning Meeting for the Ninth Malaysian Plan by the DPSD‟ stated that 
many projects were unable to be implemented at the proposed sites because of the 
failure to obtain the necessary clearance related to the acquisition of land for 
construction to begin. 
 
Furthermore, from evidences gathered from documentation as stated in the list of 
claiming of exemption of LAD Bil. No. 4/2006, about 43 or 20.48 percent of the 
contractors who were managing 210 of the projects stated that one of the 
justifications for claiming exemption of LAD was due to „delay in allocating the 
project location by the school authority and the district education office‟. The delay 
by the school authority and district education office were normally related to the 
authorization by the local authority  as giving permission and consent for executing 
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or implementing the project. Out of the 210 projects undertaken, 37 of the projects 
were due to delay and red tape by the local authorities. 
 
The land acquisition problem faced by the Ministry of Education was supported by 
the Deputy Secretary-General (Finance and Development) of the MoE. According to 
her, there were a lot of problems that relate to land acquisition with the local 
authorities pertaining to recommended or proposed locations which were found to be 
unsuitable. Some of the projects that were carried out were on lands that were not 
suitable for education purposes even though the lands were later approved by the 
local authorities. Therefore, in the Ninth Malaysian Plan, the MoE will firstly resolve 
land matters with the local authorities before proceeding with the implementation of 
the projects. 
 
Inclusion of extra conditions at mid-way of the projects 
 
Another factor that the researcher found out to be part of the sources of risks related 
to local authorities is the inclusion of extra conditions at mid-way of the projects.  
This interference happened mid-way during project implementation and have 
resulted in project delays. Changes such changes to the original plan of buildings in 
the project brief have created various problems such as incurring additional costs. 
The interference by the local authority affected the financial planning done in the 
earlier stages. 
  
This study also seeks to identify and to confirms if the inclusion of extra conditions 
at mid-way of the projects have contributed to the failure or delay in most Domestic 
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financing. The findings of the analysis showed that the 112 or 92.56 percent of the 
121 respondents agreed at various levels of risks from „Low‟ to „High‟. A 
breakdown of the figures revealed that 35 or 28.90 percent agreed at the „High‟ level 
and 56 or 46.30 percent at the „Medium‟ level. Therefore, the result showed that the 
inclusion of additional or extra conditions at the mid-way of the project by the local 
authorities was a risk factor that contributed to the project was unable to be 
completed and delivered on time.  
 
The above findings from the survey were supported from the Deputy Secretary-
General of Finance and Development, Ministry of Education. According to the 
Deputy Secretary-General, the problems faced by most projects in the Domestic 
financing in the Eighth Malaysian Plan for the ESSP were due to certain difficulties 
faced with the local authorities. For instance, local authorities will request the 
contractors or the MoE to do additional works which will involve additional costs. 
The contractors or the MoE will have to oblige. otherwise the projects will not be 
approved for occupancy by the local authorities. 
 
This is also supported by the evidences obtained from the Strategic Planning 
Meeting for the Ninth Malaysian Plan in 2004. One of the strategic planning goals 
involved financial planning.  This takes the form of capping the ceiling amount of a 
project which includes an estimation of additional cost such as works beyond the 
location of the project and other conditions imposed by the local authorities. In 
addition, the additional evidence from the Report of Exemption of Liquidated 
Ascertained Damages (LAD) Bil. No. 4/2006 stated that out of 177 Primary schools 
projects, 43 were delayed due to red-tape enforced by the local authority. Besides 
  245 
that, an analysis showed that 29 of the contractors involved had experienced delays 
in starting the projects due to the need to meet local authority requirements. 
 
Delay in approving the Certification of Occupancy (CPC) 
 
A completed project such for the purpose of education cannot be utilized unless a 
Certification of Occupancy (CPC) was approved by the local authority. The need of 
the certification is to ensure that the completed project has met all the requirements 
stipulated by the local authority. This condition is included as an assurance for safety 
of the end-users. 
 
Any delays enforced by the local authority in relation to giving the approval for 
occupancy had affected the earlier planning for the posting of teachers to the new 
schools. This also affected the effectiveness of financial and non-financial planning 
by the MoE in relation to the deployment of teachers and their remuneration. The 
delays resulted in the government bearing additional cost for storing supplied 
equipments and ensuring its safety.  
 
This study also seeks to confirm if the issue such as the delay in getting the 
Certificate of Occupancy (CPC) was part of the risks that had contributed to the 
service delivery failure. The results of the analysis showed that about 41 or 33.90 
percent of the respondents from the DPSD agreed that this factor was at a „High‟ 
level of risks, while 42 or 34.70 percent stated that it was at a „Medium‟ level and 27 
or 22.30 percent considered it as a „Low‟ level risks. Based on the figures above, 110 
or 90.90 percent of the 121 respondents agreed that the delay in getting the approval 
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of Certificate of Occupancy had contributed to the risks of project failure to be 
delivered as per schedule. The high percentage which was above average in the 
above analysis had shown the importance of speedy approval for the occupancy of 
the projects by the local authority. The certificate of approval will also helped reduce 
the impact of many associated risks which can affect future financial implications. 
As an instance, the lapse of warranty period will add maintenances cost. 
 
The evidences gathered to support the above result included statements made by the 
Deputy Secretary-General of Finance and Development of MOE through an 
interview. According to the Deputy Secretary-General even though the projects were 
completed, issues with some of the local authorities in regard to getting the 
Certificate of Occupancy (CPC) for the completed buildings. According to the 
Deputy Secretary-General, approval will be given by the local authorities subjected 
to additional works that needed to be carried out.  Some of the additional works 
required to be done by the contractors or the MoE include road works to the school 
location which is not stated in the contract for the project. 
 
The above additional requirements for the project that were enforced by the local 
authority are supported by the other officers-in-charge of the projects in the MoE 
such as the Head of Technical Unit of MoE and also the officers from the State and 
District Education Offices. This issue was brought up and deliberated in the Strategic 
Planning Meeting of the DPSD in 2004. The delay in getting the certificate of fitness 
or certificate for occupancy was due to non-compliances to additional conditions 
requested by the local authorities.  
 
  247 
As a consequence, the MoE decided to address such issues with local authorities 
with assistance of officers from the State Education Departments and District 
Education Offices at the initial stage of planning and before embarking to implement 
the planned projects at the allocated land sites.  
 
Other External factors 
 
Interferences to the success of the projects may also be a source of risks and may 
come from external parties such as political organizations or even interested 
influential individuals or bodies. This included the nature of the projects which have 
been awarded to the contractors and the PMCs which through Direct Negotiation 
method instead of through Open Tender.  The sources of risks studied related to 
external factors are: 
 
i) Intervention of certain interested parties for building contracts;  
ii) Intervention of certain interested parties in obstructing the termination 
process of contractors at the early phase of the project due to the 
contractors‟ disability to proceed;  
iii) Intervention of certain interested parties in exempting fines due from 
contractors; and  
iv) The selection of contractors not based on open tender but on Direct 
Negotiation. 
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The results of the analysis related to the above risks can be clearly seen in the Table 
8.20 below. 
 
Table 8.20 – Sources of Risks related to Other Interested Parties 
 
 Source of Risks Level of Risks Professional Supporting Total 
1 Intervention of certain 
interested parties for 
building contracts 
High 
Medium  
Low 
No risk at all  
19 
18 
5 
1 
33 
27 
8 
4 
52 
45 
13 
5 
2 Intervention of certain 
interested parties in 
obstructing the termination 
process of contractors at 
the early phase of the 
project due to the 
contractors‟ disability to 
proceed 
High 
Medium  
Low 
No risk at all  
 
16 
17 
9 
1 
24 
28 
16 
4 
40 
45 
25 
5 
 
3 Intervention of certain 
interested parties in 
exempting fines due from 
contractors  
High 
Medium  
Low 
No risk at all  
10 
18 
10 
4 
23 
32 
12 
6 
33 
50 
22 
10 
4 
 
 
Selection of contractors not 
based on open tender but 
on Direct Negotiation. 
High 
Medium  
Low 
No risk at all  
12 
15 
12 
4 
26 
30 
12 
4 
38 
45 
24 
8 
(Source: Appendix A – Survey: Research Questionnaires) 
 
Intervention of certain interested parties for schools building projects contracts 
 
The objections to the intervention of certain interested parties such as those with 
strong political influences for an educational infrastructure projects were frequently 
voiced out by the public. The public was concerned that the award of contracts to 
inexperience and incapable contractors based on political affiliations might be a 
source of risks for project failures. Other than that, the issue was also related to the 
quality of workmanship of the end projects regarding which questions were raised by 
the public of building safety since many schools collapsed or sustained damages 
after being allowed for occupation. Such incidences brought about public distrusts 
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and impacted both the financial and non-financial aspects of project management.  It 
had also left a negative impact on the capability of the MoE to provide quality 
service delivery for teaching and learning purposes as it aspires to achieve the 
Education for All (EFA) objectives.  
 
The results of the analysis carried out from the survey within the DPSD revealed that 
about 52 or 43.0 percent of the 121 respondents agreed at a „High‟ level of risks, 45 
or 37.20 percent at a „Medium‟ level and 13 or 10.70 percent at a „Low‟ level of 
risks that external influences do contribute to risks of project failures. A total of 110 
or 90.90 percent of these respondents in the DPSD of MoE that were involved in the 
study that is from the „Low‟ to „High‟ level agreed with the findings.   
 
The intervention of certain interested parties for contracts of the ESSP infrastructure 
projects in Domestic financing was supported by most of the respondents in the 
interviews conducted during the data collection period.  The range of respondents 
was from officials in the top management posts as well as the lower level staff of the 
MoE especially to those directly involved in the management of the ESSP 
infrastructure projects.  
 
For instance, according to the Deputy Secretary-General of Finance and 
Development, the problems faced in the Eighth Malaysian Plan of the ESSP for 
Domestic financing were due to the awarding of most of the projects to the 
contractors and project management consultants who had least exposure and 
experience in implementing big projects. The selection and awards of the projects to 
these groups of implementers were due to external interference which involved other 
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interested parties such as influential political figures.  The interference of influential 
political figures were also supported by others such as the Head of Technical Unit of 
DPSD, officers-in-charge of the respective projects from the DPSD and as well as 
from the officers of the State Education Department and the Districts Education 
Offices. 
 
The above issue was voiced out by those directly involved in the management of the 
projects at the Ministry level as well as at the state and district level.  Their concerns 
were also supported by the Head of Auditor for Education from the Auditor-General 
Office (AG). According to the Head of Auditor (Educational Sector), the problems 
faced in most Domestic financing projects in the Eighth Malaysian Plan were issues 
related to interferences from external interested parties such as from influential 
politicians. After a search into the background experience of the contractors awarded 
for the projects under ESSP, it was found out that some of them were financially 
unstable and had little technical experiences in successfully managing big projects. 
This also included the selection of the project management consultants (PMCs).  
According to her, in comparison with the awards of projects under the ESSP in the 
World Bank financing, the terms and conditions for selections of contractors would 
have selected only the most capable contractors with a proven track record. The 
selection process was agreed upon by the Government of Malaysia with the World 
Bank in relation to the criteria in the selections of potential developer or contractors 
and suppliers.  
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The need for good contractors was also been highlighted by the Head of Technical 
Unit of MoE. According to her, in the World Bank financing, the selection process 
were very transparent and fair. She added that, due to that, most projects in the 
Domestic financing ended up to be very costly because of awarding of the projects 
through the „Design and Build‟ approach. Other than that, due to the political 
influences of the contractors and project management consultants, most the projects 
awarded to the contractors and PMCs suffered delays and even failures due to the 
contractors and PMCs inability to manage successfully the projects.  
 
The evidences of projects failures and delays were also mentioned by the Malaysian 
Secretary-General of the Public Services in a statement in the local newspaper, the 
„Berita Harian, dated February, 2008.  Referring to the projects that failed as „Sick 
Project‟ he stated that it would take the government an additional seven years to 
complete the additional costs amounting to Ringgit Malaysia: Three point one 
million (RM3.1 million). According to Tan Sri Sidek Hassan, the Danau Kota Dua 
Primary School had to take three different contractors to complete it which according 
to the plan, it should have been completed in 2002. This school is one of the 268 
„Sick Projects‟ identified by the Ministry of Education, Malaysia under the Eighth 
Malaysian Plan which should end in December 2005. 
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Intervention of certain interested parties in obstructing the termination process  
of contractors at the early phase of the project due to the contractors‟ disability  
to proceed 
 
A non-performance contractor can be terminated in the process of implementing the 
project. This procedure would allow enough time for the new contractor to complete 
the project as scheduled. The delay in the termination process of the affected 
contractors may also affect the cost of the project as it may be the case of an increase 
in prices of building materials at a later date. This will be a contributory factor to the 
risks of insufficient fund in managing the planned project for the Domestic 
financing. 
  
Consequently, the study seeks to identify if the intervention of certain interested 
parties in obstructing the termination process of contractors at the early phase of the 
project due to the contractor‟s inability to proceed as a risks that had contributed to 
delays and failures in most Domestic financing. The results of the findings had 
shown that the total number of respondents had agreed at various levels from „Low‟ 
to „High‟ which is similar or correlate with the first or previous variable 
(3.3.2.2.1.Intervention of certain parties for schools building projects contracts) as a 
source of risks. From the total of 110 respondents, 95 or 70.30 percent agreed that 
the intervention in obstructing the termination of the contractors at the early phase of 
the projects was above average that is more than the „Medium‟ level of risks.  
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According to one of the officers-in-charge at the ministry level, there was a situation 
where some of the contractors were identified to be unable to manage the project 
well and should be terminated early. But, due to interferences from certain interested 
parties, the termination of the contractor had to be put on hold or postponed. Due to 
that fact, the results can be seen from the following Table 8.21 that showed the 
overview status of project implemented and also Table 8.22 that showed the status of 
projects completed on time or per schedule in the Eighth Malaysian Plan from the 
Primary Unit of DPSD. 
 
Table 8.21 showed that 1,583 projects had been completed, 14 were under 
construction and 270 had to be postponed for the Primary Academic School projects. 
Furthermore, further analyses showed that from the total figure of 1,583 projects, 
292 are new projects under the Phase 1, but only 93 or 31.84 percent of the projects 
have been completed as per schedule. 
 
Table 8.21- Overview Status of Implementation Project under Eighth Malaysian 
Plan (Source: Fail Meja Unit Rendah Akademik, 19 January 2006) 
  
Program Total Completed Construction Postponed 
Pre School 6103 2803 496 2804 
Primary 
Academic 
1867 1583 14 270 
Teachers 
Training 
College 
20 2 0 18 
Capital 
Assistant 
Depends on Application 
Special 
Education 
3 1 0 2 
TOTAL 7993 4389 510 3094 
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Table 8.22 - New Primary Schools Educational Infrastructure Development Project 
under the Eighth Malaysian Plan for the Education Sector Support Project (ESSP) 
for Domestic financing 
 
Project Status Domestic Financing  Phase 1 (managed by PMC) 
 Unit Percentage 
Completed on Schedule 93 31.84 
LAD 1 171 58.56 
Postponed 20 6.85 
Terminated & Continued 4 1.37 
Under Construction 4 1.37 
Total 292 100.00 
 
Intervention of certain interested parties in exempting fines due from  
contractors 
 
In a normal case, contractors who failed to complete their projects as per schedule 
stipulated in the contract should be subjected to penalty charges or fines. The fines or 
penalty charges would be a lesson learnt to the contractors in order to motivate them 
to speed up the progress of completing the projects. Furthermore, the charges will be 
an added income to the government and the amount can be huge if it‟s the case 
where many of them had been fined or charged for the penalty because of the delays 
in completion. 
 
Therefore, the study also seeks to look at the factor if the interference of any 
interested parties such as certain influential figures or any political entities, in 
exempting the fines due from the contractors as one of the sources of risks which had 
caused the projects failures. The study revealed that 83 or 68.60 percent of the 
respondents agreed at above average of the „Medium‟ level of risks and above. Out 
of that, 33 or 27.30 percent agreed at the „High‟ level of risks as compared to 22 or 
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18.20 percent at the „Low‟ level of risks. But the overall, figure showed 105 or 86.80 
percent of the total 121 respondents in the survey agreed with this factor as a source 
of risks. 
 
The above interventions were also admitted by some of the officers-in-charge of the 
projects at the ministry level. This is because the interventions will make the 
government lose a hug source of income from the imposed fines. Undoubtedly, the 
exemption of the fines will lead to a decrease in government income or revenue. For 
instance, based on the evidence obtained from the claimed for exemption of 
Liquidated Ascertained Damages (LAD), as in Bil. 4/2006 dated January 9, 2007 the 
maximum number of days given for this exemption by the committee or Board is 90 
days. The claim will be subjected to the following: 
 
a) Clause in the Treasury Secular (Surat Pekeliling Perbendaharaan) 14.2.4 SPP 
Bil.8 Year 1995 as the „Bumiputra‟ status of the contractors; 
 
b) The contractors are categorised as small category class which is the Class „F‟ 
category; and 
 
c) None or lack in experience in managing construction projects and/or 
financially unsound. 
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Selection of contractors not based on open tender but on Direct Negotiation. 
 
The selection of potential contractors as well as the project management consultants 
to manage the ESSP Domestic financing can be carried out in various ways such as 
the open tender process that had been done in other types of financing like in the 
case of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank financing of projects under 
the Eighth Malaysian Plan.  
 
But it was understood that, the ESSP projects under the Eighth Malaysian Plan for 
Domestic financing were carried out through the Direct Negotiation method. 
Through this method selected contractors and project management consultants were 
directly awarded the job of implementing the projects without any need of 
considerations from other applicants.  
 
Therefore, due to that, the study also seeks to identify to what extend the method of 
selection was based on Direct Negotiation for the Domestic financing and it was 
considered as a source of risks that had contributed to failures of most projects in the 
ESSP. The results of the analysis showed that 107 or 88.43 percent of the 121 
respondents agreed from the „Low‟ to „High‟ level of this factor as a source of risks. 
Out of that, 38 or 31.40 percent agreed with it at the „High‟ level, 45 or 37.20 percent 
at the „Medium‟ level and finally, 24 or 19.80 percent at the „Low‟ level. 
 
The above is supported from the evidences from the interviews with various top 
management or the decision-makers within the Ministry of Education, Malaysia. 
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According to the Deputy Secretary-General of Finance and Development of MoE, 
the Head of Technical Unit of the DPSD, MoE and also the Head of Auditor for 
Education from the Auditor-General Office the problems with most Domestic 
financing projects failures were due to the method in awarding the contracts through 
the Direct Negotiation method which was not transparent. This had allowed 
contractors who were incapable of quality construction work and without sound 
financial capability to be awarded the contracts to implement construction projects 
under the ESSP. 
 
Furthermore, the numbers of projects under Domestic financing were big and costly 
in comparision with the projects under the World Bank. The Deputy Secretary-
General of MoE had added that under the Ninth Malaysian Plan the MoE avoided the 
appointment of contractors through Direct Negotiation. This is the lesson learnt from 
the Domestic finance. As compared to the World Bank projects, the projects awarded 
to the potential contractors were based on Open Tender process. The statements 
above were supported by the Head of Technical Unit of MoE as well as the Head of 
Auditor for Education Sector from the Auditor-General Office. It was understood 
that the Domestic financing projects were awarded to the contractors and PMCs 
based on the „Design and Build‟ concept were carried out by the Ministry of Finance 
(MoF) in the Eighth Malaysian Plan under the Eighth Malaysian Plan as according to 
one of the officers-in-charge. 
 
The numbers contracts awarded to the contractors is also stated in the lesson learnt 
on the Strategic Planning for Ninth Malaysian Plan of the DPSD. In the lessons 
learnt, it was stated that projects should be given to one or two contractors, and that 
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the track records of the contractors should be analysed further and the projects 
should be managed by the Technical Unit in the DPSD rather than the Project 
Management Consultants (PMCs). According to one of the officer-in-charge, some 
of the contractors were new to the infrastructure projects so much so that they had to 
sub-contracts their projects.  The appointments of such contractors were due to 
interference from interested parties such as from politicians. 
 
8.3.4. Factors that relate to issues of late payment by the Ministry of Education  
            (MoE) 
 
The issue on late payment to the contractors and suppliers especially in the ESSP for 
Domestic financing under the Eighth Malaysian Plan had been brought up in the 
Parliament. This had dealt a great blow to the MoE especially to the DPSD in 
managing the projects and payments due to the contractors and suppliers involved. 
 
In this section, the researcher seeks to identify which of the factors or the sources of 
risks related to late payment that had contributed most in the failure of the ESSP. Six 
variables were identified as sources of risks as listed with an analysis of findings as 
seen in Table 8.23 below. 
 
a) Involvement of many units in the DPSD in processing payments, 
b) Lack of funds due to inefficient budgeting, 
c)  Lack of coordination in reporting the financial and physical progress of 
projects between different Units in the DPSD to its Payment Unit which is in 
the same Division, 
d) Lack of monitoring on the part of the Manager of the projects in the MoE,  
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e) Lack of involvement by accountants in planning budgets and financial                 
           planning, and 
f) Financial and physical progress reports were not constantly updated. 
 
 
The levels of risks are categorised into „High‟, „Medium‟ and „Above Average‟. The 
purpose of categories is to identify which of them contributed to the failure of most 
projects of the ESSP under domestic financing which include delays in completion, 
postponement, and even abandonment of projects during the Eighth Malaysian Plan. 
Table 8.23 - Factors Contributed to Delay in Payment by DPSD of MoE 
No. Source of Risks / Cause of 
problems 
Level of 
Problem 
Professio
nal 
Supporting Total 
1 Involvement of many Units 
in the Development and 
Procurement Division in 
processing payments 
High 
Medium 
Low 
No problem at all 
21 
17 
6 
0 
33 
31 
6 
3 
54 
48 
12 
3 
 
2 Lack of funds due to 
inefficient budgeting 
 
High 
Medium 
Low 
No problem at all 
7 
15 
13 
8 
 
12 
38 
16 
7 
19 
53 
29 
15 
3 Lack of coordination in 
reporting the financial and 
physical status of projects 
between different Units in 
the DPSD with its Payment 
Unit within the same 
Division 
High 
Medium 
Low 
No problem at all 
8 
26 
10 
0 
19 
43 
10 
1 
27 
69 
20 
1 
4 Lack of monitoring on the 
part of the Manager of the 
projects in the MOE. 
High 
Medium 
Low 
No problem at all 
10 
16 
16 
1 
14 
32 
24 
2 
24 
48 
40 
3 
5 Lack of role played by 
accountants in planning 
budgets and financial 
planning 
High 
Medium 
Low 
No problem at all 
6 
16 
19 
3 
10 
40 
18 
2 
16 
56 
37 
5 
6 Financial and physical 
progress reports were not 
constantly updated  
High 
Medium 
Low 
No problem at all 
7 
26 
8 
3 
18 
34 
20 
0 
25 
60 
28 
3 
(Source: Appendix A – Survey: Research Questionnaires) 
 
  260 
High Level of Risks 
 
Based on the analysis carried out in this study, the findings revealed that 102 
respondents as shown in Table 8.24 below, identified and agreed that the factor of 
„involvement of many units in the DPSD in processing the payments‟ as contributed 
to the delays in payments to contractors and suppliers had subsequently affected the 
progress of the projects.    
 
 This finding is supported by evidences from the officers-in-charge especially the 
staff of the Payment Unit in the DPSD of MoE.  According to some of the staff who 
were interviewed, the involvement of too many units in processing the application 
for payments before the actual documents reached the Payment Unit was 
troublesome especially when the officers involved at the initial stages of approvals 
were not in the office for quite some time because of carrying out other official 
duties that required them to be out of office.  
 
Other than that, the role of accountants in the payment unit were not utilized 
effectively as by practice the accountants were the professional staff that should be 
entrusted for approving and processing final payment. In fact, the situation worsened 
when each claim for payment musthave been made through a warrant prepared by 
the payment unit to be submitted every each time to the budget unit of the DPSD.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  261 
Tabel 8.24 - „High Level of Risks‟ 
 
  
Source of risks / cause of problems 
Total 
Respondent 
1 Involvement of many units in the DPSD in processing payments. 102 
2 Lack of coordination in reporting the financial and physical status of 
projects between different units in the DPSD with its payment unit 
within the same Division. 
27 
3 Financial and physical progress reports were not constantly updated. 25 
4 Lack of monitoring on the part of the manager of the projects in the 
DPSD of MOE. 
24 
5 Lack of funds due to inefficient budgeting by the DPSD 19 
6 Lack of role played by the accountants in financial planning and 
forecasting.  
16 
(Source: Appendix A – Survey: Research Questionnaires) 
Medium Level of Risks 
 
The agreement of the respondents at a „Medium level of risks‟ did not vary too much 
as compared to the analysis done on „High level of risks‟.  The lowest number of 
respondents who agreed that the delay in payment is a source of risk is 48 while the 
highest is 69. 
  
For instance, the „lack of coordination in reporting the financial and physical status 
of projects between different units in the DPSD with its payment unit within the 
same Division‟ scored an agreement with the highest respondents.  The score 
correlated with the second and the third highest with the respondents. The second 
highest being the, „Financial and physical progress reports were not constantly 
updated‟ and the third being the „Lack of role played by the accountants in financial 
planning and forecasting‟. The correlation reflected that the findings were in 
interrelated and were in agreement.   
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Therefore, from the above, we can conclude the importance of the role that can be 
played by the accountants in the DPSD in contributing the effectiveness of funds 
management. Based on the analysis, about 69 respondents agreed with the first 
source of risks. This is followed by 60 for the second source of risks, and 56 for the 
third source of risks as the factors that had contributed to the delays in payments. 
Other than that, it can be also associated with the forth level of risks which is the 
„lack of funds due to inefficient budgeting by the DPSD‟ that about 53 respondents 
agreed that contributed to the delay in payment. 
 
The roles of the accountants in the DPSD were very minimal in the Domestic 
financing as compared to the World Bank financing. This was because the 
accountants at the payment unit for instance were not being involved in the financial 
planning and budgeting as well as in managing the financial management report 
unlike the project accountant in the World Bank financing. This evidence was 
obtained from the observation and also through the interviews with the accountants 
and officers involved in the ESSP. 
 
The above situation was also supported by the Head of Auditor (Education Sector), 
of Auditor-General Office who commented that it would be advisable that the 
accountants in the DPSD play their role effectively as in the case for World Bank 
financing. 
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Table 8.25 - „Medium Level of Risks‟ 
 
  
Source of risks / cause of problems 
Total 
Respondent 
1 Lack of coordination in reporting the financial and physical status of 
projects between different units in the DPSD with its payment unit 
within the same Division. 
69 
2 Financial and physical progress reports were not constantly updated. 60 
3 Lack of role played by the accountants in financial planning and 
forecasting. 
 
56 
4 Lack of funds due to inefficient budgeting by the DPSD 53 
5 Involvement of many units in the DPSD in processing payments. 48 
6 Lack of monitoring on the part of the manager of the projects in the 
DPSD of MOE. 
48 
(Source: Appendix A – Survey: Research Questionnaires) 
Above Average level of Risks 
 
The study also seeks to identify which of the sources of risks which were above the 
average level of risks that were related to delay in payment and subsequently became 
problems in the ESSP infrastructure developments.  The above average was obtained 
from the „Medium‟ level and above risk levels. The results were in the Table 8.26 
below. 
 
Table 8.26 - „Above Average Level of Risks‟ 
 
  
Source of risks / cause of problems 
Total 
Respondent 
1 Involvement of many units in the DPSD in processing payments. 102 
2 Lack of coordination in reporting the financial and physical status of 
projects between different units in the DPSD with its payment unit 
within the same Division. 
96 
3 Financial and physical progress reports were not constantly updated. 
 
85 
4 Lack of role played by the accountants in financial planning and 
forecasting. 
72 
5 Lack of funds due to inefficient budgeting by the DPSD 72 
6 Lack of monitoring on the part of the manager of the projects in the 
DPSD of MOE. 
72 
(Source: Appendix A – Survey: Research Questionnaires) 
From the analysis in Table 8.26 above, the „involvement of too many units in DPSD 
in processing payments had contributed the highest score of 102 respondents as 
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compared to other sources of risks. Even though the number of respondents who 
stood at only 72 for the lowest score but the number can be significant because the 
percentage can be considered high if the total overall percentage calculated is 59.50 
percent, which is slightly above the average score of fifty percent. 
 
As the first source of risks has been discussed earlier, the evidence obtained to other 
risks associated with the delays in payments, are stated below.  
 
The source of risks which is related to the „lack of fund due to inefficient budgeting‟ 
is supported by evidence obtained from the Strategic Planning Meeting (Persidangan 
Perancangan Strategik) of the Ministry of Education 2004. According to the report, 
the DPSD of MoE should complete 20,632 projects under the Eighth Malaysian 
Plan. However, due to insufficient fund allocation, about 6,264 projects had to be 
postponed.  The lack of role played by the accountants is supported by the statement 
given by the ex-Deputy Secretary-General of Finance and Development, MoE and 
also by the Auditor-General for Education as well as the accountants in the DPSD 
who were involved in both Domestic and World Bank financing projects. 
 
This situation was again supported by the evidences gathered from documents of the 
Primary Unit Office File dated 19
th
 of January, 2006 from one of the officers-in-
charge of the project. From the document, there was an overview status of the 
projects implemented under the Eighth Malaysian Plan which was managed by this 
unit has indicated in Table 8.27.below.  
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Table 8.27 - Overview Status of Implementation Project under Eighth Malaysian Plan 
(Source: Fail Meja Unit Rendah Akademik , 19 January 2006) 
 
Program Total Completed Construction Postponed 
Pre School 6103 2803 496 2804 
Primary Academic 1867 1583 14 270 
Teachers Training 
College 
20 2 0 18 
Capital Assistant Depends on Application 
Special Education 3 1 0 2 
TOTAL 7993 4389 510 3094 
   
The findings above revealed that about three thousand and ninety four (3,094) or 
38.71 percent of the overall total projects managed by Primary Unit were postponed 
and five hundred and ten (510) or 6.38 percent were under construction. While in the 
case of the Primary Schools projects, about 270 or 14.46 percent of the total 1,867 
projects were postponed.  
 
The issue of late payments in Domestic financing might be due to a lack in the 
contract condition pertaining to penalty for late payment. As in the World Bank 
Contract, it was stated that the MoE can be sued for late payment if it does not 
comply with the contract. The above issue of late payment by the MoE was also 
mentioned by the Prime Minister of Malaysia and brought up in the Parliament of 
Malaysia too.  
 
For instance, the problems of delays in payments to some projects which should have 
been completed three to four years ago had resulted in the accounts not being closed.  
This situation had also been highlighted by the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Datuk 
Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi who instructed the Ministries which had not made any 
payments due to the contractors on completion of their projects must do so 
immediately. The Prime Minister statement was stated in the Malaysia national 
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newspaper, the „Utusan Malaysia‟ dated February 17, 2005. Due to order of the 
Prime Minister, the Ministry of Education promised and guarantied that it will make 
the due payments to the contractors that failed to get their payments even though the 
projects have been completed. The guarantee was given by the Minister of 
Education, Malaysia, Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussien to the President of the 
Malaysian Malay Contractor (PKMM, Dato‟ Roslan Awang Chik). The amount was 
about RM3 million to RM 6 million out of the RM15 million allocated to address the 
need for making immediate payments.  
 
8.4 Summary and conclusion 
 
In this chapter, a survey was carried out among the officers and staff of the DPSD of 
MoE. The aim of conducting this overall survey was due to demand of the staff 
during the data collection period while at the initial stage the survey only involved 
selected staff. The response to the survey was very encouraging as it involved all the 
units within the DPSD and the various levels of staff. The involvement of the support 
staff level proved useful in understanding weaknesses in the financial management 
system. The survey that was conducted was related to the knowledge and awareness 
of risks among the staff. 
 
Other than that, the survey also covers the perceptions of the staff related to sources 
of risks based on the “PESTLE MODEL” as in the Orange Book on Risk 
Management in Public Sector by the HM Treasury of UK (2004). The “PESTLE 
MODEL” which consists of various sources of risks that are related to the internal 
and external factors can be applied in this study. The internal and external factors in 
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this study were analysed in identifying the extent of risks and the sources of risks 
that contributed to the failure in completing the projects as per schedule.  
 
The analysis of this chapter also tries to identify which of the sources of risks that are 
related to the issues of late payments to the contractors and suppliers of MoE. The 
intention of analysing this risks factor is because the issue of late payments had been 
brought up and discussed in the Parliament. 
  
These results are supported with evidences obtained from interviews and relevant 
documentations as sources for triangulation.  It was identified that most of the staff, 
both at professional and supporting level within the DPSD had agreed to both the 
internal and external environment factors as proposed in the “PESTLE MODEL” of 
the HM Treasury UK (2004) were sources of risks that were above average or more 
than fifty percent. Furthermore, it was agreed that the knowledge and awareness of 
risks related to their jobs should be highlighted by the top management to all staff 
irrespective of their positions. This would also include the perception of staff on the 
factors related to delays in payments by the MoE. 
 
Finally, it can be stated that the contribution of the sources of risks listed above 
should be taken into full consideration by the top management in the near future 
based on the evidences gathered. This is because failures in meeting the demand of 
the contractors and suppliers due for payment by the DPSD or MoE will definitely 
increase the risk of project failures which will eventually affect the service delivery 
of the projects for education purposes. Furthermore, this condition will reflect failure 
to achieve the objectives planned earlier due to bad cash management within the 
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ministry especially in the DPSD. Therefore, based on the above results, the 
researcher believed that the objective of this chapter was achieved as stated in the 
sub-objective and hypothesis of this study.  
 
The level of awareness and knowledge of risks among staff should be given serious 
consideration by the top management of the MoE as well as officers in the DPSD 
according to the role they play in determining the success of MoE‟s project 
management either in ensuring the success of projects implemented and the effective 
financial management.  This also included the opinion in the open-ended question 
that 43 of the respondents in the survey agreed that bribery or corruption is a major 
challenge in their daily duties.  
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PART 3 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Part 3 consist of the final chapter, conclusion and implications. It summarizes the 
conclusion, and implications of this thesis. It also includes the limitations faced by 
the researcher in conduction this thesis.  
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Chapter 9 
 
Conclusion and Implications 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis set out to compare the World Bank and the Government of Malaysia 
approaches in financial management systems. The effectiveness of the financial 
management systems is evaluated within the context of the Educational Sector 
Support Project (ESSP) under the Eighth Malaysian Plan.   It examines the 
effectiveness of the financial management system in managing risks related to public 
financial management and aid.  It highlighted the various aspects and process of 
implementation by analyzing the issues brought up by all those involved in the ESSP 
and set its focus on public financial management in relation of the claims of failures 
and poor management of funds. The claims became national issues as in the case of 
Malaysia and were justifiably raised in the Parliament of Malaysia as well as similar 
experiences in other countries that sparked international debates as in the Paris 
Declaration 2005.  
 
The study focused on three main areas which are financial reporting, the roles of 
project implementation unit and procurements. This chapter has two main purposes, 
firstly, it summarised the key findings and conclusions. Secondly, it examined the 
theoretical, policy and practice implications of the study. It also included the 
limitation in carrying out this research and finally, the implications for further 
research were mentioned. 
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9.2     Summary  
 
The central proposition of the thesis was to compare the effectiveness of a country‟s 
financial management system, in this case Malaysia, as compared to a donor 
financial management system that is the World Bank. For instance, in this research 
study, the issues raised were related to country‟s financial management system such 
as its weaknesses in the PFM under the ESSP in Malaysia.  The sharing of the 
Malaysian experience in managing its financial system, the lessons learnt from it and 
the steps taken to improve the system in the near future has benefited many 
participating countries in the Paris Declaration 2005.  However, the question still 
begs the answer whether the objectives set in the Paris Declaration can yet be fully 
achieved by 2010. This is in line with the worrying results of the findings of the 
Evaluation Study 2008, which indicates that the percentage of countries committed 
to strengthening the country financial management system is still considered very 
low.  
 
Even though the findings acknowledged certain weaknesses in country‟s financial 
management system but in the Paris Declaration, that emphasized of the discussions 
centers around donors‟ leniency in using the country‟s own financial management 
system rather than an insistence on using donors‟ financial management system.  
Therefore, what remains of the focus of the debates in the Paris Declaration was still 
on issues like why donors were still reluctant to use the respective countries financial 
system in comparison with their own system. Among the financial management 
systems discussed in this study, special attention was given to financial reporting 
effectiveness, project implementation and monitoring, and on procurements 
procedures.   
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In this study, the weaknesses in the country financial management system was 
discussed in Chapter 2 on Problems in PFM which had been identified in Part II of 
the analysis of the findings. The study also examines the weaknesses in the 
Government of Malaysia a financial management system under the ESSP which led 
to the conclusion that managing the financial management system must be taken 
risks management into account.  Risk management of public fund should therefore 
be identified and studied further as the effective and efficient management risks 
directly contribute to the effective and efficient management of the financial system.  
 
Therefore, in Chapter 3, the research managed to identify the risks associated with 
public financial management and aid such as fiduciary risk and development risk, 
where fiduciary risk includes fraud and corruption as the main risks.  Furthermore, 
with the guidelines for managing risks referred to as in the Risk Management Model 
of the HM Treasury UK and the Canadian Treasury of the Integrated Risk 
Management Model, other associated risks that can be linked with managing public 
fund identified which were related to this study.  
 
In Chapter 3 too, the evolution of risks in the public sector model by ALARM were 
referred to as the basis in exploring the important financial management in managing 
risks. This is supported with various studies by the World Bank (2005), Oche and 
Ballack (1999), as well as professional bodies such as CIPFA and CIMA. This 
chapter explores the effective financial management approaches that can be used in 
managing risks related to public financial management and aid effectiveness. This 
chapter leads to the development of an analytical framework discussed in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4 examined and elaborated the analytical framework of risks management. 
The study by Drebin, Chan & Ferguson (1981) on “Objective of Accounting and 
Financial Reporting for Government Units” and the joint study by Audit 
Commission of HM Treasury UK and PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005) on „World 
Class Financial Management for Public Sector” were used as the basis for analyzing 
the data in order to compare the effectiveness of the World Bank approach and 
Government of Malaysia approach in managing risks related to public expenditure 
management and aid effectiveness. Among the areas of financial management 
systems included in the analysis were on effectiveness of financial management 
reporting, project implementation and monitoring, and procurements procedures 
between the World Bank and GoM implemented in the ESSP under the Eighth 
Malaysian Plan. The findings of the analysis were discussed in Chapter 6, 7 and 8. 
The results of the analysis were based on various evidences such as interviews and 
reports. 
 
Later, through the analytical framework, in Chapter 5, a research method was 
selected and used to analyze the research findings. This includes the collection of 
data from various sources such as those collected through interviews - individual and 
focus group, questionnaires, and official documents.  This study used both the 
qualitative and quantitative techniques. The later is to triangulate the evidence 
obtained from the qualitative method. 
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9.3    Key findings and conclusions 
 
The key findings and conclusions in this section are based on the hypothesis set for 
this study. They are as follows: 
 
9.3.1.  Main Hypothesis  
 
The PMR implemented in the World Bank approach is more effective than the 
Government of Malaysia approach in managing risks related to public financial 
management and aid of the ESSP in the Eighth Malaysian Plan. 
 
The evidence presented in Part II of the thesis leads to a number of conclusions on 
the implementation of financial management system in the World Bank approach 
and the Government of Malaysia (GoM) approach as presented by the Ministry of 
Education.  The context of the study is Educational Sector Support Projects (ESSP) 
undertaken by the MoE under the Eighth Malaysian Plan.  
 
The findings in this chapter showed the weaknesses found in implementing ESSP in 
the GoM approach led to the risks of public fund mismanaged as compared to the 
World Bank approach.  
 
For instance, the result of the analysis in Chapter 6 on the effectiveness of financial 
management reports or project management reports (FMRs/PMRs) implemented by 
the Government of Malaysia were less favourable in fulfilling the standards and 
criteria set in the study by Drebin, Chan & Ferguson (1981) and the study by the 
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Audit Commission and PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2005). The non-effectiveness of 
the PMRs in the GoM approach was supported with evidence from the interviews 
with the implementers as well as from official documentation on the impact of the 
weaknesses in financial reporting.  As compared to the World Bank approach, the 
detailed reports in the PMRs as prepared by the Project Accountant of PIU, and the 
subsidiaries reports prepared by the sub-implementers were very useful in 
determining as well as fulfilling the standards and criteria of effective financial 
reporting.  This led to the findings that the World Bank approach was more 
successful in implementing the ESSP as compared to the Government of Malaysia 
approach. For example, in the World Bank approach, the PMRs played a critical role 
in assisting the implementers in determining and predicting the cash requirements for 
meeting the short and long term demands. However, problems due to shortage of 
fund occurred in the Government of Malaysia approach in the ESSP. 
 
The project financial management systems, such as the role of project 
implementation unit (PIU) and the procurement procedures were more effective 
in reducing risks in the World Bank approach as compared to the Government 
of Malaysia. 
 
Chapter 7 shows the results related to how effective the World Bank financial 
management system were compared to the Government of Malaysia approach in 
reducing risks in the ESSP. The financial management system included financial 
reporting, project implementation and monitoring, and procurement procedures 
which were highlighted and debated in the Paris Declaration 2005. The analysis also 
included other factors such as the involvement of top management and project 
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coordination committee (PCC) which played a critical role had contributed to the 
success of the Word Bank approach in managing risk as compared to the 
Government approach. The criteria of „good governance and leadership‟ as stated in 
the “World Class Financial Management for Public Sector” by the Audit 
Commission and PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005), identified and recognized the 
effective role of top management such as the Deputy Secretary-General (Finance and 
Development) of MoE, and the commitment of the Project Coordination Committee 
which included the Project Implementation Unit (PIU), and a representative from the 
Auditor-General Office contributed to the success of the World Bank approach in 
managing risks.  
 
Furthermore, the pre-conditions set by the World Bank to the Government of 
Malaysia as part of their financial management systems such as the setting up of the 
Project Implementation Unit (PIU), procurement procedures, the need for financial 
reporting which was the Project Management Reports (PMRs) had shown the 
effectiveness of the World Bank financial management system in managing risk as 
compared to the Government of Malaysia approach.  For instance, the results 
revealed the non-existent of PIU in the Government approach and the used of the 
services of on Project Management Consultants (PMCs) in managing projects under 
the ESSP had experienced major setbacks as in the completion of the projects as per 
schedule, and issues of incurring escalating additional costs. The study had shown 
the impact of risks to infrastructure and development projects when they were 
managed by those who were inexperienced in managing a major project such as the 
ESSP.  In comparison, the conditions stipulated in awarding contracts to the 
contractors and suppliers in the World Bank approach had successfully minimized 
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risks and had contributed to the success of the ESSP. This is because in the 
Government of Malaysia approach, the leniency in awarding contracts especially to 
companies with the “Bumiputra” status, as well as the approach of awarding the 
contracts based on „Direct Negotiation‟ to the contractors and project management 
consultants led to fraud and corruption as compared to the World Bank which was 
based on „Open-tender‟. Furthermore, the findings revealed that political influences 
in the Government approach and lack of experience in parallel with exposure to 
those involved with the projects resulted in many failures of the projects under the 
Government of Malaysia approach. 
 
The lack of competency in risk management among those involved in the ESSP 
had caused a failure in managing public fund effectively, efficiently and 
economically under the Domestic financing. 
 
In Chapter 8, the researcher collected and analyzed the evidences form the 
questionnaires administered to the staff in the Development and Procurement 
Division (DPSD) of MoE. The data collected from the questionnaires seeks to 
identify the different levels of awareness of risks among staff in the DPSD and to 
understand the implications of risks and to suggest ways of improving risks 
management. It also identifies and discusses the risks factors and evaluates them 
based on the “PESTLE MODEL” of the HM Treasury UK (2002).  The risks 
identified were found to have contributed to the low performance of the Government 
of Malaysia approach. As a result, it also reflected the general weakness in the 
country financial management system as compared to the World Bank approach.  
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In conclusion, the findings in this chapter also supported the study by Youker (1999). 
According to Youker, the factors that were identified as problems in all projects that 
were financed by the World Bank  were the lack of detailed, realistic, and current 
project plans (schedule, budget, procurement), unclear lines of authority and 
responsibility (organization not structured for project management), lack of adequate 
resources, poor or no analysis of major risk factors; and delays caused by 
bureaucratic administrative systems (approvals, procurement, personnel, land 
acquisition, and release of funds). 
 
9.3.2. Theoretical Perspectives 
 
The issues on the weaknesses of a country‟s financial management system had raised 
concerns among fund donors and consequently this had affected their stand on aid 
contributions.  These issues had been deliberated in the Paris Declaration 2005 and 
various strategies and recommendations were proposed to tackle and overcome them 
such as, by strengthening a country‟s financial management system. It is expected by 
the year 2010 that the objectives set and agreed upon in the Paris Declaration by 
participating countries will be achieved.  In the review of related literature, the 
results on the Performance Evaluation by PEFA in 2008 had shown that indicators 
for efforts taken to enhance and to improve the financial management system of most 
countries were still weak and at a minimal level of improvements. The Performance 
Evaluation results reflected the weaknesses that still plagued most of the country‟s 
financial management system which continues to be of concern to fund donors. 
Some of the issues raised in the Paris Declaration are whether it is relevant and 
practical to get rid of the PIUs?  Is a country‟s financial management system in 
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relations to project implementation and monitoring, financial reporting and 
procurements effective enough in reducing risks such as fraud and corruption?  
 
As stated earlier in the review of related literature, there were mixed opinions on the 
PIU. In the Paris Declaration 2005, one of the proposals made by most participating 
countries is aimed at getting rid of the PIU, but on the other hand, donors such as the 
World Bank (2006) and ADB (2005) were still not ready to do that.  This also 
included the lack of confident of PIU internally staff (ADB, 2005) which considered 
less efficient due to lack of experience and exposure as well as demoralize on low 
salaries. 
 
This research has demonstrated the effectiveness of the internal PIU staff and 
suggested the reasons why PIU is still needed irrespective of its nature. The findings 
in Chapter 7 revealed that the effective role of PIU in the World Bank approach for 
the ESSP in Malaysia had indeed become a significant factor that had contributed to 
the successful management of the projects. Consequently, the role played by the PIU 
had reduced the risks in managing public fund in comparison to the Government of 
Malaysia approach as claimed by the Deputy Secretary-General (Finance and 
Development) of MoE,  and Head of Auditor for Education from the Auditor-
General Audit Office, as well as the World Bank in its Implementation Completion 
Report (ICR). 
 
The findings of good performance by PIU internal staff (integrated PIU) contrasts 
with the finding from the study conducted by ADB (2005) which emphasized the 
ineffectiveness of PIU internal staff.  As observed in this study, the World Bank 
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approach entails the MoE appointing their own staff in the PIU.  The appointed staff 
had performed better as compared to the Government of Malaysia approach where 
problems later developed during the implementation stages of the projects awarded 
to contractors and suppliers under the ESSP. Both in the World Bank approach and 
the Government of Malaysia approach of the ESSP, the PIU consists of the Ministry 
of Education who earned their salaries based on the government salaries scales. The 
difference was that in the World Bank approach, the PIU team were senior 
professional staff with experience and expertise and were appointed based on the 
World Bank‟s criteria.  In comparison, in the Government of Malaysia approach 
junior officers who have yet to gain the necessary knowledge and experience in their 
field of work.  
 
Current literature on financial management included studies on financial reporting as 
a tool for effective and efficient financial management.  Effective financial reporting 
can assist users in decision-making, financial planning and forecasting, monitoring 
and evaluating. It is also useful as a mechanism for internal control to reduce the 
risks of mismanagement of fund and it can be used as a potential key performance 
indicator.   
 
The need for effective financial management such as financial reporting was 
highlighted in the literatures by professional bodies such as CIMA and CIPFA, 
ALARM on Risks Management in Public Sector, as well as in the joint study by the 
Audit Commission of HM Treasury UK and PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005) on 
“World Class Financial Management for Public Sector”. This also encompasses the 
study by Drebin, Chan & Ferguson (1981) on „Objectives of Financial Reporting and 
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Accounting for Government Units” that have set the standards and criteria in 
meeting the requirements of an effective financial reporting. Therefore the standards 
and criteria proposed by Derbin, Chan & Ferguson (1981) and Audit Commission of 
HM Treasury UK and PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005), forms the basis for analyzing 
the effectiveness of Project Management Reports (PMRs) implemented in the World 
Bank approach and the Government of Malaysia approach in the ESSP of the Eighth 
Malaysian Plan. The results as in Chapter 6 is a comparison between the two 
approaches and it was revealed that the World Bank approach was more effective in 
managing or reduces risks in public financial management and aid.  
 
As the role and importance of financial management reporting in managing risks 
became clearer, other approaches such as the „Financial Management Capacity 
Model‟ by the Canadian Treasury acts to strengthen the role played in improving the 
capability of countries to improve their own financial management systems. This is 
further correlated with the study by Brooke on aid management, the World Bank 
(2005) as well as the studies by Hallak and Poission (2006) and Ochse (2004) who 
agreed that the standardized financial procedures, procurements procedures, financial 
and management accounting, monitoring and auditing served as a practical basis of 
mitigating risks such as corruption in financing education.  
 
Further study in the management of public fund by the International Institute for 
Educational Planning (IIEP) had helped reducing the risks such as corruption in 
educational system. The study stressed the need for the recruitment of potential staffs 
who are experienced in the management of public fund. In fact, this proposal for 
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such recruitment was stated in the Educational Development Blueprint 2006 – 2010 
of the Ministry of Education.  
 
9.3.3. Policy and Practice Perspective 
 
The evidences collected and examined from the various sources identified indicate 
the need for improvement in managing risks related to public financial management 
and aid in the Government of Malaysia approach as compared to the World Bank 
approach. The weaknesses examined were on how the project was being 
implemented and managed both from the financial and non-financial aspects. This 
includes the project implementation team, procurement procedures in awarding 
contracts, as well as the producing of financial reports that can be useful for various 
purposes, not only as a monitoring device but also as a tool for performance 
evaluation and key performance indicator.  For instance, in the World Bank 
approach, its detailed Project Management Reports (PMRs) had increased the 
effectiveness and efficiency in decision-making for budgeting, financial planning 
and forecasting, as well as monitoring and evaluating the progress status and 
completion of projects effectively.  Through this mechanism, the risks of fraud and 
corruption were reduced and the mismanagement of public fund can be avoided.  
 
The setting up of the PIU within the Ministry of Education with experienced staff in 
managing the ESSP also includes the setting up of a management team known as 
Project Coordination Committee (PCC) members which consists of both internal and 
external members of the MoE including representatives from the Treasury, 
Economic Planning Unit of the Prime Minister Department and the Auditor-General 
Office should be a lesson learnt in the World Bank approach.  
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In addition, the effectiveness of the World Bank approach can lead to the following 
gaps and weaknesses that were related to the country financial management system 
such as: 
  
a)  Reducing the gap of non-submissions and delays in submission of annual 
financial report to be audited by most government bodies; 
 
b)  Reducing the gap of projects failures due to the mismanagement of funds that has 
been highlighted in the Parliament; 
 
c) Facilitating the role of internal auditors; 
 
d) Encouraging the officers involved in various projects or programs to closely 
monitor the progress of their respective projects or  programs in both financial and 
qualitative aspects; 
 
e) Assisting the top management of MoE to monitor the progress of the respective 
projects or program funded; 
 
f)  Increasing the confidence of both implementers and the public in public fund 
management.  
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In conclusion, the study proved that the World Bank approach in reducing risks 
related to public financial management and aid is a valuable lesson learnt by all 
parties involved.  
 
9.4 Limitations 
 
9.4.1. Limitations in Funding the Research 
 
Even though the researcher got the support from the top management of the Ministry 
of Education in carrying out this research, there were some limitations faced. Site 
visits of school projects which were categorised as unsafe, abandoned and delayed 
were restricted to only two schools because of financial constraints 
 
9.4.2. Limitations in getting full participation from potential  
           respondents 
 
In addition, the researcher was also unable to get all the respondents to give their 
cooperation in the interviews and questionnaires administered as planned earlier. 
This was because some of the officers-in-charge for a particular ESSP in the Eighth 
Malaysian Plan had been promoted and had moved to other places. Furthermore, 
even though, appointments had been made earlier to meet with them but until the end 
of the data collection period, the researcher found that it was difficult to meet them 
as they were engaged with other official matters and were frequently unavailable and 
out of the office.  
 
The limitations faced also included the problems in getting the appropriate 
cooperation of the Project Management Consultants (PMCs). Most of the PMCs 
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were reluctant to participate even though a directive issued by the officer-in-charge 
of the Development and Procurement Division (DPSD).  In fact, only one out of 
twenty-one of the PMCs responded to the queries sent by the researcher on matters 
relating to the progress reports on the projects they are managing. Hence, the report 
delays had contributed to the failure of good cash flow management in the DPSD 
itself. However, the researcher had managed to get reports such as the “Liquidated 
Ascertained Damages‟ (LAD) from the officer-in-charge of the DPSD of MoE. 
 
9.5. Implications for further research 
 
 It is suggested that future research should also take into account the different states 
within Malaysia and different ethnic groups, which may influence the outcomes for 
risk management in public expenditure and service delivery in Malaysia.  
Furthermore, future research should investigate the role of training and capacity 
building that is required in order to implement national programmes. This is because 
the findings of the study suggest that World Bank programmes are more successful 
than government run programmes because the latter do not have the required skilled 
staff.  
 
In addition, similar comparative studies of donor and country financial management 
system could be carried out in other countries, particularly to test the PMR 
effectiveness with the aim of managing risks in public expenditure in a better way 
and to enhance the service delivery. 
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APPENDIX A RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRES / INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
 
Unstructured Questions as a guideline for Interview: 
 
There were certain projects which were completed on schedule (time) and also some 
projects that were not completed on time. 
 
1. What contributed to the success of the project that was completed on 
time? 
2. Why was there failure to meet the dateline for certain similar project? 
 
There were certain potential projects which were not able to proceed as planned. 
 
3. Why did the project not able to proceed as planned (meant priority)? 
 
There were issues related to the postponement of certain projects, delaying in 
completion as well as abandonment which were supposed to be under your control. 
 
4. Were the problems related to the financial management of the Ministry of 
Education (MOE) or by the contractors or suppliers? 
5. If by the MOE, why it happens? 
 
 
In financial management of infrastructural projects –  
 
6. How was the project being management in terms of supervision, physical 
monitoring and financial data?  
7. Were there any specific guidelines or procedures? 
8. Were there any problems in getting the information on progress status for 
physical and financial from the subordinates? 
9. What action will be taken in order to get the above information ad hoc? 
10. were the current project/financial management reporting format helpful in 
identifying in details when required especially in getting financial 
information regarding a particular project such as Contract Cost, 
Current/Actual Cost, VOs, penalties and others? 
11. Were there any problems in financial planning and budgeting with the 
current practice? 
 
 
There were projects financed by World Bank and ADB but their projects were 
completed on time.  
 
12. Why similar projects under government domestic financing had 
problems? 
13. Were the failures due to any other factors? 
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Questions for contractors, suppliers and independents consultants that related 
abandoned and project delayed. 
 
1. When did the project started? 
2. At what level does the project comes to an end (failed)? 
3. Why do you think that the project failed?  
4. What was the consequence of the failure due to financial? 
 
Questions to Focus Group (Local Communities) 
 
1. What is the expectation when you heard about the project that will be 
carried out in your area? 
2. How much do you think it has cost when there is a delayed, abandonment 
or postponement of the project? 
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QUESTIONNAIRE ON RISK MANAGEMENT STUDY ON PUBLIC FUND 
MANAGEMENT AND ITS RELATION TO EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT 
PROJECT 
 
Name (Optional)…………………………………………… 
 
Designation and Grade:……………………………………………………….. 
 
Current Unit assigned……………………………………………………. …… 
 
Occupation Status:  Permanently employed / Temporarily employed  
(Cross out which is NOT relevant) 
 
Number of Years and  Months of Service on this Division:…………………. 
 
Number of Years and  Months of Service with the Government:……………. 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
THE FOLLOWING ARE QUESTIONS RELATED TO KNOWLEDGE AND 
EXPERIENCE ON RISKS INVOLVE IN MANAGING PUBLIC FUND 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Choose and circle or tick ( / ) your answers to the questions 
below. 
 
1. What is the level of your knowledge on the risks in public fund management 
when you were offered the current post in your Division or Unit?   
 
A. High B. Average C. Low D. Very low or almost non existent 
 
 
2. What is the level of your knowledge on the risks in public fund management 
as soon as you hold your current post in your Division or Unit?   
 
A. High B. Average C. Low D. Very low or almost non existent 
 
 
3. What is the level of your knowledge on risks in public fund management as a 
public officer?  
 
A. High B. Average C. Low D. Very low or almost non existent 
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4. How were you introduced to matters relating to risks management? Please 
tick your choices. You can tick more than one choice. 
 
No. Methods Tick 
( / ) 
1 Briefing upon reporting for duty 
 
 
2 In weekly or monthly meeting by superior  
3 Memos or letters to staffs 
 
 
4 Notes circulated to staffs 
 
 
5 Not informed at all 
 
 
 
5. If YES, do you think that the information on risk management should be 
conveyed to which of the following officers? Please tick your choices. You can tick 
more than one choice. 
 
No. Groups Tick 
( / ) 
1 Only to those officers of DG48 Grade and above  
2 Only to those officers of DG41 Grade and above  
3 Only to Executive Officers and Chief Clerks  
4 All staffs  
 
 
 
 
6. If no briefing or exposure where given, do you think that information on risk 
management should be given to the following officers? Please tick your choices. You 
can tick more than one choice. 
 
No. Groups Tick 
( / ) 
1 Only to those officers of DG48 Grade and above  
2 Only to those officers of DG41 Grade and above  
3 Only to Executive Officers and Chief Clerks 
 
 
4 All staffs  
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7. In your opinion, what is the best method (or methods) that is (or are) most 
appropriate to inform staffs on risk management?  Please rank your choices 
according to the following scale:  
 
1 Most effective 
2 Effective 
3 Mildly effective 
4 Not effective at all  
 
No. Methods Choice 
1 Once upon reporting for duty  
2 In monthly or weekly meetings held by 
management 
 
3 Memos or letters to staffs  
4 Notes circulated to staffs (with staffs signing a 
record book as proof that they have read the 
notes) 
 
 
8. In your opinion, what do you think are the risks associated with your current 
occupation? 
 
i. ______________________________________________________ 
 
ii. ______________________________________________________ 
 
iii. _______________________________________________________ 
 
iv. _______________________________________________________ 
 
 
9. In your opinion, what are the level of risks are associated with the project 
delays or completed without meeting quality specifications? 
 
Please rate your choice based on the following scale: 
 
1 High 
2 Medium  
3 Low 
4 No risk at all  
 
Parties Involved Source of risks Level 
Contractors Less than 2 years experience in handling infrastructure 
projects 
 
Not having enough skilled workers  
Managing too many projects within the same stipulated 
timeframe  
 
Not having adequate financial resources for revolving 
working capital 
 
 
  301 
Consultants (PMC) Managing too many projects  
Frequently late in processing approved payments to be 
forwarded to the Development and Procurement Division, 
Ministry of Education 
 
Did not closely monitor the projects undertaken  
Not submitting monthly reports according to stipulated 
datelines 
 
Local Authorities Late in giving approvals  
Inclusion of extra conditions at mid-way of  the projects  
Late in approving the Certification of Occupancy  
State and District  
Education Offices 
Were not requested to be involved in monitoring of 
projects 
 
Did not submit progress reports or late in submitting the 
progress reports of the projects to the Ministry of 
Education 
 
No staff with technical expertise were involved with 
infrastructure projects 
 
Proposed a hazardous or inappropriate site for school 
projects 
 
Ministry of Education Lack staff with technical expertise for project 
management 
 
Frequent change of staff at the officer level during tenure 
of project  
 
Lack of support staff  
Lack of exposure to work procedure  
Lack of training for staff involve in the project  
Late payment to supplier or contractor due to checks-and-
balance procedures within Divisions. 
 
Other factors Intervention of certain interested parties for building 
contracts 
 
Intervention of certain interested parties in obstructing the 
termination process of contractors at the early phase of the 
project due to the contractors‟ disability to proceed 
 
Intervention of certain interested parties in exempting 
fines due from contractors  
 
Selection of contractors not based on open tender but on 
Direct Negotiation. 
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10. In your opinion, what are the levels of problems that caused the contractors to 
delay receipt of payments from the Ministry of Education? 
 
Please rate your choice based on the following scale: 
 
5 High 
6 Medium  
7 Low 
8 No problem at all  
 
No. Cause of problems Level of problem 
1 Involvement of many Units in the Development and 
Procurement Division in processing payments 
 
2 Lack of funds due to inefficient budgeting 
 
 
3 Lack of coordination in reporting the financial and physical 
status of projects between different Units in the Development 
and Procurement Division with its Payment Unit within the 
same Division  
 
4 Lack of monitoring on the part of the Manager of the projects 
in the  Ministry of Education 
 
5 Lack of role played by accountants in planning budgets and 
financial planning 
 
6 Financial and physical progress reports were not constantly 
updated  
 
  
 
Your kind cooperation is greatly appreciated.  
 
All information are classified and meant to serve the purpose of this study only and 
never intended for public consumption.  
 
Thank you. 
 
SULAIMAN ARIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  303 
Interview Session 
(List of Interviewees) 
 
 
Dato‟ Dr. Islahuddin bin Baba. Ex-Chairman of the Project Coordination Committee 
(PCC), Educational Sector Support Projects (ESSP) World Bank 4451 MA, and also 
the Ex-Deputy Secretary General (Finance and Development), Ministry of 
Education, Malaysia, 7
th
 August, 2007. 
 
Dato‟ Fatimah binti Md. Deni. Deputy Secretary General (Finance and 
Development), Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 7
th
 June, 2007 & 10
th
 August, 2007. 
 
Dato‟ Badarudin bin Abdul Rahaman. Principal Secretary, Development and 
Procurement Division (DPSD), Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 10
th
 August, 2007. 
 
Mdm. Hjh. Zainun binti Mohd Taib. Ex-Head of Auditor (Educational Division), 
General Auditor Office, Malaysia, 8
th
 August, 2007. 
 
Mdm. Hjh. Samini binti Omar. Head of Technical Unit, Development and 
Procurement Division (DPSD), Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 11
th
 July, 2007. 
 
Ms. Sahara binti Ahmad. Assistant Director, Educational Planning and Research 
Division, Ministry of Education, Malaysia (formally Secretariat of the Project 
Coordination Committee (PCC), Educational Sector Support Projects (ESSP) World 
Bank 4451 MA), 4
th
 July, 2007. 
 
Dr. Mohd Nasir bin Abu Hassan. Director, Technical Education Division, Ministry 
of Education, Malaysia, 3th August, 2007. 
 
Mr. Zaharuddin bin Saaya. Senior Assistant Director, Technical Education 
Department, Ministry of Education, Malaysia (formally Project Architect ESSP 
World Bank), 3th August, 2007. 
 
Mr. Megat Nabil. Senior Assistant Director, Technical Education Department, 
Ministry of Education, Malaysia (formally Project Manager ESSP World Bank), 25
th
 
July, 2007. 
 
Mr. Marzuki. Senior Accountant, (Payment Unit), Development and Procurement 
Division, Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 29
th
 June, 2007. 
 
Mr. Ahmad Jawab. Accountant, Payment Unit, Development and Procurement 
Division, Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 11
th
 July, 2007. 
 
Mr. Zahar Harun. Principal Under Secretary (Ex-Primary Unit & Supporting Unit), 
Development and Procurement Division, Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 7
th
 
August, 2007. 
 
Mr. Khairul Kassim. Principal Under Secretary (Budget & Planning Unit), 
Development and Procurement Division, Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 21
st
 June, 
2007. 
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Mrs. Siti Fatimah. Assistant Under Secretary (Budget & Planning Unit), 
Development and Procurement Division, Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 1
st
 July, 
2007. 
 
Mrs. Azarah. Accountant (Budget Unit), Development and Procurement Division, 
Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 21
st
 June, 2007. 
 
Mr. Joseph Ngalambai. Executive Officer (Supporting Unit), Development and 
Procurement Division (DPSD), Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 11
th
 and 22
nd
 June 
2007. 
 
Miss Fadilah. Executive Officer (Supporting Unit), Development and Procurement 
Division (DPSD), Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 11
th
 and 22
nd
 June 2007. 
 
 
Mr. Bukri. Assistant Under Secretary (Supporting Unit), Development and 
Procurement Division (DPSD), Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 22
nd
 June 2007. 
 
Mrs. Haslinda. Executive Officer (Primary Education Unit), Development and 
Procurement Division (DPSD), Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 28
th
 May 2007. 
 
Mr. Ramzi. Senior Assistant Under Secretary (Primary Education Unit), 
Development and Procurement Division (DPSD), Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 
28
th
 May 2007. 
 
Miss Yohista. Assistant Under Secretary (Primary Education Unit), Development 
and Procurement Division (DPSD), Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 28
th
 May 2007. 
 
Mr. Mukhris. Assistant  Under Secretary (Primary Education Unit), Development 
and Procurement Division (DPSD), Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 28
th
 May 2007. 
 
Mr. Sariman. Assistant  Under Secretary (Secondary Education Unit), Development 
and Procurement Division (DPSD), Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 28
th
 May 2007. 
 
Mrs. Raimah. Executive Officer (Budget and Planning Unit), Development and 
Procurement Division (DPSD), Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 21
st
 June 2007. 
 
Mr. Amar. Assistant Administrator (Payment Unit), Development and Procurement 
Division (DPSD), 18
th
 and 29
th
 June 2007. 
 
Mrs. Badariah. Executive Officer (Payment Unit), Development and Procurement 
Division (DPSD), Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 18
th
 June 2007. 
 
Miss Rosita. Assistant Accountant (Payment Unit), Development and Procurement 
Division (DPSD), Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 29
th
 June 2007. 
 
Mr. Fadil. National Accountant Office, formally Assistant Administrator (Payment 
Unit), Development and Procurement Division (DPSD), 29
th
 June 2007. 
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Miss. Farizatul Akmar. Architect (Technical Unit), Development and Procurement 
Division (DPSD), Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 29
th
 June 2007. 
 
Mr. Hasri. Executive Officer (Secondary Education Unit), Development and 
Procurement Division (DPSD), Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 21
st
 June 2007. 
 
Mrs. Noraidah Sulaiman. Senior Clerk (Payment Unit), Development and 
Procurement Division (DPSD), Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 26
th
 July 2007. 
 
Mr. Mohd Yasin Muda. Development Officer (Johor State Education Department), 
Ministry of Education, Malaysia. 26
th
 July 2007. 
 
Mr. Badrulhisham Wahab. Development Officer (Pahang State Education 
Department), Ministry of Education, Malaysia. 24
th
 July 2007. 
 
Mr. Ahmad Borhanuddin Mohd Shariff. Development Officer (Pahang State 
Education Department), Ministry of Education, Malaysia. 24
th
 July 2007. 
 
Mr. Husin. Development Officer (Kuala Lumpur State Education Department), 
Ministry of Education, Malaysia. 24
th
 July 2007. 
 
Mr. Rozaini. Development Officer (Kedah State Education Department), Ministry of 
Education, Malaysia. 24
th
 July 2007. 
 
Mr. Ahmad Basarudin. Development Officer (Lipis, Pahang District Education 
Department), Ministry of Education, Malaysia. 24
th
 July 2007. 
 
Mr. Rahmat.  Development Officer (Johor Bahru District Education Department), 
Ministry of Education, Malaysia. 17
th
, 18
th
 and 23
rd
 July 2007. 
 
Mrs. Salmah. Quantity Surveyor (Technical Unit), Development and Procurement 
Division (DPSD), Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 29
th
 June 2007. 
  
Mr. Marwan. Contractor Marwan, 10
th
 July 2007. 
 
Mr. Osman Ali. Contractor, Mutiara Rini, Johor Bahru, 20
th
 July 2007. 
 
Miss Norazian Kamil. Senior Assistant Director, Curriculum Development Center, 
Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 4
th
 July 2007. 
 
Mr. Azizan Hitam. Senior Assistant Director, Technical Educational Division, 
Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 26
th
 July 2007. 
 
Mr. Noor Azman Mohd Johan. Senior Assistant Director, Teachers‟ Educational 
Division, Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 9
th
 August 2007. 
 
Mr. Rosman (Dino). Clerk (Primary Education Unit), Development and Procurement 
Division (DPSD), Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 2
nd
 July 2007. 
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Ms. Mahfutha. Parent, Danau Murni off Taman Danau Desa, Kuala Lumpur, 3
rd
 
August 2007. 
 
Mr. Kaya. Student, Danau Murni off Taman Danau Desa, Kuala Lumpur, 3
rd
 August 
2007. 
 
Mr. Masod. Supporting Staff, Sekolah Menengah Tasek Utara, Johor Bahru, 23
rd
 
July 2007. 
 
 
Electronic Mail: 
 
Ms. Nipa Sribuddhamas. Senior Financial Specialist for ESSP 451MA, World 
Bank,12 April 2007. 
  
Mr. Joseph Ngalambai. Executive Officer (Supporting Unit), Development and 
Procurement Division (DPSD), Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 27
th
 March 2008. 
 
Mrs. Haslinda  Bustaman. Executive Officer (Primary Education Unit), Development 
and Procurement Division (DPSD), Ministry of Education, Malaysia, 19
th
 April 
2007. 
 
 
 
Focus Group: 
 
Due to confidentiality and the request of those involved in the focus group, their 
names were not listed. Anyhow, their names can be traced from the school visitor 
registration book on the date the interviewing in the focus group. 
 
1) SK. Mutiara Rini – 6 parents and 2 Senior Teachers. Being conducted 
separately. 
 
2) SK. Tanjung Puteri Resort, Pasir Gudang – 4 parents involved and 2 
senior teachers conducted separately. 
 
 
Direct-Observation: 
 
The condition of the Schools after focus group sections being carried out and 
Sekolah Rendah Kebangsaan Dana Kota, Taman Desa, Kuala Lumpur. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  307 
APPENDIX B  
 
ORGANISATIONAL LIST OF RESPONSIBILITIES OF SECTIONS OR 
UNITS UNDER THE DEVELOPMENT AND PROCUREMENT DIVISION 
(DPSD), MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, MALAYSIA 
 
Primary (Rendah) Menengah 
 
1. Pre-School (Pra-sekolah) 
2. Academic Primary (Rendah 
Akademik) 
3. Teachers‟ Training Colleges 
(Maktab Perguruan) 
4. Capital Assistance (Bantuan 
Modal) 
5. Special Education 
(Pendidikan Khas) 
1. Academic Secondary (Menengah 
Akademik) 
2. Sports Schools (Sekolah Sukan) 
3. Integrated Residential Schools 
(Sekolah Berasrama Penuh Integrasi) 
4. Technical & Vocational Schools 
(Teknik & Vokasional) 
5. Curriculum Development Center 
(Pusat Perkembangan Kurikulum) 
6. R & D Computer System Programme 
(Program R & D Sistem Komputer) 
7. Schools Computer Systems (Sistem 
Komputeran Sekolah) 
 
 
Supporting (Sokongan) Budgeting & Planning (Perancangan & 
Perbelanjawan) 
1. Teachers‟ Quarters (Rumah 
Guru) 
2. Students Hostels (Asrama 
Harian) 
3. Educational Offices (Pejabat 
Pendidikan) 
4. Technology Education Division 
(Bahagian Teknologi Pendidikan) 
5. Dewan Bahasa & Pustaka 
6. Institut Aminuddin Baki 
7. Malaysian Examination Board 
(Lembaga Peperiksaan Malaysia) 
8. Sports Development Program 
(Program Pembangunan Sukan) 
9. Rural Area of Sabah & Sarawak 
Development Program (Sabah & 
Sarawak Program Pembangunan 
Luar Bandar Sabah & Sarawak) 
10. Matriculation  (Matrikulasi) 
11. National Interpretation Institute 
(Institut Terjemaah Negara) 
 
1. Renovation & Upgrading of Primary 
Schools (Ubahsuai Naiktaraf 
Rendah) 
2. Renovation & Upgrading of 
Secondary Schools (Ubahsuai 
Naiktaraf Menengah) 
3. Renovation & Upgrading of 
Teachers‟ Training Colleges 
(Ubahsuai Naiktaraf Maktab 
Perguruan) 
4. Renovation & Upgrading of 
Supports Education Unit (Ubahsuai 
Naiktaraf Sokongan Pendidikan) 
5. Renovation & Upgrading of 
Technical and Vocational Schools  
(Ubahsuai Naiktaraf Teknik & 
Vokasional) 
6. Expansion of KPM Net (Peluasan 
KPM Net) 
7. Involvement of  Bumiputra 
Contractors and Suppliers 
(Penglibatan kontraktor dan 
Pembekal Bumiputra) 
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